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The Marriage Revolution in Asia

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This work will build on information collected from a variety of countries of Asia and will eventually involve a number of co-authors. The tables at the back of the paper are the basic form of analysis (though material for oral presentation will be converted to graphic form) and it is anticipated that materials will be available for Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, and Sri Lanka. The analysis will focus on intercountry and intertemporal comparisons.

2006 Abstract: *Across Asia the patterns of marriage have been changing is dramatic and complex ways. While attention has been focused on the delay in the age at marriage of both women and men, changes to patterns of divorce, widowhood and singlehood have been equally important in shaping family formations across the region. This paper utilizes a standard index of marital status to compare trends over time and differences between nations. This method is particularly useful in highlighting the potential impact of changing marital behaviour on the fertility levels and trends in Asia. In particular it points to the contradictory influences that marriage, divorce and widowhood have on fertility, and how the net impact has been to reduce fertility. This analysis points to numerous implications concerning the future trends in fertility if current marriage trends continue and open the chance to speculate on impacts of changing marriage behaviour.*

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Indonesian marriage patterns in the twentieth century

Between 1900 and the outbreak of World War II Indonesian marriages generally occurred between very young girls and somewhat older boys or men. Brides of 12 or 13 were not uncommon, and it was relatively rare for a girls to reach 20 without being married, or at least betrothed. Since the early part of this century the average age of girls at marriage has been rising, but lack of surveys and censuses in the first half of the century prevent us from constructing a precise picture of when, and how fast, such increases have occurred. Sutarsih (1976) using data from the 1973 Fertility Mortality Survey captured the experience of women for the first quarter century of independence post 1945. She showed that the median age at marriage among cohorts of women aged 45-49 down to 20-24 had risen steadily from 15.9 to 16.5 in West Java, 17.1 to 18.0 in Central Java and 18.3 to 19.5 in Sulawesi. Other regions had similar increases. Surveys conducted in Indonesia, and particularly in Java, since 1976 indicate that the average age of marriage of women has continued to increase with gains of two to three years over the last two decades.

By 1990 the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for women (the only measure of average marriage age which is readily available for provincial comparisons in the absence of published registration statistics) was over 20 in all provinces and was over 23 in North Sumatra, Jakarta, South Sulawesi and East Nusatenggara, while the small student city of Yogyakarta recorded a SMAM of 24.1 (Table 1). The fact that most provinces had been just on or under an average of 20 prior to 1971 indicates a very thoroughgoing change in marriage age across the archipelago. Obviously, with a large number of provinces having attained the average age of 20 by the time of the 1971 Census, the impact of the 1973 Marriage Law, which set a legal minimum marriage age for women of 16, was largely to reinforce rather than produce the change in the SMAM. Of course, it may be that awareness of the law might have encouraged some married adolescents to overstate their ages after 1973, but this is unlikely to have been a major problem for the calculation of average ages of marriage in table 1.

Even as the average age at marriage rose the differences in experience between urban and rural areas was maintained, as seen in table 2. In part the differences reflected the impact of differential migration on the numbers of young unmarried women residing in the different regions. Young rural women were drawn to the city to work as servants or to attend schools. As a result the apparent average age at marriage appeared later because of the shift of single women out of the villages and into urban residence. This is not to say that the calculations are biased – after all the single women were indeed living in cities – but rather that the forces behind the patterns were more complicated than differences in the decisions about the timing of marriage. Whether by decision to delay marriage, or to change abode, women throughout Indonesia married up to three years later (on average) if they lived in cities than if they remained in villages. The bold numbers in each column points out the provinces where the SMAM is lower than the national figure. What is particularly striking is the prevalence of lower SMAM in the very populous provinces of Java, in both urban and rural areas, and this is particularly true of West Java where the Sundanese ethnic group is dominant.

For generations Indonesian families were created by parents negotiating marriages for their teenage children, who then were likely to live in the parental home until they had themselves become parents, and sometimes until they had produced quite a few children. Marriage was the entry point to adulthood. It also coincided with the recognition that young people were likely to follow the ways of life of their parents, be those in agriculture, retailing, laboring, or through work in government. For young people of nearly all ethnic groups and social classes the paths to work and family were fated, and their parents were the key instruments for the realization of those fates.

From the early 1900's government and social organizations pressed to change these systems. Women's groups in particular fought to increase the minimum legal age at marriage (to prevent the physical damage and maternal mortality associated with early childbearing) and to abolish polygamy. For early feminists increased schooling for women was meant to help them become more responsible in making decisions important to their own lives and to the care and welfare of their families. They took their lead in part from the arguments of colonial advocates of liberal, modern values. While the elite may not have been aware of the European socialist roots of these ideas, they were aware of the newspaper articles of their compatriots such as Kartini, who spoke out for the need to educate women as the mothers and carers of future generations. This belief in the value of knowledge was matched by a commitment to liberation of the individual from the yoke of tradition, and the recognition in particular of the need for women to be freed from the burden of arranged affectionless marriages. Such thoughts formed the foundation for actions and demands by women activists and liberal officials in the colony of Indonesia from 1910 through the achievement of independence in 1950.

As a result of these pressures the proportion of marriages arranged by couples rose steadily and the traditional delays in cohabitation have all but disappeared (Hull and Hull 1987). The majority of couples arranges their marriages on the basis of mutual attraction, or romance, and as a result tend to marry later, and have more lasting unions. At the same time that women are marrying later, the nature of the institution of marriage has also been changing. In particular, the method of arranging the marriage has shifted from a common practice for parents to seek a partner for their child, and negotiate the terms of the union with the intended spouse's parents, to a tendency for children to seek their own partners. An indication of this change is shown in Table 3 where data from surveys in central Java show that the proportion of marriages arranged by parents fell from around 90% in the pre independence period to 50% after 1960, and in some cases to less than a fifth in rural Yogyakarta. In urban areas the proportion of marriages that are totally arranged by parents is now negligible, after having been as high as a third among middle and lower class groups just a generation ago. This does not mean that young people have full freedom to choose partners. As any university student will attest, parents and aunts and uncles take a great interest in matchmaking, but it is generally recognized that young people are fully prepared to reject unwelcome candidates presented for inspection by doting family members.

Were the story to end here tables 1 and 2 would appear to tell a very straightforward story of social change: As Indonesia has undergone modernization, the method of arranging marriages has changed, with couples taking the initiative more often, and parents retreating from the practice of match fixing. Apparently in consequence, the average age at marriage has been rising. As such, the explanation is a simple matter of 'shifting locus

of decision-making'. However the social transformations in Indonesia have not been so simple.

New roles for girls and young women

Among the most powerful changes to the constellation of social institutions in Indonesia are two that have influenced people of all social classes, and most geographic regions. These are the spread of primary and lower secondary schooling, and the formalization of many working arrangements for young people. The rising educational attainments of children and the transformation of the labour force from family based to industrial forms of organizations appear both indicate how children develop greater independence in decision-making, and alter the location where they meet their future spouses.

Table 4 shows census data on participation in school and in formal sector working arrangements among girls and young women from the ages of 10-14 through to 20-24. Participation in primary and high school has shown a marked increase with a majority of 10-14 year olds enrolled in primary or junior high school, and over a third of high school aged girls being enrolled in school. Young women of an age to attend tertiary institutions have not done so in huge numbers, but the trend in enrollments has been upward, and shows no sign of abating. While they are in school young girls cannot be married or have children, both because of the competition for time that this would entail, and because of the very strict rules that schools set.

Interestingly the school trends appear to have an interesting impact on the participation of women in the formal workforce. The younger girls are dropping away from formal labor force participation, presumable to ensure that they can participate in schools. At the same time their older sisters have moved to formal employment in ever greater numbers, perhaps as a result of the preparation that high school has given them to seek employment in factories and offices. These are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive choices of activity. Women can be in school or the formal workforce, or they can be in both, but they could also devote their time to home-based activities, which would be the traditional alternative for women in many areas of Indonesia. As the figures in the table imply, the proportion of 10-14 year olds exclusively involved in household duties must be falling no matter how many schoolgirls are also engaged in formal work. The same is true of older adolescents and young women. For these groups school and jobs stand as alternatives to early marriage or full-time homemaking assistance to families. But while these women may be delaying marriage, but they are not necessarily delaying courtship.

The whole practice of courtship has altered in Indonesia, with the emergence of an elaborate set of romantic practices among adolescents. Where in the past children might meet their future spouses only on the wedding day, today urban school children develop *pacar* (romantic) relationships in Junior High School, with attendant customs of going to films, doing homework in mixed sex groups, and going out for snacks and picnics. An interesting implication of this change is that the relative timing of marriage and first intercourse has altered substantially. Previously many marriages involved delays of cohabitation for some months, or even years, after the wedding, and premarital sexual relations were virtually unknown. In recent years the pattern has been reversed, with the practice of delayed cohabitation gradually disappearing, while premarital relations are increasingly acknowledged by young couples in response to survey questions (Hull and Hull, 1984: 112-115). The new forms of sexual initiation are sometimes condemned by older people as being indicative of “Western” influences on Indonesian society. In fact

the reasons young women enter into sexual relationships before marriage are more complex than this charge would imply. At one level, the flexibility of marital arrangements across different ethnic groups means that it is often socially acceptable for young people to become sexually active before legal marriage, so long as their relationship is recognized as heading toward marriage. This state of *pertunangan* (betrothal) is widely recognized and in some ways stands as an early stage of the process of marriage. Among young people the term *berpacaran* (a loving relationship – going steady) may be acknowledged by peers as a potential time for sexual relations, but may not be so acknowledged by family members who could be concerned at the lack of formality implied by the term. Because both terms are linked in the Indonesian mind and language with marriage, they are not usually regarded as situations in which the term "premarital sex" would be relevant. Instead that Western concept is linked to what Indonesians refer to as "*seks bebas*" or "free sex" – terms that broadly describe behaviour that might appear to Westerners to be a caricature of the 1960s. Certainly there are some young people who practice such behaviour – including multiple partnering and trading of sexual services for money or gifts. It is difficult to determine whether people engaging in premarital sexual relations would regard their relationships as pre-marriage or not. It is widely assumed that the rise of romantic relationships is a function of more extended time spent by adolescents in school and formal employment and the changed locus of marriage decision-making.

Even in cases where it is said that parents arrange the marriage, the nature of that arrangement, and the potential input of the couple is very different today to what happened thirty or forty years ago. These changes are reflected in the 'advice to the lovelorn' columns of popular magazines and newspapers, where the young, and some of their parents, seek guidance in situations where they find themselves bereft of clearcut rules, or at odds with family members pushing values in conflict with the attitudes of their peer groups and role models.

What, then, is happening to the institution of "marriage" in Indonesia? Even allowing for problems of obtaining accurate estimates of individuals' ages, it is obvious that in all provinces and in both urban and rural areas the average age of marriage -- as defined in SMAM calculations in tables 1 and 2 -- is rising. But at the same time the nature of the institution of marriage in Indonesia is undergoing radical transformations. No longer do parents make the matches, and no longer do couples necessarily delay sexual relations till after the ceremony. Perhaps most importantly, the assumption in the past that marriage formed a basic productive economic unit for farming or trading, has been modified by the current requirement that basic consumption needs such as capital for a house, or consumer goods, and basic educational attainments must be achieved before a marriage can 'wisely' take place. Finally, it is now widely assumed that 'love' must be the basis of marriage. With such fundamental changes in the nature of the institution, it is questionable that the comparison of ages of 'marriage' over time has much validity without a great deal of supplementary information on evolving patterns of courting and sexual behaviour and a continuing reassessment of the changing relations between parents and their children.

The role of schooling in these transformations also needs to be reassessed. The fact that a huge range of demographic changes appears to be related to education tends to imply that knowledge is a key to change. Schooling does much more than provide knowledge, either in the narrow sense of the basic skills of reading and writing, or in the broader

sense of inculcating national, modern, western, or individualistic values. In Indonesia the early stage of schooling before 1940 served important functions in class differentiation and definition, and in the reinforcement of distinct cultural differences. Schooling was a major tool for entrenching an elite. As a larger portion of the population gained access to primary and later secondary school, it became possible to see the creation, emergence and spread of a middle class. Finally, as schooling becomes universal, there is a possibility to see the gradual development of characteristics of a mass society where common language, and some commonality of ideology challenge traditional differences in a heterogeneous society. This in itself produces further divisions between older and younger generations, related to their radically different exposure to schooling.

What is interesting though, is that where parents in the 1930's arranged marriage alliances for daughters aged 12-15, girls today begin to develop romantic relationships at about the same age but these are sparked in the schoolyard or the workplace. Both processes are intended to culminate in marriages, but of very different sorts, and, as we have seen, at very different ages.

Contradictory trends

Two additional aspects of the nature of the institution of marriage deserve mention. They are the practice of divorce and the changing incidence of widowhood during a time of falling mortality. To simplify the analysis of these phenomena, standardized indexes of the proportion of women in the marital status 'widowed' or 'divorced' at the time of the survey or census have been calculated (Table 5). Based on the well known “Princeton” or “Coale” indices used for fertility analysis, the marital status distributions are standardized using weights approximating the Hutterite fertility schedules to reflect the impact of different marital patterns on the potential natural fecundity of different populations. The indices follow the notation of I_m, used in the Princeton publications, and elaborate the components of non-marriage as: I_s (single), I_w (widowed), I_d (divorced), the three of which add up to I_u (unmarried). There are other ways to summarize the patterns of marital status, including age standardization, but the advantage of the Princeton indices is that they put heavy weight on the experience of women at the peak childbearing ages and downplay the experience of women later in life. The Hutterite weights are also useful in making interregional and international comparisons.

The figures in table 5 show that both widowhood and divorce have declined steadily and substantially in virtually all provinces. The reasons for the former change are clear; spouses are living longer, so it is less likely that women will be widowed at any point in time. There might also be some tendency for widows to remarry more quickly, but that speculation cannot be addressed with census information. However, the falling proportion divorced is more puzzling, especially in the light of the flood of articles in women's magazines and newspapers decrying the problem of divorce in Indonesian society. The fact that less than 4% of Indonesian women are in the divorced state at any given time, and that this proportion fell by a quarter in the decade of the 1980s should indicate a declining problem of divorce. The apparent gap between perceptions and data is explicable by consideration of the changing motivations for divorce. In earlier times many divorces arose very soon after marriage, and sometimes before cohabitation, because the young couple rejected their parents' choices of mates. Under such circumstances the break-up was only minimally traumatic, and involved few issues of children, property or emotional disruption. By contrast, the emergence of love matches

has meant that divorces occur later in the marriage, following the breakdown of the relationship. They are more likely to involve substantial property issues, questions over custody and access to children, and possibly the emotionally hurtful problems of infidelity. Thus, as the incidence of divorce declines, the social importance of the practice, particularly among the middle and upper class, might well be increasing.

At the same time as marital disruption is of decreasing importance in removing fecund women from the potential of socially acceptable reproduction, the rising age at marriage is creating a rapidly growing group of young women who are single during the most fecund portion of their lives. The index of the proportion single (I_s) rose in Indonesia from one-sixth to one-quarter of the potentially fecund women between 1971 and 1990. In the metropolis of Jakarta, where data are available for a longer time span, the increase has been rapid and steady, from 15 percent in 1961 to 42 percent in the 2000 census. Singlehood is emerging as one of the most important factors dampening potential fertility in urban areas, and is even having a growing importance in rural areas.

What may be of some surprise to many students of Indonesian anthropology and history is the fact that these changes in marriage patterns are taking place throughout the culturally heterogeneous archipelago, albeit starting from different bases, and progressing at different rates. Parts of Java have some of the most "traditional" patterns of marital status while Jakarta and Yogyakarta have high ages at marriage (tables 1 and 2), high and rising singlehood, and low and falling indicators of marital disruption. Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi show similar trends, though the index of women in a divorced state showed a tendency to rise through to 1980, after which it fell. Divorce in Indonesia is regulated by laws that give much power and discretion to religious boards, and these have been subject to changing norms and procedures over the period. While the data are not sufficiently reliable to be certain, it is interesting to note that in many regions the proportion of women in a state of widowhood rose between 1964 and 1971. Indonesia experienced a tumultuous period of military and paramilitary violence against alleged members of leftist parties, during which time it is estimated that upwards of one million people were murdered. The rise in the proportion of young women who were widowed is one sign of the demographic impact of this event. The pattern found in East Java is particularly notable, since that was the only major province for which data from the aborted 1961 census analysis remains. The proportion widowed fell between 1961 and 1964, and then peaked at 7.5 percent in 1971, before falling precipitously in 1980 and 1990. In contrast disruption due to divorce fell continuously and singlehood rose steadily over the three decades from 1961 to 1990.

The summary measures of marital status show a picture of the changing structure of the institution of marriage, with declines in the proportion of potentially fecund women who are married, divorced or widowed. What is emerging is the growing proportion of young women's lives that is spent in a state of singlehood. Tables 6 and 7 provide more detail on the nature of that condition. The ages of peak fertility, both in terms of biology and Indonesian government family planning policy, are from 20 to 29. In the early 1960s the vast majorities of women were married and were mothers at these ages. Available national data show that the proportion who remained single at ages 20-24 rose from less than one fifth to over one third by 1990 (and the 2000 census results will likely show a further rise). By age 25-29 marriage could justifiably be called universal in the 1960s, but by 1990 over ten percent of the age group remained single. Jakarta, the capital, and a metropolis of ten million residents, shows the emergence of singlehood most

dramatically, with the 2000 census registering almost two thirds of the 20-24 age group and one third of the 25-29 age group being single, and with one in seven women in their early thirties being single.

In table 7 calculations are presented of the dynamics of transition from a single to a married state among apparent cohorts of Jakarta women in the intercensal periods from 1971 through 2000. Women of 25-29 who were single in the earlier census were increasingly likely to marry by the time of the later census, and the same was true of the women who were 30-34 in the early census and survived to ages 40-44 in the later census. What we are seeing is the emergence of singlehood as a distinct and growing stage of life for young Indonesian women, but the persistence of a norm of marriage for the majority of these single women.

At the same time there appears to be a relatively small core of women who are opting to remain single throughout their lives. We know relatively little about these women (see Jones 2002 for an early analysis of the characteristics of the group). Some newspaper articles and anecdotal evidence identify this group as the potential 'high flyers' in Indonesian society – women trained in the professions, or active in leadership positions in business and government. Often they have devoted their lives to study and work and have developed commitments to causes. In the patriarchal institution of marriage these interests would have to be subsumed to the demands of a husband and children, so these women have made a choice against marriage. Other women would like to have a family, but on their own terms. Like their Italian, Spanish and Japanese counterparts, they despair of finding a man who would respect their professional ambitions, and share in the burdens of housekeeping and childrearing. Men of their social class all seem to be either married, or happily living in the parental home where mothers and servants take care of daily needs. One woman who was worried about the ticking of her biological clock questioned: "Why would I want to marry a child, in order to have a child?" For her, and growing numbers of well-educated women like her, the problem of the marriage market is not the lack of available males, but the shortage of men who share their values and expectations. Whether this is a transient phenomenon or the emergence of a major change in social behaviour is a question that will not be answerable for some decades. At the moment it merely suggests that the revolution in marriage patterns in Indonesia is not finished with the transfer of responsibility for selecting partners from parents to children. Instead there are complex dynamics arising from the spread of schooling and rise of industrialism producing major changes in the attitudes of young women and men, and altering the behaviours associated with sexual initiation and social role formation. Given the trajectory and acceleration of these changes, it is likely that Indonesian fertility will continue to fall to replacement level, and well below that level, and that Indonesian families in the next two decades will be transformed (Hull 2002 a). This is not because they are copying western values, but because they are following the logic of Indonesian traditions in dealing with new patterns of education and occupation.

Conclusions

The depth, breadth and importance of the changes to patterns of marriage in Indonesia seen in the last half century warrant the word 'revolution', but the nature of the changes to date indicates that there may be even more important transformations on the way. While the rising age at marriage has come about due to the shift of the locus of marriage decision making from parents to children, this can in turn be traced back to the spread of

schooling to the point that most young girls today finish elementary school, and young women are increasingly involved in the formal workforce. This shift of the focus of women's lives from the household to the school and formal workplace has changed behaviour and expectations related to courtship, sexuality and marriage partnerships in ways that make the young Indonesian woman very different from her grandmother, or even her older sisters.

The implications of these changes for the institution of the family and the process of personal and social reproduction are profound, and potentially far-reaching. If the trend to singlehood seen in urban areas continues in the next three decades, Indonesia could join the ranks of other Southeast Asian nations where up to a third of urban women never marry, and consequently do not reproduce. When married women are deciding to have fewer children, and the socially promoted norm of a two child maximum is widely accepted, this would mean total fertility rates could sink well below replacement to the levels seen in much of the developed world – with TFRs of 1.4 to 1.6 being possible among the women coming into the reproductive ages within two decades. As with the developed nations struggling to frame appropriate population policies to prevent fertility implosion, and maintain labor forces in the face of potential population declines, Indonesian bureaucrats of the next generation could well find themselves facing a totally different concept of "population problems" than that which has shaped policy since 1965. It will be ironic if the bureaucrats making decisions in 2020 are women whose education and position is a product of their choices to remain unmarried and childless sitting across the table from men who regard housework and child care as the responsibility of their wives. At that point it will be too late for regrets over Indonesia's current tenacious attempts to maintain patriarchal legal and social structures in a rapidly modernizing and industrializing society.

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Table 1. Estimates of Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) Indonesia, 1961-2000

	1961	1964	1971	1980	1990	2000
Indonesia	-	18.9*	19.3	20.0	21.6	
Sumatra	-	19.9	19.9	20.6	22.2	
D.I. Aceh	-	-	19.5	20.8	22.6	
North Sumatra	-	-	20.8	21.7	23.3	
West Sumatra	-	-	20.3	20.8	22.8	
Riau	-	-	20.0	20.7	22.0	
Jambi	-	-	18.4	19.2	20.8	
South Sumatra	-	-	20.0	20.7	21.7	23.0
Bengkulu	-	-	19.7	19.6	21.0	
Lampung	-	-	18.0	18.9	20.8	
Java	-	18.1	18.7	19.5	21.2	
DKI Jakarta	19.0	20.0	20.2	21.7	23.9	25.2
West Java	-	17.4	17.8	18.5	20.2	
Central Java	-	18.2	19.0	19.8	21.3	
DI Yogyakarta	20.6	20.7	21.8	22.5	24.1	
East Java	17.9	18.1	18.7	19.4	21.0	
Nusa Tenggara	-	-	20.8	21.6	22.4	
Bali	-	21.7	20.8	21.2	22.7	23.1
West Nusa Tenggara	-	21.0	19.2	20.3	21.0	
East Nusa Tenggara	-	-	22.4	23.1	23.8	
Kalimantan	-	18.6	20.0	20.2	21.4	
West Kalimantan	-	-	20.9	20.9	21.4	
Central Kalimantan	-	-	19.7	19.8	20.8	
South Kalimantan	-	-	19.2	19.6	21.5	
East Kalimantan	-	-	19.6	20.5	21.6	
Sulawesi	-	19.5	20.7	21.6	22.8	
North Sulawesi	-	-	21.6	21.7	22.4	
Central Sulawesi	-	-	20.6	20.7	21.3	
South Sulawesi	-	-	20.5	21.8	23.6	
Southeast Sulawesi	-	-	19.9	20.6	21.5	
Maluku	-	-	22.0	21.6	22.4	
Irian Jaya	-	-	20.9*	19.8	20.4	

Note: The tabulations for only three provinces survive from the 1961 Census results (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and East Java).

*Irian Jaya results for 1971 are for urban and selected rural areas only and is likely an overstatement of the provincial SMAM. The 1964 sample survey did not allow for provincial tabulations and excluded Maluku and Irian Jaya. The 2000 Census results are not yet available for most provinces.

Sources: calculated from census and 1964 Survey reports published by the Central Bureau of Statistics

Table 2. Estimates of Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) in Urban and Rural Areas of Indonesia, 1971 and 1990

	1971			1990		
	Rural	**Urban**	**U/R**	**Rural**	**Urban**	**U/R**
Indonesia	**18.8**	**21.1**	1.12	**20.5**	**23.5**	1.14
Sumatra	19.4	21.8	1.12	21.3	24.2	1.14
D.I. Aceh	19.3	21.4		22.3	24.2	
North Sumatra	20.1	23.2		22.4	24.6	
West Sumatra	19.7	22.4		22.0	25.2	
Riau	19.9	21.1		21.2	23.6	
Jambi	**17.9**	**19.5**		**19.9**	23.6	
South Sumatra	19.6	21.2		20.6	23.9	
Bengkulu	19.4	21.9		**20.4**	22.8	
Lampung	**17.7**	**20.4**		**20.4**	**23.3**	
Java	**18.1**	**20.8**	1.15	**19.7**	**23.2**	1.17
DKI Jakarta	-	**20.2**		-	23.9	
West Java	**17.3**	**20.6**		**18.8**	**22.4**	
Central Java	18.5	21.9		**20.4**	**23.3**	
DI Yogyakarta	21.2	24.0		22.5	25.5	
East Java	**18.2**	**20.9**		**19.9**	**23.4**	
Nusa Tenggara	20.7	22.0	1.06	22.1	23.7	1.07
Bali	20.5	22.5		22.2	23.8	
West Nusa Tenggara	19.1	**20.5**		**20.5**	**22.7**	
East Nusa Tenggara	22.3	23.1		23.6	24.9	
Kalimantan	19.9	**20.4**	1.03	20.7	**22.9**	1.11
West Kalimantan	20.7	22.1		20.7	23.6	
Central Kalimantan	19.7	**19.8**		**20.4**	**22.2**	
South Kalimantan	18.9	**19.9**		20.8	**23.0**	
East Kalimantan	19.4	**20.0**		**20.5**	**22.6**	
Sulawesi	20.4	22.2	1.09	22.2	24.6	1.11
North Sulawesi	21.2	23.1		21.9	23.7	
Central Sulawesi	20.5	21.8		20.8	**23.2**	
South Sulawesi	20.1	22.1		22.8	25.3	
Southeast Sulawesi	19.8	**20.5**		21.1	**23.3**	
Maluku	21.8	22.8	1.05	21.8	24.6	1.13
Irian Jaya*	-	**20.9**		**19.6**	**22.5**	1.15

Note: **Bold Figures:** provinces with SMAM less than or equal to the national average.
*Irian Jaya results for 1971 are for urban areas only and is likely an overstatement of the provincial SMAM.
Sources: calculated from census reports published by the Central Bureau of Statistics

Table 3 Methods of Arrangement of Marriage in Three Central Java Community Studies.

	Percentage of marriages arranged by parents			
Community	**Before 1950**	**1950-59**	**1960-69**	**After 1969**
Sriharjo	88	78	70	57
Maguwoharjo	89	70	42	20
Ngaglik	82	80	66	56

Sources: Sriharjo: Chapon, 1976, p. 19. Maguwoharjo: Hull, 1975, p. 207. Ngaglik: Study file tables from Population Institute, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 1984.

Table 4. Percentages Currently in School or Currently Working and Marriage Status Among Young Indonesian Females, 1971-1990

	1971	**1980**	**1990**	**2000**
Schooling and formal work				
Percentage currently in school among:				
10-14 year olds	57.5	77.6	82.5	
15-19 year olds	17.0	26.0	37.3	
20-24 year olds	3.0	3.9	7.2	
Percentage currently working in the formal sector among:				
10-14 year olds	10.8	9.0	8.1	
15-19 year olds	26.6	29.8	30.3	
20-24 year olds	29.1	32.7	39.3	

Source: Calculated from census reports published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Results for 2000 due out in early 2002.

Table 5 Indices of marital status in Indonesia, 1961 – 2000*.

Region	Index of proportion: *Single* I_s	*Widowed* I_w	*Divorced* I_d	**Unmarried** $\mathbf{I_u}$	Married I_m
Indonesia					
1964	.1300	.0532	.0515	**.2343**	.7657
1971	.1573	.0580	.0455	**.2607**	.7393
1980	.2052	.0258	.0459	**.2769**	.7231
1990	.2600	.0175	.0329	**.3103**	.6897
Sumatra					
1964	.1637	.0326	.0178	**.2141**	.7859
1971	.1936	.0425	.0235	**.2596**	.7404
1980	.2412	.0214	.0255	**.2881**	.7119
1990	.2911	.0165	.0216	**.3292**	.6708
Java					
1964	.0904	.0611	.0675	**.2190**	.7810
1971	.1276	.0638	.0546	**.2461**	.7539
1980	.1788	.0282	.0556	**.2626**	.7374
1990	.2376	.0171	.0382	**.2929**	.7071
Jakarta					
1961	.1505	.0564	.0779	**.2848**	.7152
1964	.1790	.0622	.0591	**.3003**	.6997
1971	.2199	.0469	.0438	**.3107**	.6893
1980	.3039	.0206	.0395	**.3640**	.6360
1990	.3904	.0132	.0272	**.4309**	.5691
2000	.4194	.0108	.0168	**.4470**	.5530
West Java					
1964	.0750	.0488	.0779	**.2017**	.7983
1971	.0954	.0567	.0584	**.2105**	.7895
1980	.1304	.0230	.0625	**.2158**	.7842
1990	.1993	.0149	.0459	**.2601**	.7399
Central Java					
1964	.0911	.0633	.0546	**.2090**	.7910
1971	.1373	.0633	.0499	**.2505**	.7495
1980	.1938	.0283	.0495	**.2716**	.7284
1990	.2362	.0172	.0320	**.2855**	.7145
D.I. Yogyakarta					
1961	.1852	.0477	.0610	**.2940**	.7060
1964	.1843	.0480	.0565	**.2888**	.7112
1971	.2523	.0411	.0372	**.3306**	.6694

1980	.3206	.0178	.0343	**.3728**	.6272
1990	.3731	.0109	.0203	**.4043**	.5957
East Java					
1961	.0783	.0721	.0861	**.2365**	.7635
1964	.0813	.0702	.0726	**.2240**	.7760
1971	.1182	.0753	.0588	**.2523**	.7477
1980	.1677	.0318	.0604	**.2599**	.7401
1990	.2220	.0211	.0401	**.2832**	.7168
Bali					
1964	.2370	.0243	.0164	**.2777**	.7223
1971	.2407	.0374	.0223	**.3003**	.6997
1980	.2724	.0171	.0205	**.3100**	.6900
1990	.3321	.0106	.0133	**.3560**	.6440
2000	.3059	.0093	.0117	**.3269**	.6731
Kalimantan					
1964	.1706	.0344	.0330	**.2380**	.7620
1971	.1932	.0488	.0340	**.2760**	.7240
1980	.2140	.0255	.0361	**.2756**	.7244
1990	.2528	.0193	.0265	**.2987**	.7013
Sulawesi					
1964	.2380	.0488	.0279	**.3147**	.6853
1971	.2449	.0591	.0332	**.3373**	.6627
1980	.2788	.0277	.0334	**.3400**	.6600
1990	.3343	.0193	.0260	**.3796**	.6204

Notes: * The tabulations for only three provinces survive for the 1961 Census results (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and East Java).
2000 Census results are only available for 3 provinces as of May 1, 2002.
Indices are proportions of reproductive aged women in each marital status, standardised according to the Hutterite schedule of age specific fertility rates.
The 'single' category means never having been in a marital union, and among certain ethnic groups in Eastern Indonesia would imply never having been in a defacto union.

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Table 6 Percentage never-married among young women in Indonesia, 1964 – 2000.

	Age Groups of Women at Enumeration					
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
Indonesia						
1964						
1971	62.6	18.5	5.0	2.2	1.4	1.2
1980	70.0	22.3	7.4	3.4	1.9	1.5
1990	81.8	35.7	11.2	4.5	2.7	2.0
2000						
Jakarta						
1961	55.8	16.6	4.6*		2.1*	
1964	66.2	17.5	8.1	3.8	1.3	3.4
1971	68.5	26.1	8.9	4.2	2.3	2.1
1980	78.9	35.7	15.2	7.0	3.4	2.5
1990	91.6	55.7	23.1	8.7	4.7	3.0
2000	94.0	63.3	31.2	14.3	7.0	3.8
Urban Areas						
1971	76.7	33.7	10.7	4.7	2.8	2.1
1980	82.2	37.3	14.5	6.5	3.5	2.5
1990	90.9	53.4	19.0	7.3	4.5	3.3
2000						
Rural Areas						
1971	58.9	14.5	3.8	1.7	1.1	1.0
1980	65.4	17.1	5.2	2.5	1.5	1.2
1990	76.5	25.3	7.3	3.1	1.9	1.6
2000						

Notes: Never married is the response given to the census question on current marital status, and is likely to be interpreted as never having entered a cohabiting union (including defacto unions among some ethnic groups).

* The surviving 1961 Census tabulations for marital status switch from five year to ten year age groups at 25-34.

Sources: Census Reports for each region.

Table 7. Cohort Proportions Remaining Single or Marrying during Successive Intercensal Periods for Jakarta.

	'Apparent' Cohorts			
	25-29 to 35-39		30-34 to 40-44	
Intercensal Period	Proportion Remaining Single	Proportion Marrying	Proportion Remaining Single	Proportion Marrying
1971-1980	.38	.62	.60	.40
1980-1990	.31	.69	.43	.57
1990-2000	.30	.70	.44	.56

Note: The term "Apparent" is used because the intercensal periods are of somewhat different durations, and the population of single women in each census is subject to the influence of in migration related to rapid urbanization.
Source: Calculated from Table 6.