YOUNG ADULTHOOD AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL CHANGE

by

Michael J. Rosenfeld *
Stanford University

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* Michael J. Rosenfeld, Dept. of Sociology, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, Bldg 120, Stanford, CA 94305. email: michael.rosenfeld@stanford.edu. Website: www.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe.

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Abstract:

This essay compares family change during two periods of social and historical upheaval in the U.S.: the industrial revolution and the post-1960 period. Despite the manifest social and demographic changes that the industrial revolution brought, some aspects of family life remained unchanged. Almost all new families formed in the U.S. before and during the industrial revolution were same race heterosexual marriages. In the post-1960 period, however, family diversity has become the new rule; interracial marriages and extramarital cohabitation have both risen sharply. I suggest that a key to understanding the new family diversity (and the lack of diversity in the past) is the changing nature of young adulthood.

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The industrial revolution in the United States, which took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, transformed the way Americans worked and had a profound effect on some aspects of family life. People left rural farms to migrate to the cities for factory work. Fertility and family size declined, and mortality (especially infant mortality) declined. The divorce rate rose. Families, who had previously educated their own children informally, were for the first time forced to send their children to a public school. The social and demographic upheavals of the industrial revolution were truly profound. And yet, despite all the changes that the industrial revolution brought, some aspects of American families remained surprisingly unchanged by the industrial revolution. Same race heterosexual marriage was virtually the only type of romantic union that existed in the U.S. during the industrial revolution. Non-traditional types of unions, such as interracial unions, same sex unions, and extra marital heterosexual cohabitation were almost completely invisible.

In the post-1960 U.S., interracial unions, same sex unions, and extramarital cohabitation have all increased dramatically, so that the types of romantic unions Americans form are much more varied now than in the past (Rosenfeld and Kim 2005). Assuming that the shape of human desires has not been fundamentally changed, it stands to reason that the near absence of non-traditional unions during the industrial revolution in the U.S. was the result of the orderly reproduction of the traditional family form (same race marriage) and the effective suppression of non-traditional family forms. If the industrial revolution transformed society and the family so

thoroughly, how did industrial society manage so effectively to suppress the formation of non-traditional unions?

Recent research on young adulthood in the U.S. has suggested that the process of how young people become adults has fundamentally changed in recent decades (Arnett 2004; Arnett and Taber 1994; Buchmann 1989; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999; Hogan 1981; Modell 1989; Rosenfeld and Kim 2005; Setterstein, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2005). Young adults are marrying later, getting more education, and traveling more. Single young adults in the post-1960 U.S. are much less likely to live with their parents than was the case in the past. Young adults experience the new life stage of residential independence, higher education, and delayed marriage as a period of social independence, free from the immediate constraints of family.

The changing transition to adulthood offers clues to why non-traditional unions were nearly invisible during the industrial revolution, but have flourished in the post-1960 period. Families weathered the social changes of the industrial revolution together. Most single young adults in the late 19th and early 20th centuries remained in their parents' homes until they married. When young adults lived apart from their parents in the past, they usually lived with relatives or were servants in another family's household. Coresidence with young adult children gave parents (or parental surrogates) a significant degree of supervision over their children's social lives, and made it much more difficult for young adults to form the kinds of unions (i.e. non-traditional unions) that their parents would not have approved of. In the post-1960 period, the residential and social independence of young adults has reduced parental supervision over their children's' courtship activities, which in turn has contributed to the rise of non-traditional unions.

The Idea of Family Government, and Social Control of Marriage, from the Colonies to the Late 19th Century

Young adults were less able to form non-traditional unions in the past, even during the upheavals of the industrial revolution, because young adults were subject to what colonial leaders called 'family government' (Morgan [1944] 1966). Family government was the way that colonial leaders ensured that traditional family norms, including the norm of heterosexual same race marriage, were respected and renewed with every generation. In the American colonies people were obliged to be part of a family throughout their lives. Young people either lived with their parents until they married, or they were servants in another family's home. In either case the adults were expected to supervise, educate and socialize the young. Because colonial governments were so weak, family government was practically the only kind of government there was. Colonial leaders were so afraid of the potential destabilizing force of young adults living outside of family government that in several colonies it was illegal for young adults to live on their own. Married people separated from their spouses were ordered to send for their spouses. Unmarried bachelors in the Massachusetts Bay Colony were (except for special exceptions granted by colonial leaders) forced either to marry, move in with an established family, be imprisoned, or leave the colony (Morgan [1944] 1966).

In Puritan New England as in most of the American colonies, parents had final legal authority over the disposition of their children in marriage. The legal right of parents to choose the mates of their children was sometimes overlooked, but parents and even community members were expected to exercise a veto over marital choices perceived to be inappropriate (Demos 2000; Godbeer 2002; Grossberg 1985; Morgan [1944] 1966; Rothman 1984). If the

parents were still in Europe, a marriage of young people might be delayed for months while written parental approval was obtained (Calhoun [1917] 1960 p.156).

Marriage in the colonies was subject to several different, sometimes conflicting authorities. Some of the more remote outposts of the colonies were beyond the reach of any formal authority. The Church of England only recognized marriages celebrated in the church, and the Church of England therefore viewed informal unions (unions not formalized in the church) as tantamount to extra marital fornication and adultery. On the other hand English tradition, also known as 'common law,' was interpreted by American scholars as recognizing the equivalence of informal marriages to marriages sanctified by the church (Grossberg 1985). Despite the variety of legal and ecclesiastical authorities which governed marriage rituals in the colonies, the basic rule was that mate selection was too important to be left to the young people themselves, so parents and the community always had ways of exerting their influence over the mate selection process. Historians make clear that, despite the priority of love and the absence of arranged marriage in the Western tradition, marriage is and has always been a social act whose celebration was subject to careful social control and management (Cott 2000; Grossberg 1985; Shammas 1995).

The independence of United States from England opened up western territory (specifically Native American lands) that the English had previously prevented the colonists from exploiting. The westward expansion of the U.S. gave young adults the option of marrying young and moving west, rather than waiting for their parents to provide a dowry or an inheritance. The opening of the west undermined parental control over their adult children. The independence of young adults in the early 19th century U.S. alarmed American religious leaders and amazed observers of American life such as Alexis de Tocqueville (Tocqueville [1835]

1945). The independence of young adults in the early 19th century U.S. is reported to have led to a diversification of forms of unions with high rates of cohabitation and common law marriage, though the evidence is fragmentary (Calhoun [1918] 1960; Furstenberg 1966; Godbeer 2002; Goode [1963] 1970).

According to one view of the social tumult of the early 19th century U.S., the 'spirit of republicanism' and specifically the overthrow of the authority of the unyielding paternalism of the King of England undermined the power of family government in the young United States (Grossberg 1985). Since colonial family government depended on the unquestioned patriarchal authority (one might even say the monarchical authority) of white fathers over children and servants, and husbands over wives, and since the rhetoric of the American Revolution was fervently anti-monarchical, the revolution could not help but undermine the legitimacy of parental control over their adult children.[1]

The independent spirit of the early 19th century was, however, short lived. Parents and civic leaders, fearing their own loss of communal authority over the younger generations, created state and local government institutions to step into the social void and regulate family behavior. Over the course of the 19th century religious leaders and family reformers enlisted the growing power of the state to marginalize informal marriages and enforce a system of state licensed matrimony (Grossberg 1985). Parents, social reformers and church leaders responded with a broad wave of mobilization and legislation against prostitution, homosexuality[2], birth control,

[1] The white men who made the American Revolution used a universal language of rights, but in reality they had only white male rights in mind, so some scholars have argued that the spirit of republicanism had no effect on the rights of women, minors, or blacks. Some of the northern states that had small numbers of slaves emancipated their slaves after independence, but the influence of slavery deepened in the south. In the north, indentured servitude continued unabated. See Shammas (1995 p.128-133).

[2] In Colonial times sodomy had generally been illegal (and continued to be illegal in some states until the 2003 Supreme Court decision in *Lawrence v. Texas*) but homosexuality was unknown, that is there was no language of different sexual orientations. The term 'homosexuality' was a creation of the late 19th century. (D'Emilio and Freedman 1988; Foucault [1976] 1990)

and 'indecency'. The temperance movements, the Young Women's and Young Men's Christian Associations, and other religiously oriented civic institutions worked tirelessly to enlist the lost souls of the city and to castigate and marginalize those who could not be enlisted. The American Medical Association worked with religious groups to make abortion illegal in the U.S. for the first time in the late 19th century (Smith-Rosenberg 1985). After the emancipation of the slaves in 1865, all the states of the old Confederacy (and many border states and western states) enacted laws against racial intermarriage, and these remained in effect in most of those states until 1967 when the Supreme Court's ruling in *Loving v Virginia* finally made the laws against intermarriage unconstitutional (Moran 2001; Wallenstein 2002).

In the early 1870s, a young dry goods dealer named Anthony Comstock was working with the Young Men's Christian Association of New York to fight against sexually explicit pamphlets, newspaper advertisements, and books. Frustrated by the law's apparent inability to curb what he saw as rampant indecency, Comstock went to Washington and lobbied Congress for stronger legislation. In 1873 Congress passed the Comstock Act, and Anthony Comstock was appointed as a postal inspector to enforce the new law. In the next four decades and with the support of the YMCA and leading New York industrialists like J. Pierpont Morgan, Comstock led a religious crusade against newspapers, publishers, gambling houses, night clubs, artists (including the New York Art Students League for advertising a nude painting), avant-garde theater, prostitutes, advocates of birth control, feminists, and free thinkers of all types. After receiving information about the publication of supposedly indecent materials, Comstock typically would order the materials under a false name. Upon receipt of the materials, Comstock used his authority as a postal inspector to declare the materials indecent, and then he would escort the local police to the source of the publication to arrest the publishers and destroy the

stock of offending materials. Often Anthony Comstock was the only prosecuting witness in the indecency cases, but judges sympathetic to Comstock and the stiff penalties specified by the Comstock Act meant that many of the accused were convicted and spent years in jail and saw their careers and livelihoods ruined. Comstock bragged that no less than 15 of his accused subjects committed suicide rather than face the humiliation and financial ruin of trial and conviction (Bates 1995).

The industrial revolution in the U.S. took place during a period of Victorian social retrenchment. Family government, which had been upset during the first few decades after the American Revolution, was firmly restored by the late 19th century.

Industrialization and the Family:

The Amoskeag textile mill (which in the late 19th century was the largest textile mill in the world) selectively recruited entire families to move together to Manchester, New Hampshire (Hareven 1982). Family recruitment had several benefits for the company. First, by recruiting whole families the company ensured their future work force because in each family the children were socialized to work at the mill by their elders. Sometimes the children worked as assistants to their parents and were apprenticed to them directly. More often, the children learned indirectly from their elders about the different specialized kinds of textile work (and how to avoid their inherent dangers) and about which particular factory foremen were the best to work for. Since industrial work was a fundamentally different kind of work from the subsistence farming most families had known before, the familial socialization to factory work was crucial to the successful recruitment of new workers. Secondly, since Amoskeag had built not only the world's

largest textile mills but also an entire city to house mill workers, the company had an interest in community stability which they furthered through family recruitment and the maintenance of family government.

The Amoskeag company especially recruited French Canadian families to the mills in part because French Canadian families had higher fertility and therefore brought more children (i.e. more future mill workers) to Manchester when they migrated. Hareven notes that there were also 'mill girls', single women who worked at the mill and who lived in company dormitories. The company subjected these women to the kinds of social constraints that the times demanded--no alcohol was permitted and all women had to be in their rooms alone by 10 P.M. The company was very explicit in its recruitment advertisements that the company treated workers in the paternalistic way that families treated their own children. Rather than undermining the family, Hareven's analysis of Manchester's textile industry shows how industrialism relied on and reinforced family mores and family government.

City life certainly presented new challenges to late 19th century families. Industrialism changed the rhythms and obligations of the word day quite dramatically. Factory work and wage labor changed the economic organization of families (Smelser 1959; Thompson 1963; Tilly and Scott 1987). In pre-industrial times all members of the family, including servants, had worked together. Industrialism separated work from the home (Tilly and Scott 1987). In early industrialism children often worked in the factories as assistants to their parents (Hareven 1982; Smelser 1959). In the later stages of industrialism, when factories were larger and as children were prevented from working by child labor laws, work kept family members apart (Smelser 1959). Because industrial work kept family members apart during working hours, and because the first available data on industrialism was work-place data rather than household survey data,

scholars like Neil Smelser tended to overstate the impact of industrialism on the internal structure of families. In contrast to work-place data which suggested something like the disintegration of the family, household survey data such as the U.S. census (or such as Hareven's retrospective interviews with families of factory workers) tend to show that the internal social structure of the family remained surprisingly stable through the industrial revolution.

Scholarly Perspectives on Family Change in the Industrial Revolution

The social sciences as we know them were created in Europe and in America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by scholars who saw the effects of the industrial revolution all around them. Little wonder, then, that even well into the 20th century, scholars saw the industrial revolution as the period that divided historical time into before and after. Marx and Engel's sweeping analysis of history made the rise of industrialism and the bourgeois class the crucial fulcrum of historical change. About the profound effect of the bourgeois revolution on the family, Marx and Engels wrote ([1848] 1978 p.487),

> "On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among proletarians, and in public prostitution. The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital."

Frédéric Le Play was a politically conservative 19th century Frenchman who would have disagreed with Marx and Engels about nearly everything, with one exception. Like Marx and Engels, Le Play thought the industrial revolution (which, as a mining engineer, he was fully part of) was radically undermining the traditional family. In Le Play's view, the nuclear family

system (which he assumed was relatively new) was jeopardizing social stability. Le Play referred to the nuclear family as the 'unstable family' because nuclear families sustain themselves in place for only one generation, after which the children move away and the family, in a traditional sense, disappears (Le Play 1982). Le Play did not understand how cultural traditions and values could be transmitted from elders to the younger generation in the absence of long term coresidence, and without parental control over their children's inheritance. In his travels across Europe studying mining communities, Le Play found several examples of what he called the 'stem family.' Stem families were a cross between the nuclear family, and the patriarchal multigenerational farming family that Le Play assumed had dominated premodern Eastern Europe. In the stem family, one of the parents' sons (presumably the hardest working and most morally fit) remained with the parents after his marriage, and inherited the family farm or trade while the other siblings were cast out to find their fortunes where they could. Le Play never claimed that the stem family was predominant throughout Europe, or even in the communities he studied, but rather Le Play argued that the stem family was a socially beneficial way of maintaining the orderly reproduction of societal values from one generation to the next and ought therefore to be encouraged.

Arthur Calhoun, the first true social historian of family life in the U.S., published a three volume social history of the American family in 1917-1919 (Calhoun [1917] 1960; Calhoun [1919] 1960; Calhoun [1918] 1960). Calhoun's work is now long out of print and his influence is largely forgotten, but his work provides an insight into how scholars at the end of the industrial revolution in the U.S. viewed the effect of industrialization and modernization on the family. Calhoun's work reflected the common wisdom that the pre-industrial family lived three or more generations together, that pre-industrial women married in their early teenage years, and that

most pre-industrial people lived their entire lives in the communities of their birth.[3] For many decades, these hypotheses about the pre-industrial family were the accepted wisdom for scholars and the public alike. Like many scholars and cultural observers of his day, Calhoun thought that the industrial revolution had completely remade the family. Calhoun was so impressed by the changes of industrialism and urbanization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (and, perhaps, carried away by enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution of 1917) that he predicted (in the final chapter of his three volume treatise) that marriage, capitalism, and prostitution were all soon to be extinct in the U.S.

Calhoun's visionary predictions have not come to pass. Calhoun's history of the American family was written without the benefit of demographic or household data. The advent of historical household data, either from government censuses or created by researchers from parish registers or other archives, overturned some of the classic assumptions about family and history. Before scholars had historical demographic data at their disposal, they generally assumed that family life in premodern Europe was similar to family patterns which they observed directly in the less industrialized parts of their contemporary world. In other words, they inferred historical changes from geographic and cultural variety, a fallacy that Arland Thornton (2005) describes as 'reading history sideways'.

Peter Laslett's 1965 book *The World We Have Lost,* with reconstructed family data from parish records, showed that in Europe the age at first marriage had been in the 20s, as back as far as the 16th century (Laslett [1965] 1971). Hajnal (1965) and Laslett both argued that the premodern European family had always been a nuclear family and that premodern European extended families (Le Play's stem family) hardly ever lived together under one roof (Laslett and

[3] (Calhoun [1917] 1960; Elder 1981; Goldthorpe 1987; Marx and Engels 1978; Smelser 1959) For additional arguments from the modernist school, that is the school that argued that the industrial revolution was the fundamental fulcrum of change in family history, see (Ariès 1962; Shorter 1975).

Wall [1972] 1977). In addition, Laslett found that preindustrial populations in England migrated surprisingly often (Laslett 1977).[4] By showing that the industrial revolution had less effect on family structure in Europe than had previously been assumed, Laslett's research deflated prior assumptions about the way industrialization had affected the structure of the family. Around the same time as Laslett and Hajnal were publishing their influential work on the pre-industrial family, several American sociologists also become skeptical of the supposed influence of the industrial revolution on the family (Furstenberg 1966; Goode [1963] 1970).

Whereas sociologists from the 19th and early 20th century such as Calhoun and Le Play had generally assumed that the industrial revolution changed family life in nearly every way, after the influential work of Laslett and Hajnal in the 1960s, the pendulum swung in the other direction and scholars began to doubt the importance of the industrial revolution's effect on the family. In Hajnal's (1965) view, the family system of Western and Northern Europe had always been a small nuclear family system with late marriage, and this nuclear family system predisposed Europe to develop capitalism before the rest of the world.

Scholarship on the history of the family can be divided between those who emphasize the continuity of the Western family system over time (such as Laslett and Hajnal), versus those who emphasize the changes in family over time (such as Ariès, Calhoun, and Le Play). Each side in the debate between historical change and historical continuity have produced their scholarly and rhetorical excesses. While Laslett's use of parish records and pre-industrial censuses revolutionized the study of the pre-industrial family, the quality of the data did not always match Laslett's sweeping claims. In many cases the parish registers and premodern censuses did not specify the age of members of the household, or household members' relationships to each other;

[4] The finding of population turnover in pre-industrial towns is from Laslett's study of the parish records for the English towns of Clayworth and Cogenhoe.

Laslett and his group had to make assumptions about family structure and interrelationships, the very point upon which their empirical claims rested. Lutz Berkner (1975) was especially critical of the data's ability to support Laslett's claim that the premodern European family was exclusively a nuclear family. Furthermore, if life expectancy in preindustrial times was less than 50 years, and was highly variable, and if age at marriage was in the early 20s, then many preindustrial people would have died before or soon after the birth of their grand children (Levy 1965 first introduced this argument).[5] High mortality would have limited the time any individual spent in a three-generation household, and therefore could have limited the number of three-generational households in any household census. Wachter, Hammel and Laslett (1978) used computer simulations to argue that mortality, or demographic constraints more generally, could not explain the absence of three generation families in preindustrial censuses. Ruggles (1987) used a different computer simulation program, along with different assumptions to come to the opposite conclusion- that demographic constraints were indeed the reason that preindustrial censuses found so few three generation families in England (see also Anderson 1980; Ruggles 1994).

Laslett's data for different parishes in England showed that household size in England had been roughly constant at about 4.75 persons per household from the 16th century through the English industrial revolution to the early 20th century (Laslett and Wall [1972] 1977). In contrast, American data presented by Philip Greven in the same volume, showed that household size in the U.S. had been declining steadily from preindustrial times to the present (Greven 1977). Because the data that Laslett's Cambridge Group relied upon was necessarily fragmented, i.e. different kinds of data from different parishes and different sources at different times, the

[5] The real issue is not life expectancy at birth, which in the past was strongly influenced by infant mortality, but rather life expectancy for persons who were old enough to have had children of their own.

question of the geographic and temporal generalizablity of their conclusions has always been problematic (Anderson 1980).

Philippe Ariès' (1962) *Centuries of Childhood* viewed the preindustrial family the way scholars had usually done before the advent in the 1960s of demographic analyses of the past. Ariès examined the customs and mores and art of the past and found that the preindustrial family had been, in fact, fundamentally different from the modern family. Specifically, Ariès argued that childhood did not exist in the preindustrial family. Certainly, Ariès was correct in pointing out that young people in preindustrial times generally did not attend formal schools, and instead were put to work as soon as they were physically able. Ariès placed a substantial weight of his argument, however, on the depiction of young people in painted portraits. The paintings of premodern Europe nearly always show children with the facial expressions, physical proportions, and dress of small adults. Ariès argued that the depiction of children as young adults in painting meant that the adults actually saw children as no different from themselves, except for size. Childhood as a separate stage of life, in other words, did not exist. Although *Centuries of Childhood* has been enormously influential, scholars have questioned Ariès' interpretation of the paintings. One alternative interpretation is that portrait painting was painstaking work, which the children would not have been expected to sit through, so in their absence the children may have been painted to look more like the adults who did actually sit still for hours while the artists did their work (Pollock 1983 p.44-48).

Because the U.S. industrialized relatively recently, nationally representative and historically consistent census data are available from the industrial revolution to the present. Nationally representative census data are clearly an advantage not only over old paintings, but also over the fragmentary local data from different sources that Laslett had to work with. The

U.S. census data make clear that the industrial revolution was a time of enormous change, but also, in some ways a time of stasis in family life. The mixed record of family change and stasis during the industrial revolution undercuts somewhat the all-or-nothing tendency in the literature on family history. Comparing the demography of the family during the industrial revolution to the remarkable record of family change in the post-1960 also provides some clues to the sources of the more recent and dramatic changes in family life.

The Data:

In order to quantify the changes in family structure over time, I rely on U.S. census microdata from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, or IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2004) as well as published census and vital records reports on such things as life expectancy and divorces. Table 1 presents summary statistics for a variety of household characteristics that changed during the industrial revolution in the U.S.

[Table 1 here]

The United States industrialized a century after England, and even then the process of industrialization in the U.S. was far from uniform. New York and Philadelphia were great industrial centers by the mid 19th century while the western territories and the southern states did not see heavy industry until decades later (Furstenberg 1966). The Civil War was a stimulus for industrialization in both the North and the South. The North had to use and increase its industrial might to win the war, while in the South the result of the war shattered the main obstacles to

industrialization- the planter aristocracy and the slave system. Keeping in mind that industrialization is a long process which began at different times in different regions of the country, it is possible nonetheless to draw a general picture of industrialization in the U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The industrial economy of the 19th century was organized around the population centers of the cities because the cities had access to shipping lanes and the cities had the necessary population density to supply wage laborers to the factories. The story of industrialization is therefore a story of the rise of the cities and the concomitant decline of subsistence farming. In the mid 19th century, the U.S. was still mainly a pre-industrial agricultural country. Table 1 shows that in 1850, only 7.9% of Americans lived in cities while 58% of American families were farming families, meaning they had at least one full-time farmer in the family. From 1850 to 1920, the cities swelled with immigration from abroad and from rural America. Over the course of one hundred and fifty years from 1850 to 2000, the percentage of American families involved in farming dropped from 57.6% to 1.2%.

Along with the decline of farming and migration to the cities, fertility declined and average household size shrunk from 5.54 in 1850 to 4.32 in 1910, and the decline in mean household size has continued through the 20th century. Life expectancy improved steadily after 1900, mostly due to a sharp decline in infant mortality. The increasing life span of adults has changed the balance of time that adults spend being married, being the parents of minor children, and being widows or widowers (Watkins, Menken and Bongaarts 1987).

School enrollment grew sharply in the early 20th century, with the spread of mandatory public primary schooling (Katz 1987; Kett 1977). According to Table 1, school enrollment for persons age 5-19 appears to have declined from 57.8% in 1860 to 47.5% in 1870, but this is an

artifact of the changing racial composition of the U.S. In 1860 the black population of the U.S. was mostly still enslaved, and therefore not surveyed in the census. By 1870 the slaves had been emancipated and were therefore surveyed in the census, but white society especially in the South did not furnish blacks with schools, so the black school attendance rate in 1870 was less than 10%. School attendance for blacks rose sharply after 1880, and reached 35% by 1900, but black school attendance did not approach white levels until 1980. Both black and white school attendance rose in the years after 1900.

Given the decline of farming, the growth of the cities, the rise of divorce (divorce rates climbed from 1.2 divorces per thousand married couples per year, to 8.0 divorces per thousand married couples in 1920), public school's encroachment into the education of the young, increasing life spans, and the decline of fertility it is easy to see why scholars assumed that the industrial revolution and its attendant demographic effects must have completely reshaped the American family.

Both progressives such as Arthur Calhoun and conservative social critics such as Anthony Comstock believed that the traditional family was near extinction at the beginning of the 20th century (Bates 1995; Calhoun [1919] 1960). Herbert Spencer (1880 p.737) wondered, "Is there any limit to this disintegration of the family?"[6] While the industrial revolution had a dramatic effect on some aspects of family life in the U.S., other aspects of family life were unaffected by industrialization. Age at first marriage remained constant. Most unmarried young adults continued to live with their parents. Heterosexual extramarital cohabitation remained rare. Interracial marriages were few.

[6] Spencer was an Englishman, but his concern about the disintegration of the traditional family was most acute for the U.S., where he thought the scourge of individuality had reached its apex.

[Table 2 here]

Table 2 presents family characteristics that were relatively static during the industrial revolution, but have changed relatively rapidly in the post 1960 period.

Median age at first marriage for U.S. born women was about 22 years of age from 1880 to 1940, reflecting little change during the last part of the industrial revolution, before dropping to 20 during the great baby boom of the 1950s (Cherlin 1992; DaVanzo and Rahman 1993; Thornton and Freedman 1983).[7] From 1960 to 2000 the age at first marriage for women climbed sharply, by more than one year per decade, to 25.2 years in 2000.

American women (more so than American men) are now marrying later than ever before. Fragmentary local records suggest that women in the American colonies and in pre-industrial England may have had a median age of first marriage of roughly 22 years (Greven 1970; Laslett [1965] 1971).[8] Since World War II the age at first marriage for women in the U.S. has undergone a rapid decline during the baby boom, and then a rapid increase in the post-1960 period. The changes in the age at first marriage for women in the last 50 years are especially impressive given the historical record of the stability of age at first marriage throughout the industrial revolution.

[7] The irreversibility of the transition to first marriage allows for inferences about the age of first marriage from census data with reasonable precision. The literature of historical demography starts with a different kind of data (marriage records from churches or from town halls) and arrives at a different measure of age at marriage, the average age of marriage for those who do marry. The average age of marriage tends to be higher than the median age at first marriage because the reconstructed historical demographic data is usually unable to discern first marriages from second or third marriages which occur later in life. Additionally, the census data calculations of the median age at first marriage take into account the population who never marries, a population which is missing from the town hall registry of marriage licenses granted. For examples of age at marriage from reconstructed parish records, see Greven (1970) and Laslett ([1965] 1971; 1977).

[8] In Greven's case the median age of marriage (all marriages, not just first marriages) is not provided but can be estimated from the tables (p. 121, Table 11 and text below), if one also knows how many individuals remained unmarried.

In colonial times when unmarried children lived with their parents, late marriages were a sign of the dependence of children on their parents (according to Philip Greven 1970). Couples could not marry without financial assets in the American colonies even if both sets of parents endorsed the match. The main asset of value was land, and the problem in colonial towns like Amherst, Massachusetts was that parents were already farming all of the available land. In order for young couples to gain title to the land their parents had to give it to them and that meant the parents had to give up control over their own livelihoods, which many parents were unwilling or unable to do so.

In the post-1960 society, late age at first marriage is a result of increased independence. Because single young adults no longer live with their parents, late age at first marriage prolongs the independent life stage. In modern times young men and women with some education and even modest labor market skills can support themselves and do not need to marry in order to survive. Late marriages in the post-1960 period mean exactly the opposite of what they used to mean, because the fundamental relationship between the generations has changed.

Between 1880 and 1940, the tail end of the industrial revolution in the U.S., the percentage of single young adults who lived with their parents increased somewhat, from 68.4% to 71.1% for women, and from 59% to 74.9% for young men. This increase was due in part to the increasing life span of older Americans (Ruggles 1987). In the early part of the 20th century, as life expectancy increased, more and more unmarried young adults lived with their parents because there were more parents available to live with, living with parents was the normative behavior, and because there were few other practical options.

Around the middle of the 20th century, the long established norm of intergenerational coresidence began to change. After 1950, even as parents were living longer and longer (so that

more and more adult children had living parents), the percentage of children living with their parents began to decline. Between 1950 and 2000, the percentage of single young women who lived with their parents dropped from 65% to 35%. The modern residential independence of singe young adults represents a reversal of the old system of family government which was based on surveillance and coresidence.[9]

Like all census analyses, the data in Table 2 represent a series of snapshots in time. In 1970 about 50% of single U.S. born women age 20-29 lived with their parents, and an equal percentage lived separately from their parents. For individuals, separation from parents is a reversible process. In fact, individual young adults may return to the parental home several times before moving out on their own for good. One can not deduce individual life course paths from census records of reversible events (Modell, Furstenberg and Hershberg 1978). One does not know, for instance, how many years any individual spent living on their own before marriage. The census data do, however, provide insight into the typical family structure at the time of census.

Although 68.4% of unmarried young U.S. born women lived with their parents in 1880, the real percentage who were subject to some kind of family government was much higher. Most of the remaining 31.6% of single women were either living with other relatives, or were servants, lodgers, or boarders in another family's household. Of the 31.6% of young single women who did not live with their parents, fewer than one in ten (or 2.4% of all unmarried young women) were heads of their own households. Lodging and boarding families were surrogate families (Modell and Hareven 1973). Adult supervision over servants was usually expected to be at least

[9] It is also interesting to note that whereas young men had more residential autonomy from their parents in the beginning of the 20th century, by the end of the 20th century young women were less likely than young men to live with their parents. The independent life stage has been especially empowering to women, who were especially constrained by the previously dominant patriarchal family forms.

as strict and as vigilant as adult supervision over their own children. While some scholars have compared servitude to independence (Reher 1998), because of the residential independence from parents, the preindustrial roots of servitude were based on occupational apprenticeship and on strict family government, albeit by the surrogate family. In the American colonies, even some well-to-do families bound their children out as servants, in order to give them occupational training, in order to gain income from their children (the servant's wages were usually paid directly to the servant's parents), and also in order to avoid the temptation of spoiling the children. Presumably, heads of households were less inclined to spoil the servants than to spoil their own children (Calhoun [1917] 1960; Kett 1977; Morgan [1944] 1966).

Household arrangements such as servitude, boarding, and lodging were prevalent in the past but went into steep decline towards the end of the industrial revolution (Modell and Hareven 1973). Because family government over young adults was maintained in so many different ways in the past, the declining percentage of single young adults who lived with their parents does not convey the full measure of the decline in family government over time.

The prevalence of heads of household who are neither married nor living with their parents is a better measure of independence from family government, because this was the living arrangement that colonial leaders worked hardest to suppress. Among unmarried young adults in 1880, only 2.4% of women and 4.5% of young men headed their own households and did not live with their parents. The percentage of unmarried young adults who headed their own households declined between 1880 and 1920. The percentage of unmarried young adults who headed their own households began to rise after 1950, growing rapidly until 1980, when 30.4% of young unmarried women and 26.8% of young unmarried men were heads of their own households. If young people living in dormitories and group quarters (who generally cannot be

the head of their household) are excluded from the sample, the growth in residential independence for young adults in the post 1960 period would be even greater.

The last row of Table 2 starts with the population of young male heads of households, and displays the percentage who were neither married nor living with their parents, that is the percentage who were unattached. The percentage of young male heads of household who were unattached did not change much from 1880 (5.7%) to 1960 (4.7%), whereupon the rate of unattached male heads of household began a steady increase, reaching 35.1% in 2000. The same analysis cannot be repeated for women because 19th and early 20th century census enumerators nearly always listed a man as the head of each household if a man was present. As a result women were only listed as the head of household in the census if they were unattached.

American society in the past was careful to ensure that young adults were nearly always subject to family government of some sort. The data on intergenerational coresidence, on unmarried young adults heading their own households, and on unattached young men support Tamara Hareven's (1982) argument that the industrial revolution of the late 19th century did not break families apart. Families moved together from rural areas to the cities, and therefore family government was maintained, and transgressive unions continued to be prevented. When unmarried young adults lived apart from their parents in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they were nearly always subject to the family government of a surrogate family. The contrast with the post-1960 period is striking. Living on their own, single men and women in the late 20th century U.S. have had the freedom to meet, form romantic unions, and experiment beyond the watchful eyes of parents or parental surrogates, in ways that would have been mostly unknown in 1900.[10]

[10] Some modern young adults who live on their own are financially dependent on their parents (Schoeni and Ross 2005). Even if the parents pay the bills for higher education (as most do) and even if the college students live with

Non-Traditional Family Outcomes:

The mate selection system has quantifiable outcomes, which can be measured with some consistency from census to census. Especially noteworthy is the prevalence of mate selection outcomes that were repressed or disfavored in the past. In this section I focus on interracial marriage and heterosexual cohabitation because those are two forms of unions or living arrangements which can be measured with some consistency with the U.S. census back to the 19th century. For the purposes of examining historically comparable outcomes, I ignore types of non-traditional unions which were not captured in the U.S. census during the 19th century, such as Hispanic- non Hispanic unions and same sex cohabiting unions.[11]

[Table 3 here]

One measure of the greater flexibility in mate formation in the post-1960 era is the rise of heterosexual cohabitation. Extramarital heterosexual cohabitation or coresidence represents the ability of couples to form romantic unions without the need to solemnize the union in church and without the formal approval of the state. In colonial north America, both parental approval and community approval were necessary before a young couple could be married (Calhoun [1917]

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their parents (as some still do) while going to college, college nevertheless paves the way for financial and social independence after graduation. College education gives young adults labor market skills, and the labor market skills enable them to work outside of the family business or trade.

[11] Hispanicity was introduced into the census in 1970 (Bean and Tienda 1987; Ruggles et al. 2004). Same sex cohabitation was first coded distinctly from same sex roommates in 1990. Since most roommates are same sex roommates rather than romantic partners, the Census Bureau's pre-1990 policy of combining partners with roommates made the same sex cohabiting partners invisible. Research on Hispanic-non Hispanic unions as well as on same sex unions suggests that these types of non-traditional couples are rapidly increasing in numbers (D'Emilio 1993; Rosenfeld 2002), consistent with the trends I describe for interracial married couples and heterosexual cohabiting couples.

1960; Godbeer 2002; Morgan [1944] 1966). In the 19th century religious leaders and social reformers in the U.S. led a long and ultimately successful battle to nullify common law marriages (that is marriages without formal state approval) and force all couples to come to the county courthouse for an official marriage license (Grossberg 1985). Couples who persisted in living together without a formal marriage license risked bastardizing and disinheriting their children. Colonial society precluded marriage without parental and community approval, and 19th century U.S. society insisted on formal state sanction of all marriages for a simple reason: mate selection was too important to be left to the whims of the young people themselves.

Colonial and 19th century American society exerted control through law, custom, and social pressure to prevent young people from forming unions that were deemed inappropriate. Since marriage was tightly controlled, divorce was nearly impossible, and premarital sex was criminal (though hardly unknown), the process of mate selection was tightly constrained. Heterosexual extramarital cohabitation is an unfettered informal kind of union whose prevalence in the post-1960 period is an example of the new freedom young adults have to make their own mate selection choices.

Prior to 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau did not distinguish between unmarried partners and roommates (Ruggles et al. 2004). 'Partner' and 'Roommate' carry different meanings, of course. The vast majority of roommates in the period under study here have been same sex roommates. Opposite sex roommates or boarders were frowned upon in the past because of the appearance of impropriety. Extramarital heterosexual cohabitation raised the possibility of sexual access, which in turn would have challenged the exclusive place of heterosexual marriage. Same sex roommates did not raise a specter of impropriety in the 19th century in part because 19th and early 20th century Americans were naive about homosexuality (D'Emilio and Freedman 1988;

Faderman 1991; Faderman [1981] 1998). To make a historically consistent comparison of heterosexual coresidence and cohabitation over time using census data, it is necessary to include both 'partners' and 'roommates', which is not so problematic since U.S. society in the past was suspicious enough about the distinction to make either category rather rare.[12] In order to qualify as a cohabiting couple in Table 3, the male householder and his female roommate or partner must have been unrelated by blood, both unmarried, both living apart from their parents, and of similar ages (both 20 to 39 years of age). The male householders were all U.S. born (so as to exclude international immigrants separated from their partners), and all living in private homes or apartments rather than in group quarters. I include the following relationships among the cohabiters: friends, partners, roommates, boarders and lodgers, but I exclude domestic employees such as servants or nannies.

Between 1880 and 1960, the fraction of U.S. born male heads of household age 20-39 who were cohabiting with young women; remained steady at 0.1%, or one per thousand. In the post-1960 era, however, a new pattern emerged. The percentage of young men cohabiting with women outside of marriage rose steadily, reaching 7.9% in 2000.

The bottom of Table 3 shows that interracial unions have increased (as a percentage of married whites) at the same time as the independent life stage has given young adults greater freedom. The trends for black-white intermarriage show no significant increases during the industrial revolution of the late 19th century. In 1880 fewer than one in a thousand married white men and fewer than one in a thousand married white women had black spouses. By 1920, the intermarriage rate had fallen (from 0.5 to 0.3 for white men, from 0.6 to 0.4 for white women). Black-white intermarriages were equally absent during the industrial revolution in states that

[12] In the 1970s, the U.S. Census Bureau introduced a new and unwieldy phrase for this theoretically unwieldy mixture of partners and roommates, 'People of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters,' or POSSLQ.

made racial intermarriage illegal (Wallenstein 2002 p.160), and in states that had no legal bar to racial intermarriage. The real barrier to racial intermarriage, in other words, was social rather than legal.

After 1960, the rate of intermarriage between whites and blacks began to rise, especially for white women. By 2000, 5.4 out of every 1,000 married white women were married to black men. The rate of intermarriage between whites and blacks remains low, though the youngest and most recently married couples have much higher rates of intermarriage. The rate of black-white intermarriage in 2000, while still low, is much higher than it was in the past.

Reliable data on Asian-white intermarriage do not extend back into the 19th century because before 1900 the number of Asians in the U.S. was too small to have an effect on the marriage patterns of whites. Between 1910 and 1950, far fewer than 1 in 1,000 whites were married to Asians, and these numbers did not rise substantially until after 1950. Between 1950 and 2000 the number of whites (especially white men) who were married to Asians rose sharply, reaching 9.2 per thousand married white men in the 2000 census. As with black-white intermarriage, these all-ages data are subject to societal inertia; most married people in the census are older people who were married at least a decade before the census. It is the younger generations who intermarry at higher rates, and their intermarriage rates are substantially higher than the societal mean. The gender gap in interracial marriage (in 2000, 9.2 white men per thousand were married to Asian women but only 3.4 per thousand white women were married to Asian men) is an interesting subject in its own right. The prevalence of white men in Asian-white intermarriages owes something to the two generations of men who served in the military in Asia, while the gender gap in black-white intermarriage is less well understood (Jacobs and Labov 2002).

The black and white populations of the U.S. have been roughly proportionate in size since 1880, but the Asian population in the U.S. has grown dramatically since 1960. In order to determine whether the rise in Asian-white marriage over time is a result of the greater freedom of young adults to choose mates rather than the simple result of the growing Asian population, Figure 1 uses odds ratios to control for the sizes of each racial group (Rosenfeld 2002; Rosenfeld and Kim 2005).

[Figure 1 here]

Figure 1 shows the odds ratios of racial intermarriage on a logarithmic scale. Odds ratios for black-white intermarriage rose sharply between 1970 and 2000, while Asian-white intermarriage rose sharply from 1940 to 1980, and then leveled off.[13] The confidence intervals for the intermarriage odds ratios are much wider prior to 1950 because the counts of racial intermarriage in the census were much lower prior to 1950, so uncertainty about the odds ratio was greater. All of the odds ratios in Figure 1 are significantly less than 1, because racial segregation, social pressure against intermarriage, and legal barriers all have kept the number of racial intermarriages far below the number which would result from random mixing (Massey and Denton 1993; Moran 2001; Wallenstein 2002). The lower odds ratio of black-white intermarriage reflects the fact that the black-white racial division remains the sharpest social

[13] In figure 1 the odds ratios of intermarriage and confidence intervals are calculated individually for each census year and each racial intermarriage pairing. Black-white intermarriage, for instance, is the cross product of the 2×2 cross tabulation of husband's race and wife's race, excluding racial groups other than white and black. Figure 6 includes married couples of all ages and all national origins. Limiting the data to younger married couples or U.S. born couples only results in a similar pattern. Even with all ages and all national origins included, there were not enough Asian-white intermarriages in the census prior to 1920 to allow for a meaningful calculation of the odds ratio. Odds ratios are based on household weighted census data, whereas confidence intervals are based on unweighted counts (Agresti 1990; Clogg and Eliason 1987).

division in American life (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Massey and Denton 1993; White 1987). Although racial intermarriage was suppressed in some states by law, the pattern in all states (including states like New York, not shown, which had substantial minority populations and which never had laws against racial intermarriage) were similar.

Figure 1 suggests that the industrial revolution in the U.S. did not have a strong effect upon black-white intermarriage. Between 1880 and 1920 the odds ratio of black- white intermarriage fluctuated between 10^{-5} and 10^{-6}, meaning the odds of being married to a black person were as much as a million times higher for blacks than for whites. The number of intermarriages in this period were so few, and the confidence intervals were so correspondingly wide that it is difficult to say with certainty what the intermarriage trend in this period was. In the post-1960 period, on the other hand, interracial marriage has increased sharply and significantly.

Discussion:

The fact that interracial marriages and extramarital cohabitation have increased in the U.S. just as young adults have attained more independence from their parents and more freedom from family government does not prove that the independence of young adult is the cause of the diversification of types of romantic unions in the U.S. Complex social systems resist simple causal theories. Evidence in the scholarly literature has been mounting that the transition to adulthood in the U.S. has fundamentally changed in the past 40 years (Arnett 2004; Modell 1989; Setterstein, Furstenberg and Rumbaut 2005), so it seems reasonable to inquire into how the new transition to adulthood may effect the kinds of families young adults in the U.S. form

(Rosenfeld and Kim 2005). The post-1960 period has seen many changes, from the civil rights movement to the women's movement, to liberalization in laws about sexuality and birth control, to the striking down (in 1967) of laws which prohibited interracial marriage in some states (Koppelman 2002; McAdam 1982; Moran 2001; Wallenstein 2002) which can all be counted alternately as causes or effects of the broader social and demographic changes. Some scholars see an ideational shift towards more individuality driving the recent demographic changes in family structure (Lesthaeghe 1983; Shorter 1975).

Although Le Play (1982) assumed in the 19th century that nuclear families would be too individualistic to be able to transmit cultural norms from generation to generation, Hajnal (1965) and Laslett ([1965] 1971) claimed that the Western European family had almost always been a nuclear family. Even with a predominantly nuclear family system, and a cultural ideology that favored individuality, U.S. society managed to reproduce a unitary system of heterosexual same race marriage from generation to generation without much deviance from the norm until fairly recently.

During the industrial revolution the nuclear family system in the U.S. was subjected to a host of new stresses and changes, including urbanization, factory work, and compulsory schooling for children. Mortality dropped, life expectancy rose, divorce increased and fertility declined. To some observers at the time, it seemed as if the entire fabric of family life was being undone. And yet census data reveal that the system of heterosexual same race marriage was maintained during the industrial revolution. Extramarital heterosexual cohabitation remained rare. Interracial marriages were few, even in the states which allowed such marriages.

As a potential factor in historical change, young adulthood may seem to be a strange candidate. The young adult life stage is a transitional one, from the family of the parents to the

family one makes with a spouse or partner. Progress through the various phases of leaving the parental home, finishing school, starting work, and starting a new family may entail enough detours and reversals to make young adulthood seem hopelessly directionless to the young adults themselves, and to the researchers studying them (Rindfuss 1991). The protean nature of young adulthood, the uncertainty of outcome, is the very feature which makes young adults potential agents for change in the family system. The formation of a new family through marriage (formal or informal) is the transitional moment in the cycle of social reproduction.

Adult society managed the younger generation's transition to adulthood much more carefully in the past. Young adults in the late 19th century either lived with their parents or were servants in another family's home, or if they lived in group quarters such as a university or factory sponsored dormitory they were subjected to strict rules and regulations. Young adults in the past were nearly always subject to what colonial leaders referred to as 'family government.' One reason the enormous economic and demographic upheavals of the industrial revolution did not result in a diversity of family forms was that family government was maintained. In the post-1960 world, however, young adults experience a life stage of independence during which time they are less subject to family government, and this may be one reason that family forms have diversified and non-traditional families have increased in number since 1960.

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Table 1: Selected Family Characteristics that Did Change During the Industrial Revolution in the U.S.

	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Pct of Households who Farm	57.6	52.5	44.9	46.8		42.5	37.0	33.1		25.1	16.9	9.5	4.5	2.7	1.8	1.2
Pct Who Live in Urban Center	7.9	12.3	13.4	15.0		23.0	27.9	32.0		33.5	31.2	37.0	34.5	29.2	22.3	27.1
Mean Household Size	5.54	5.3	4.99	4.8		4.56	4.32			3.63	3.36	3.35	3.13	2.73	2.57	2.49
Life Expectancy At Birth						47.3	50.0	54.1	59.7	62.9	68.2	69.7	70.9	73.7	75.4	77.0
Divorce Rate		1.2	1.5	2.2	3.0	4.0	4.6	8.0	7.5	8.8	10.2	9.2	14.9	23.9	22.2	20.1
School Enrollment age 5-19	54.0	57.8	47.5	51.2		54.9	63.4	68.6		74.1		84.3	88.0	88.8	88.9	93.4

Source: Percent of households who farm is percentage of households with U.S. born head, which included at least one full time farmer, from weighted census data (via IPUMS). Percent of persons living in urban center excludes the suburbs, and is derived from weighted census microdata (via IPUMS). Household size from weighted census microdata for US born persons in non group quarters. Percent college attendance is percent of women age 20-29, U.S. born who have at least some college education, from weighted census microdata. Life expectancy from *Historical Statistics*, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975 p.55). Divorce rate is number of divorces per thousand married couples, number of divorces 1920-1970 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975 p.49). Divorce rate 1860-1900 from Jacobson (1959 p.90). School Enrollment from weighted census microdata for U.S. born persons age 5-19.

Table 2: The Stability or Reinforcement of Family Government During the Industrial Revolution,
And the Decline in Family Government Since 1960:

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Median Age at First Marriage:													
Women	22.0		22.4	22.4	21.9		22.0	20.8	20.2	21.0	22.5	24.3	25.5
Men	25.4		26.1	25.6	25.4		25.0	23.5	22.5	22.8	24.5	26.6	27.4
Pct of Unmarried Young Adults Living with their Parents:													
Women	68.4		70.2	70.8	73.1		71.1	65.4	56.1	49.6	39.1	38.9	36.2
Men	59.0		60.4	61.1	68.4		74.9	66.0	56.3	51.6	45.3	45.1	41.6
Pct of Unmarried Young Adults who Head their own Household													
Women	2.4		2.2	2.4	1.8		2.9	5.2	10.8	18.2	30.4	30.4	35.6
Men	4.5		4.6	4.0	2.6		2.7	2.8	7.6	14.5	26.8	24.3	28.0
Pct of Young Men Unattached	5.7		6.5	5.5	3.8		3.5	2.7	4.7	8.9	22.0	27.8	35.1

Sources: All data are author's tabulations from weighted census microdata (via IPUMS). Median age of first marriage is calculated for U.S. born men and women. Unmarried young adults are U.S. born, age 20-29, never married. Unmarried young adults who head their own households excluded those who lived with their parents. Unattached heads of household were age 20-39, lived in non-group quarters and were neither married nor living with parents.

Table 3: The Prevalence of Non-Traditional Family Outcomes Over Time

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Pct of Young Men Cohabiting with Women	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	2.8	5.3	7.6
Intermarriages to Blacks Per 1,000 Married White:													
Men	0.5		0.2	0.3	0.3		1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.4	2
Men (in legal states only)	0.6		0.2	0.1	0.3		0.7	0.5	0.6				
Women	0.6		0.5	1.5	0.4		1.1	0.8	0.7	1.0	2.3	3.7	5.4
Women (in legal states only)	0.6		0.6	0.8	0.4		0.8	0.6	0.6				
Intermarriages to Asians per 1,000 Married White													
Men				0.0	0.1		0.0	0.1	0.8	1.8	4.8	7.5	9.2
Women				0.1	0.2		0.2	0.2	0.5	1.0	2.0	3.1	3.4

Sources: All data are author's tabulations from weighted census microdata (via IPUMS). Male heads of household (the denominator population for heterosexual cohabitation) were age 20-39, U.S. born, not living in group quarters. In order to be counted as heterosexual cohabiters, the male householders must have been living with a woman (not related by family) in the same age range, both unmarried, neither living with their parents. Census categories include friends, lodgers, boarders, roommates, and partners. Whites and Blacks include Hispanics for consistency with pre-1970 data. Laws against racial intermarriage were unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable in the U.S. after 1967 (Wallenstein 2002).

Figure 1: Odds Ratio of Racial Intermarriage 1880-2000, with 95% Confidence Intervals



Source: weighted census microdata 1880, 1900-1920, 1940-200, via IPUMS. Odds ratios derived from two-race tables, with other races excluded. Includes married persons of all ages and all national origins. Data points are slightly offset from census years to keep the two series from overlapping.