DONOR FUNDING PRIORITIES FOR COMMUNICABLE DISEASE

CONTROL IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Jeremy Shiffman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Public Administration
The Maxwell School of Syracuse University
306 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090
jrshiffm@maxwell.syr.edu

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Abstract

Prior research has considered donor funding for developing world health by recipient and donor country but not by disease. Examining funding by disease is critical since diseases may be in competition with one another for priority and donors may be making allocation decisions in ways that do not correspond to developing world need. In this study I calculate donor funding for 20 historically high burden communicable diseases for the years 1996 to 2003 and examine factors that may explain variance in priority levels among diseases. I consider funding for developing world health from 42 major donors, classifying grants according to the communicable disease targeted. Data show that funding does not correspond closely with burden. Acute respiratory infections comprise more than a quarter of the burden among these diseases but receive less than three percent of direct aid. Malaria also stands out as a high burden neglected disease. The evidence indicates that neither developing world need nor industrialized world interests explain all funding patterns, and that donors may be imitating one another in ways that do not take into account problems in the developing world. There is an urgent need for a major increase in funding for communicable disease control in the developing world, and for more balanced allocation of resources already provided.

Introduction

Which developing world communicable diseases do donors prioritize with funding and which do they neglect? What explains differential treatment? Are new funding patterns emerging that diverge from past donor practices?

The adoption by United Nations member states of the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflects a new commitment to address the burden of poverty in the developing world. This consensus includes a particular concern for improving the health conditions of the poor, and may have spurred increased donor funding for health. MDG goals four, five and six concern health explicitly, and lay out specific objectives for the control of a number of diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and measles. A new commitment to the health of the poor is also reflected in the proliferation of initiatives and public-private partnerships over the past decade dedicated to addressing health problems in the developing world, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI).

Despite increasing industrialized world attention to the health of the developing world's poor in recent years, these questions of donor allocations for communicable disease control deserve consideration for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the shortfall between needed and committed resources for health remains very large, and it is by no means certain that the MDG consensus will bridge the gap any time soon. As MacKellar (2005) has noted, the final report of the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and

Health (2001) argues for a donor commitment of $27 billion per year by 2007 to address the health needs of developing countries. By 2003, at $8 billion, actual donor commitments for health were less than a third of that amount.[1] A consequence of this persistent shortfall is that health initiatives, including efforts to control particular communicable diseases, find themselves in ongoing competition for scarce resources, a dynamic noted in several studies of donor health priorities (Forsberg, 2001; MacKellar, 2005; Reich, 1995; Segall, 2003; Waddington, 2004). Researchers developed the disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) measure explicitly in recognition of resource scarcity to aid policy-makers in making difficult allocation decisions (Michaud, Murray, & Bloom 2001).

A second reason these questions deserve attention is that factors other than developing world need may influence donor behavior, including the interests of industrialized states. This dynamic has received confirmation from several decades of scholarship on aid provision generally and in particular policy sectors such as the environment (Feeny & McGillivray, 2004; Hook, 1995; Jones, Riddell, & Kotoglou, 2005; Lancaster, 1999; Lewis, 2003; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). However, it has attracted little explicit attention in analyses of aid for health. An exception is MacKellar (2005) whose work has highlighted the prominence of HIV/AIDS on the donor agenda to the neglect of nutrition and other basic health care issues, a phenomenon he notes may be a function of domestic politics in industrialized states.

Third, in the developing world communicable diseases continue to pose the greatest burden among all disease categories, and the priority donors give to many may be insufficient. The burden of other conditions, including non-communicable diseases and injuries, is increasing in the developing world, particularly among lower middle income states. However, in the poorest countries where aid is most needed and where the majority of donor funds are directed, communicable diseases continue to represent by far the greatest burden among all categories (Murray and Lopez, 1997; Global Forum for Health Research, 2004). In sub-Saharan Africa these diseases alone are responsible for more than half of all deaths (Global Forum for Health Research, 2004).

There are several other reasons analysis of communicable disease control funding allocations is critical. Such funding may constitute a significant portion of donor spending on health and reflect their overall priorities. Also, new initiatives directed toward particular diseases may be altering funding allocations in favor of these diseases and to the neglect of others, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, President Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and the Millennium Development Goals, which mention HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and measles directly. Finally, a new era of vertical disease control may be emerging that is in tension with horizontal reform initiatives intended to enhance the effectiveness of national health sectors, a subject of ongoing analysis among scholars and observers investigating the most effective means of enhancing health systems capacities in developing countries (Caines & Lush, 2004; Forsberg, 2001; Reich, 2000; Waddington, 2004; Widdus, 2003).

Several studies have considered patterns of funding for developing world health by recipient and donor country (Drager, Camen, Fouad, & Genberg, 1991; Howard, 1992). With the exception of a decade old inquiry that touched on the issue in passing (Michaud & Murray, 1994) and a more recent study that examines allocations for research alone and only for a limited number of conditions (Global Forum for Health Research, 2004), none has done so comprehensively by disease. In this paper I calculate and examine recent donor funding and initiatives for 20 historically high-burden developing world communicable diseases. I consider explanations for variance in priority, and explore whether funding patterns for the communicable disease sector as a whole have shifted in recent years. By examining only donors I do not mean to de-emphasize the critical role in health of other actors such as non-governmental development organizations and developing world governments; my aim, rather, is to narrow the focus so as to better understand this particular, highly influential group of actors.

Analysts of foreign aid have developed a number of frameworks to explain donor behavior, and these may be applied to disease control (Feeny & McGillivray, 2004; Hook, 1995; Lancaster, 1999; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). A *recipient need* framework presumes that donors respond to the seriousness of problems in a considered way, taking into account humanitarian concerns and the most pressing problems of people in developing nations. With respect to disease control, this framework would posit that factors such as a disease's burden and speed of spread should influence funding levels, as donors target those diseases that pose the greatest threat to the health of the poor in the developing world.

A *provider interest* framework presumes that the interests of constituencies in industrialized states are paramount. Donors may prioritize a disease because political elites perceive a disease to be a national threat. For instance, in 2000 the Clinton administration labeled the global spread of HIV/AIDS a national security threat, arguing that it had the potential to cause political instability in the developing world. In consequence for the first time the United States Security Council became involved in the fight against an infectious disease. Also, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the U.S. and Western European governments detected a rise in domestic tuberculosis incidence after decades of decline. It was only thereafter that the United States Congress authorized significant funding for the control of tuberculosis both domestically and overseas, and that the disease received major attention from international organizations such as the World Health Organization (Raviglione, Sudre, Rieder, Spinaci, & Kochi, 1992). A disease also may be prioritized because it offers profit potential for pharmaceutical companies in drug and vaccine sales (Webber & Kremer, 2001; Widdus, 2001), another dynamic consistent with a provider interest framework.

Recent scholarship in political science suggests yet another logic that may underpin the provision of aid. Scholars working from a constructivist international relations paradigm have argued that the interests of individual nation-states cannot be understood by considering domestically-oriented concerns alone (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Deacon, 1997). Rather, states, like individuals, exist in an international society, where they are subject to socialization processes. They may not initially know what they

want but come to hold particular preferences as a result of socialization by other state and non-state actors into commonly held norms.   For instance, a state originally may not prioritize a health cause such as polio eradication, but come to adopt the cause because domestic health officials learn at international gatherings that other countries are pursuing this goal and they are likely to be left behind. Thus, we may identify a *global policy* framework that presumes a cross-national diffusion of ideas and preferences as state and non-state actors learn from and influence one another. In line with this dynamic, the agendas of particular individuals and organizations may be crucial. For instance, if influential donors such as the World Bank or the Gates Foundation agree that a particular disease should be targeted for global control, dozens of other donors may follow. While recipient need or provider interest may shape initial donor choices, subsequent behavior may be based less on deliberation than on precedent, resulting in simultaneous global shifts in priorities not always in accordance with developing world need (Périn & Attaran, 2003).

In the sections that follow I examine evidence for these explanatory frameworks by comparing recent funding data across diseases and by considering emerging donor practices.

Methods

I calculated funding for 20 communicable diseases (table 1) from 42 donor organizations (table 2) for the years 1996 to 2003 (in deflated dollars using 2002 as a base year). I included diseases that historically have afflicted large numbers of people in the developing world, and whose burden has been calculated by the Global Burden of

Disease (GBD) project. I analyzed the years 1996 to 2003 since my primary concern was recent rather than historical priorities, and since records for these but not earlier or later years were relatively comprehensive for each of the donors considered, facilitating reliable comparisons across diseases.

(Tables 1 and 2 here)

I considered donors of four types: bilateral development agencies of industrialized states; international financial institutions; philanthropic foundations; and multinational pharmaceutical companies. I included each bilateral donor of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an institution that groups the world's industrialized powers. I also considered five international financial institutions offering concessionary loans and grants to developing countries, including the World Bank (loans from these institutions that were not concessionary – including IBRD loans – were excluded). Among the hundreds of philanthropic foundations that fund communicable disease control in the developing world, I focused on a handful that dominate funding. Many pharmaceutical companies have been involved in drug or vaccine donations: I considered a number with major roles.

Several agencies of the United Nations system also are involved in communicable disease control. I examined their records but ultimately did not include their funding since most United Nations agencies do not have budgeting or grants collection systems that enable comprehensive classification of grants by diseases targeted for all the years considered in this study. It is possible to estimate disbursements from some of the UN agencies for a

small group of diseases. However, to include certain diseases for which data are available and exclude others for which data are not would bias results. The exclusion does not likely influence results significantly as aggregate UN funding for communicable disease control is small compared to that coming from other categories of donors. The World Health Organization's own estimates of planned resources in 2000-01 for HIV/AIDS, for instance, was $55 million, only 0.40% of the total funding for AIDS control from direct grants calculated in this study. Also, UN priorities do not likely diverge so significantly from the rest of the donor community as to require a modification in conclusions.

I reviewed approximately 15,000 health-oriented grant records from the 42 donors. I identified 6,104 as direct grants targeted toward the control of a clearly-specified communicable disease or set of communicable diseases for the years 1996-2003. I excluded a number of other direct grants for communicable disease control since records did not provide sufficient information to determine the diseases targeted. For this and other reasons, the figures I calculate should not be used as global totals of funding spent on specific diseases.

I created a grants database and derived funding totals for each disease year by year. For multi-disease grants I divided funding equally across diseases. There was one exception: the Global Fund pools resources for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria control. Its records indicate that 56% of funds have gone toward AIDS programs, 31% toward

malaria and 13% toward tuberculosis. I divided funding accordingly for those grants made to the Global Fund by donors considered in this study.

For the bilateral development agencies I utilized a database of grants to developing countries compiled by the OECD (OECD, 2005). A study has noted limitations of this database (Attaran & Sachs, 2001); however it is sufficiently complete to facilitate comparative inferences across diseases. For international financial institutions, philanthropic foundations and pharmaceutical companies I consulted annual reports and grants databases of individual organizations. Also, I cross-checked philanthropic foundation records with those from an organization that independently tracks U.S. grants (Foundation Center, 2003). In addition, for all four donor categories I consulted reports from global health initiatives. Disease incidence data are from the Global Burden of Disease project (Murray & Lopez, 1996; World Health Organization, 2001). Project researchers have developed the disability-adjusted life-year (DALY), an indicator that integrates mortality and morbidity information and allows for comparison across diseases of the number of healthy life-years lost due to individual conditions.

Some diseases neglected by direct grants may be prioritized by integrated, non-disease specific indirect grants oriented toward health sector strengthening, and vice-versa. In order to examine this possibility, I considered a sample of 100 such grants, randomly selected from nine donors: the Asian Development Bank, Australia, the Gates Foundation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World Bank. My initial aim was

to parse spending by individual disease. This proved impossible, as the very nature of

these horizontal grants, predominantly for comprehensive health sector development,

meant that few (less than five percent) included separate budget line items for the control

of particular diseases. I therefore decided on an alternative means of approaching the

issue. While few grants delineated disease-specific funds, each grant included sufficient

information to determine whether the control of one or more of the 20 diseases

considered in this study was a major objective. I used this information to calculate for

each disease the percentage of grants in the sample that included their control as an

objective. I then placed the percentages in rank order by disease, and compared this

ranking with rankings of direct spending, using Spearman's correlation.

Results

Aggregate spending

Spending on communicable disease control constitutes a considerable and rising

proportion of total donor funding for health and population (figure 1), making analysis of

how this money is distributed crucial. Such funding comprised 12 percent of total

spending on health and population for 1996, rising to 37 percent of total spending on

health and population by the year 2003.

(Figure 1 here)

Recipient need

Concern for recipient need does not imply a linear relationship between disease burden and donor funding since factors such as projected change in disease incidence, health systems capacities, the costs of interventions and expenses associated with final stages of eradication should also influence funding levels. However, a recipient need framework would predict a measure of correspondence, on the presumption that donors are responding to the scale of the problem in the developing world.

Figure 2 compares burden and funding shares for direct grants for a selected group of diseases, and table 3 lists figures for all 20. Direct grant levels correspond little to burden. An indicator is that the annual donor dollars per healthy life-year lost (table 3, column 2) vary widely across diseases. Acute respiratory infections represent more than a quarter of the total developing world burden among this group of diseases – second among the 20 diseases and nearly as high as AIDS – yet receive less than two and a half percent of direct funding. AIDS is favored relative to burden, comprising just over 30 percent of the burden but receiving nearly half of all direct donor funds. Measles and onchocerciasis also present an interesting contrast: measles comprises more than 9 percent of the burden but receives only 1.5 percent of direct funding, while onchocerciasis shows the reverse pattern. Trachoma, leprosy, polio and Chagas disease also are favored relative to burden, a reflection of the fact that, like onchocerciasis, donors have targeted each disease for elimination.

(Table 3 and figure 2 here)

On the other hand, GBD data indicate that the increase in burden of AIDS in the developing world from 1990 to 2000 - nearly 57 million DALYs - far exceeded that of the other 19 diseases. The next highest increase was for lymphatic filariasis at 4.05 million. Donors therefore have prioritized a very high burden disease rapidly growing out of control, a funding pattern in accordance with recipient need.

Provider interest

A strong correspondence between industrialized world disease burden and donor funding for control of developing world diseases may indicate the influence of provider interests, as donors may be targeting diseases that industrialized world political elites believe to be threats to their own citizens or that pharmaceutical companies perceive to be sources of potential drug sales profit.

Table 4 presents an indicator of donor direct funding for three high burden developing world diseases alongside burden in the industrialized world. A correspondence exists between the two. The communicable disease with a very high industrialized world burden, HIV/AIDS, is also the one that receives by far the greatest donor attention. HIV/AIDS is unique among developing world communicable diseases in that it is the only one that is a major threat in both developing and industrialized countries, and one of the few diseases for which drug and vaccine discovery and sales offer potentially large pharmaceutical company profits. Thus provider interest offers an alternative explanation to recipient need for donor prioritization of HIV/AIDS.

Funding priority for tuberculosis compared to malaria control may also indicate provider interest (table 4). In developing countries the burden of tuberculosis is 57 percent lower than that of malaria. In industrialized states, however, tuberculosis has a burden more than 25 times greater, emerging as a threat in the 1980s when multi-drug resistant strains appeared.

(Table 4 here)

On the other hand, provider interests do not explain funding patterns for trachoma, onchocerciasis, leprosy, polio and Chagas disease, each of which, relative to burden, receives considerable donor funding (see table 3 above). These diseases do not threaten industrialized states; nor do they offer pharmaceutical companies significant profit potential.

Global policy

Parallel shifts in priority in concentrated time periods may indicate the influence of global policy diffusion. Such shifts may occur because actors are imitating one another or because particular organizations are encouraging them to adopt certain practices.

Several trends indicate the presence of such effects. In the late 1990s direct aid for communicable disease control as a percentage of total funding for health rose markedly (figure 1). Also, donors suddenly and dramatically increased funding for a number of long-neglected diseases (figure 3). Other communicable diseases also experienced

significant increases across two time periods (1996-1999 and 2000-2003): HIV/AIDS funding rising 472%, malaria funding 199% and tuberculosis funding 163%.

(Figure 3 here)

Collected grant records indicate that a proliferation of new communicable disease control alliances stood behind these increases, bringing together donors in public-private partnerships, disease control campaigns and global funds focused on specific sets of diseases (table 5). The increases were due also to Gates Foundation involvement, which in this period gave grants of $10 million or more for 18 of the 20 diseases (only leprosy and onchocerciasis were not given grants of this size).

(Table 5 here)

There were precedents to these partnerships from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, including: smallpox eradication; Chagas disease control initiatives; onchocerciasis control programs; dracunculiasis, leprosy and polio campaigns that continue to the present; and multiple public-private partnerships that appeared in the 1990s (Widdus, 2003; Reich, 2000). What is distinct about recent developments is the number of initiatives that emerged in a concentrated period of time. This proliferation cannot be traced to any new needs from developing countries: most of the targeted diseases had long been endemic in that part of the world. Nor are there any obvious new provider interests that appeared.

What seems to have occurred is a process of policy diffusion, driven by interactions among donors.

Indirect grants

Indirect grant data (figure 4) present a mixed picture on the degree to which these resources compensate for disproportionate allocation of direct grants across diseases. On the one hand, some diseases de-prioritized by direct funding are prioritized in indirect grants and vice-versa. Acute respiratory infections, highly neglected in direct funding, fare somewhat better in indirect grants as 29 percent of the sample target them for control, fifth highest among the 20 diseases. Measles and tetanus, also neglected in direct funding, rank fourth and tied for first, respectively, in indirect grants. Onchocerciasis, prioritized in direct grants with 8.17 percent of direct funding but only 0.35 percent of the burden, is de-prioritized in indirect grants, targeted by only two percent. Trachoma and Chagas disease also are prioritized in direct funding and de-prioritized in indirect grants.

On the other hand, the priority that several diseases receive among direct grants is reinforced in indirect grants. HIV/AIDS, which ranks first in total direct grant funding, ranks third in indirect grant prioritization. Poliomyelitis, which at $2454 receives more donor dollars per disability-adjusted life-year from direct grants than any other disease, a function of the present global eradication campaign nearing its final stages, is also prioritized in indirect grants, ranking sixth among the 20 diseases. In addition, several diseases relatively neglected by direct funding also are neglected in indirect grants. These include intestinal nematode infections, lymphatic filariasis, schistosomiasis, meningitis and trypanosomiasis, none of which are targeted by more than four percent of

indirect grants. Beyond this, Spearman's rank correlation for the 20 diseases for total

direct funding and the percentage of indirect grants that target a disease is 0.53 and

significant at the 0.05 level (significance level = 0.016), suggesting that indirect grants

may reinforce rather than compensate for donor direct grant imbalances.

(Figure 4 here)

Discussion

The data suggest that multiple factors shape donor behavior. Each framework captures

certain funding patterns but none is consistent with all. The focus on AIDS is consistent

with recipient needs; the prioritization of certain high over low burden industrialized

world diseases despite their lower developing world burden indicates the influence of

provider interests; and the flurry of disease control alliances indicates global policy

diffusion. However, the lack of correspondence between funding and burden for many

diseases raises questions about the degree to which consideration of recipient needs shape

donor decisions; the prioritization of diseases that pose no threat to wealthier countries

indicates the influence of forces beyond provider interests; and the global policy

framework is unable to explain variance in funding levels across diseases.

The aggregate figures calculated in this study are valuable for evaluating the predictions

of explanatory frameworks and revealing the contours of donor priorities. Additional

research will be required to clarify the influence of and relationships among specific

factors. At least five issues are worth consideration:

(1) What is the impact of the absence of a cost-effective intervention on the funding level for a disease? Does it stimulate funding because donors wish to discover means of addressing the problem, or hamper attention because donors prefer to concentrate on causes where they can have immediate impact?[2]

(2) How does the nature of the victim shape the level of priority for a disease? Do diseases receive more funding if they predominantly afflict men rather than women, children rather than adults, the middle class rather than the poor?

(3) What characteristics of diseases influence funding priorities? For instance, many of the diseases that have spurred global campaigns such as polio, leprosy and onchocerciasis result in noticeable disabilities. Is a disease more likely to attract attention if donors can see its physical manifestations?

(4) What power do individuals, organizations and global initiatives have in influencing funding allocations? Can committed policy advocates and declared global priorities such as the Millennium Development Goals substantially alter allocations, or do structural factors such as burden and industrialized world interests largely determine the donor disease agenda?

(5) To what extent are these declared global priorities leading to a meaningful increase in donor funding for particular diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis? Are other diseases receiving less funding in consequence, or is no such crowding-out effect taking place?

Another area for exploration concerns the significance of the rise in priority in the late 1990s for communicable disease control. Has a new era of verticality appeared? Donor priorities for developing world health have moved in waves (Périn & Attaran, 2003), including vertical disease control in the 1950s and 1960s, primary health care in the 1970s and health sector reform and sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in the 1980s and 1990s. Observers have commented on tensions between approaches, as concentrated campaigns may effectively address one disease but divert scarce resources away from other needs (Waitzkin, 2003; MacFarlane, Racelis, & Muli-Musiime, 2000). The creators of a number of new disease-specific initiatives are cognizant of this tension and have designed their initiatives in order to be consistent with health sector strengthening efforts. For instance, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has created country coordinating mechanisms composed of local stakeholders to ensure projects initiated are consistent with national priorities. This being said, vertical-horizontal tensions persist, even in these more carefully designed efforts (Brugha, Donoghue, Starling, Ndubani, Ssengooba, Fernandes, et al., 2004), and it remains to be seen whether these new initiatives will hinder or help health sector development, and whether they represent a new era in donor priorities or just a brief phase.

Additional research on indirect grants is also critical. A limitation of this study is that it does not include calculations on funding by disease coming from indirect grants. A proxy indicator was used: the percentage of indirect grants that target a particular disease. Far superior would be a means of parsing out actual funding among indirect grants for individual diseases. Combined with direct grant data, such information would facilitate

more robust inferences concerning which diseases donors prioritize and neglect and why they do so.

It would be inaccurate to conclude from these data that certain communicable diseases of the developing world are over-funded. Even diseases that appear to be prioritized receive amounts that are far from adequate. From 1996 to 2003 total direct grants considered in this study amounted to merely $9.23 annually for each year of healthy life lost in the developing world due to HIV/AIDS, and only $1.71 billion annually for control of all 20 diseases. By comparison, a recent study estimated that in 1999 health administrative costs in the United States amounted to $1059 per capita and at least $294.3 billion in total – nearly 175 times this funding figure for developing world communicable disease control (Woolhandler, Campbell, & Himmelstein, 2004). Also, the same study estimated savings of $209 billion annually were the United States to reduce health administrative costs to per capita levels in Canada. As the World Health Organization's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has noted (2001), there is an urgent need for a significant increase in public and private sector industrialized world funding for the control of communicable diseases in the developing world, an investment that the governments and citizens of wealthy countries can easily afford.

A major increase in spending may be a long time in coming, however, and with wealthy countries unwilling to provide adequate resources, donors will undoubtedly continue to make many funding decisions based on the disease targeted, influenced by industrialized world interests and priorities of the moment. The result will be ongoing competition

among diseases for attention. This dynamic makes continued research and monitoring of

funding patterns essential, since recipient needs may be crowded out in the process.

Acknowledgements

Table 1: Communicable diseases considered

Disease	DALYs in Developing World*
Acute Respiratory Infections	71,302,314
Chagas Disease	91,473
Dengue Fever	378,650
Hepatitis	1,749,484
HIV/AIDS	85,428,359
Intestinal Nematode Infections	2,068,962
Japanese Encephalitis	67,304
Leishmaniasis	1,732,239
Leprosy	111,229
Lymphatic Filariasis	4,896,775
Malaria	39,253,040
Measles	24,863,534
Meningitis	3,788,112
Onchocerciasis	950,541
Polio	101,803
Schistosomiasis	1,536,102
Tetanus	8,983,423
Trachoma	601,985
Trypanosomiasis	1,584,036
Tuberculosis	24,973,890

* Countries classified by World Health Organization as having very high or high child and adult mortality.
Data from World Health Report 2001.

Table 2: Donor organizations considered

Bilateral Donors	International Financial Institutions
Australia	African Development Bank
Austria	Asian Development Bank
Belgium	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Canada	Inter-American Development Bank
Denmark	World Bank
European Community (grouping of states)	**Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies**
Finland	Aventis
France	BristolMyersSquibb
Germany	Glaxo SmithKline
Greece	Merck
Ireland	Novartis
Italy	Pfizer
Japan	**Philanthropic Foundations**
Luxembourg	Burroughs Wellcome
Netherlands	Edna McDonnell Clark Foundation
New Zealand	Ford Foundation
Norway	Gates Foundation
Portugal	MacArthur Foundation
Spain	Nippon Foundation
Sweden	Rockefeller Foundation
Switzerland	Wellcome Trust
United Kingdom	
United States	

Table 3: Disease burden in the developing world versus share of donor funding, direct grants only*

Disease	Annual donor dollars per DALY, direct funding	Percent of burden among 20 diseases	Percent of direct funding among 20 diseases	Total direct funding 1996-2003 (thousands of dollars)
Polio	$2453.83	0.04	14.61	$1,998,458
Onchocerciasis	146.96	0.35	8.17	1,117,553
Leprosy	138.07	0.04	0.90	122,858
Trachoma	54.76	0.22	1.93	263,698
Chagas Disease	54.29	0.03	0.29	39,726
Japanese Encephalitis	51.78	0.02	0.20	27,879
Hepatitis	21.14	0.64	2.16	295,888
Dengue Fever	20.43	0.14	0.45	61,893
HIV/AIDS	9.23	31.13	46.13	6,308,389
Trypanosomiasis	8.00	0.58	0.74	101,349
Lymphatic Filariasis	5.11	1.78	1.46	200,142
Tuberculosis	4.68	9.10	6.84	935,448
Meningitis	4.52	1.38	1.00	137,074
Schistosomiasis	3.99	0.56	0.36	49,066
Malaria	3.93	14.30	9.03	1,235,289
Leishmaniasis	3.45	0.63	0.35	47,743
Intestinal Nematode Infections	3.40	0.75	0.41	56,204
Tetanus	1.65	3.27	0.87	118,621
Measles	1.14	9.06	1.66	227,346
Acute Respiratory Infections	0.58	25.98	2.42	330,497

*For table 3 donor funding is considered for the years 1996-2003 in deflated dollars, with 2002 as the base year. Burdens are measured in DALYs for the year 2000 for developing countries. Percentages are of the total for the twenty diseases considered, not of all developing world diseases.

Table 4: Industrialized and developing world burden for selected diseases, and funding for their control*

| Disease	Industrialized world burden (thousands of DALYs)	Annual donor dollars per disability adjusted life-year	Developing world burden (thousands of DALYs)
HIV/AIDS	822	$9.23	85,428
Tuberculosis	136	$4.68	24,974
Malaria	5	$3.93	39,253

* Burden for year 2000; annual donor dollars per disability adjusted life-year is annual average for the years 1996 to 2003, and considers direct grants only.

Table 5: Partial list of new communicable disease control initiatives and public-private partnerships since late 1990s

| Year	Disease	Purpose	Major donors
1997	Meningitis	Coordinating group for epidemic response	Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, US, UK, World Bank, Gates, Glaxo, Aventis
1998	Malaria	Roll Back Malaria alliance to halve world's malaria burden by 2010	Multiple OECD states, World Bank, Gates, Rockefeller, Wellcome Trust, Burroughs Wellcome, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP
1998	Tuberculosis	Stop TB partnership to control disease	Multiple OECD states, World Bank, Aventis, Glaxo, Gates, Rockefeller, Wellcome Trust
1998	Trachoma	International Trachoma Initiative to eliminate disease	Clark, Pfizer, Gates, WHO
1999	Hepatitis, Acute Respiratory Infections and others	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) - fund for new vaccines and infrastructure strengthening	Gates primary donor. Donations from multiple OECD states.
1999	Tetanus	Campaign to eliminate disease by 2005	Gates, Japan, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA
1999	Leprosy	Global Alliance to Eliminate Leprosy (GAEL)	WHO, Novartis, Nippon, Denmark, World Bank
2000	Lymphatic Filariasis	Alliance to eliminate disease	Glaxo, Merck, Gates, UK, Japan
2001	Measles	Campaign to halve measles deaths worldwide by 2005	US, Gates, WHO, UNICEF

| 2001 | Trypanosomiasis | Public-private partnership and funding for drug/vaccine development | Aventis, WHO, Gates, Wellcome Trust, Belgium, France |
| 2002 | HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria | Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria | Contributions from most OECD states and many other donors |

Figure 1: Funding for communicable disease control as a percentage of total donor spending on health and population*


* Calculations are aggregates of the OECD states and agencies as reported in the OECD's credit reporting system, combined with Gates Foundation figures as calculated from the Foundation's grant records.

**Figure 2: Percent of developing world burden and percent of donor funding for selected communicable diseases***

*For the period 1996-2003, direct grants only. Sources same as table 3.

Figure 3: Donor funding in direct grants across two time periods for selected diseases*

*Figures from author's calculations based on compiled donor grants database

Figure 4: Percentage of indirect grants targeting diseases*

* Data from sample of 100 indirect grants randomly selected from nine donors

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[1] This figure is the total amount of spending on health and population for 2003 as reported in the OECD's Credit Reporting System, combined with total spending by the Gates Foundation for global health.

[2] The relatively low priority for the control of trypanosomiasis, for which no cost-effective intervention exists, and high priority for the elimination of polio and onchocerciasis, for which such interventions do exist, suggests that donors prefer to devote resources toward diseases they think they can effectively control. On the other hand, cost-effective interventions exist for neglected diseases such as schistosomiasis and measles, while dengue fever, for which no such intervention exists, has received increasing funding recently precisely because of that fact. The overall relationship between the presence or absence of cost-effective interventions and donor prioritization is therefore far from clear cut.