INTERSECTING INEQUALITIES AND IMMIGRANT JOBLESSNESS IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND SWEDEN

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers destination effects on immigrant joblessness in Britain, Germany, and Sweden. Findings show that immigrant/native-born joblessness differentials are larger in Sweden than in Britain and Germany, net of human capital, socio-demographic characteristics, and sending country. Institutional explanations include cross-national differences in occupational structures, access to welfare, and anti-discrimination law. A second important finding is that Swedish institutions boost women's employment so much that immigrant women in Sweden have lower absolute levels of joblessness than immigrant women elsewhere. This suggests that gendered institutional configurations in destination countries are an important aspect of immigrant economic incorporation. Furthermore, the finding provides evidence that institutions which foster women's work have independent effects on newcomers' employment, and are not merely an indicator of pre-existing proclivities toward work.

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Many industrialized countries will face financially insolvent welfare states in the course of the coming decades, as populations age and ratios of workers to pensioners decline. Immigration is an oft-mentioned solution, but its role in this policy arena is complex. On the one hand, immigration can and does counteract population decline. However, many immigrants, particularly in Western European host countries, work at rates much lower than their native-born counterparts, due to lower labor force participation and higher vulnerability to un- and underemployment. If immigration is to economically benefit receiving societies, these societies must address immigrant joblessness.[1]

But high levels of joblessness are a concern not only because of the needs of host societies' welfare-state finances. European debates on immigrant integration focus on joblessness because of its important implications for poverty and material well-being, social integration, and the future fates of immigrant second generations and beyond. A recent European Commission report (2004:5) on immigrant integration policies underscores this point: "Lack of access to employment has been identified as *the greatest barrier to integration* and thus *the most important political priority* within national integration policies" (my emphasis).

This analysis considers three countries (Britain, Germany, and Sweden) that are all home to large foreign-born populations: 8.3%, 12.5%, and 12.0% of the respective populations (OECD 2004:41). Comparisons include immigrant groups from 33 specific sending countries, each present in at least two of the three destinations. The cross-nationally comparative design of this research serves as an analytic lens to better understand the contexts of immigrant joblessness in Western Europe. Empirically, the article has three foci: (1) cross-national differences in the size of gaps in joblessness between immigrant groups and native-born populations, (2) absolute cross-

national differences between immigrant jobless rates, and (3) how the effects of individual characteristics on joblessness vary across countries and between immigrant and native-born populations.

MOTIVATION AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Despite the ever-increasing flows of international migration toward newer receiving societies, important theories for understanding immigrant employment are still based largely on classic settler societies. For example, important explanations for the seeming paradox of proliferating low-skilled immigrant work in the advanced post-industrial world consider the features of modern service economies, with a particular focus on large urban centers in "liberal"[2] countries (Sassen 1988, 2001; Waldinger 1996; Waldinger & Lichter 2003). The explanations vary even within these settings, but when we look at a wider range of receiving societies, the very explanandum changes, because immigrants have quite variable rates of joblessness.[3] Though prominent researchers have noted the remarkable variety among advanced post-industrial economies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Fligstein 2001), little empirical research has explored the implications for immigrant labor-market experiences.

Comparative research is central to understanding the role of context in immigrant economic incorporation. Nevertheless, cross-nationally comparative studies have been rare until recently. Three strands of research have begun to remedy this. The first looks at a variety of immigrant groups in a single host country. There are a number of excellent recent studies on immigrant economic outcomes for the three host countries that are the focus here (Arai & Vilhelmsson 2004; Bell 1997; Berthoud 2000; Bevelander 1999, 2005; Granato & Kalter 2001; Heath & McMahon 1997; Kogan 2004; le Grand & Szulkin 2002; Modood 1997; Owen 1997;

Scott 1999; Seifert 1996). These studies consistently show variation across immigrant groups in each country, net of observed individual-level characteristics. There are a variety of explanations for net intergroup differences, including unobserved differences in human capital, cultural attitudes toward work, and discrimination in the host country. It is difficult to adjudicate between these with standard statistical data, and a full analysis of intergroup differences is beyond the scope of this article, but an important lesson is that one must carefully take origins into account in any analysis of destination effects.

A second approach tracks a single immigrant group across multiple receiving societies. Kogan (2003) posits that welfare availability and demand for low-skilled workers improve occupational status outcomes but depress labor force participation and employment among ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden versus Austria. Lewin-Epstein et al. (2003) attribute higher occupational attainment and higher unemployment among immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Canada versus Israel to Canada's restrictive "point system" that selects for human capital and Israel's settlement assistance that benefits recent newcomers. Model et al. (1999) find that there are surprisingly few destination effects on the economic outcomes of Caribbean migrants in Canada, the US, Britain, and France. The major downside to such studies looking at a single group is that we do not know whether findings are generalizable to other groups. A wider range of sending countries allows detection of patterns with broader contextual causes.

The few studies that include multiple immigrant groups *and* receiving societies tend to focus on the "liberal" societies, perhaps in part because there is a comparatively long tradition of immigration research on these countries. Certainly, liberal societies are not identical in their institutional configurations. One body of research on the US and the UK (Model 1997, 2005;

Model & Ladipo 1996) attributes more positive immigrant outcomes in the US to the presence of native-born minorities (African Americans) in the lowest position of the labor queue. Reitz (1998) and collaborators (Reitz et al. 1999) identify overall earnings inequality as a primary contextual difference between Australia, Canada and the US and Canada and Germany. In countries with more equal earnings, those at the bottom of the distribution (disproportionately immigrants) are economically better off. One recent study (van Tubergen et al. 2004) includes many sending and receiving countries. This study is a major contribution, and its "double comparative design" is ideally suited to test theories about the effects of immigrants' origins and destinations on labor force participation and unemployment. Due to its very broad scope, this study is not able to devote attention to cross-national differences in the effects of individual-level variables (e.g., destination effects on recent newcomers versus longer-settled immigrants).

I extend these previous studies in several ways. First, unlike much of the previous research just discussed, I include immigrant men and women with a wide range of origins (33 sending countries) in three distinct destinations. Second, I carefully distinguish between immigrant/native-born inequality and more general contextual effects (those that affect immigrants and the native-born). Finally, I examine the role of cross-national variation in the effects of individual-level variables.

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATIONS

The discussion below emphasizes, first, variations across host societies that could affect observed gaps in joblessness between immigrant groups and native-born populations. These fall into several broad categories: variations in (a) observed and unobserved characteristics of the immigrants themselves, relative to their native-born counterparts, (b) the level of

immigrant/native-born inequality in access to non-market income sources, (c) the level of immigrant/native-born inequality in access to the labor market, and (d) the extent of immigrant/native-born complementarity in the labor market. I briefly discuss each of these in turn. As relevant, the discussion indicates whether cross-national differences pertain to persons with specific individual-level characteristics.

The second concern of the article is absolute cross-national differences between immigrant jobless rates. Note that this is a question of whether native-born baselines in the three countries vary, such that immigrant/native-born gaps do not translate directly into absolute differences in immigrant outcomes. In this context, the discussion turns to cross-national differences in work/family policies, which are generally recognized to boost women's employment rates in social democratic countries such as Sweden (Gornick & Meyers 2003; Gornick et al. 1998).

This research design does not permit a definitive disentangling of causal mechanisms; its goals are primarily descriptive. Nonetheless, this discussion serves to highlight some of the potential causes of cross-national variation, as well as the expected direction of effects.

Language abilities

Variation in immigrants' characteristics is perhaps the most obvious explanation for cross-national differences in immigrant labor market outcomes. Most analyses (including this one) control for important *observable* characteristics. Nonetheless, immigrants' *unobservable* characteristics can also vary across host countries. One important example in this analysis is language ability, unobserved here because of data limitations. We might expect many immigrants in Britain to have a critical advantage vis-à-vis their counterparts in Sweden and Germany: They

arrive with English-language ability. English is learned more frequently than German or Swedish in most sending countries, regardless of whether English is an official language. Thus, it is more likely than migrants to Britain will have overall better language abilities upon arrival. This residual effect of Britain's colonial history could lead to relatively high employment rates among recent arrivals to Britain, but we might also expect a cross-national convergence among longer-settled immigrants who have had time to learn German or Swedish.

Income inequality, selectivity, and de-commodification

An important line of work, most clearly articulated by Borjas (1987), has stressed the relation between income inequality and selectivity of migration. The basic assertion is that higher income inequality attracts more positively selected migrants along unmeasured dimensions such as motivation. This reasoning suggests that migrants to Britain from a given origin country would be more positively selected than those to the other two countries.[4] Recent empirical findings do show that the ratio between inequality in the sending and receiving society is negatively correlated with labor market outcomes (van Tubergen et al. 2004). Holding origin constant, this implies that migrants to Britain will have more positive outcomes.

Note, however, that it is not possible to disentangle such unobserved heterogeneity, purportedly based on income-maximizing strategies prior to migration, from the effects of another institutional factor that immigrants need not be aware of before moving: the availability of non-market income sources. A major way that advanced industrialized societies reduce income inequality is through taxes and transfers. An effect of the availability of transfer income is empirically indistinguishable from an effect of income inequality on migrant selectivity, at least in conventional data sources. Even with similar unobserved characteristics such as

motivation, we would expect lower employment rates among immigrants in host countries that provide greater access to non-market income, because such immigrants are less forced into employment.

Esping-Andersen (1990:37) calls access to non-market income sources "de-commodification," defined more specifically as "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation." The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is a rough indicator of this concept for the working-aged adults in this analysis. (A METR of 100% implies the financial equivalence of work and non-work – maximum de-commodification.) Across a range of family types and circumstances, Sweden and Germany actually have similarly high METRs; figures for Britain are lower (OECD 2005:Chap. 3). But most important for the discussion here is that both Britain and Germany restrict immigrants from receiving non-contributory benefits such as social assistance. In Britain, most immigrants have no access to social assistance for the first five years of residence, and in Germany, recourse to social assistance can jeopardize a non-citizen's right to renew a residence permit (Groenendijk et al. 2000). Thus, Sweden has the smallest gap between the welfare rights of immigrants and the native-born.

The link between de-commodification and employment outcomes is empirically tenuous (OECD 2005:139). Despite an extremely high level of de-commodification, Sweden boasts one of the highest employment rates in the industrialized world. Nevertheless, de-commodification might more significantly depress employment among immigrants, who face specific barriers to employment. Whether through effects on the (unobserved) selectivity of migrant flows or through de-commodification, we might expect Sweden's high levels of income redistribution to

depress immigrant employment relative to the native-born.

Labor market access

Formal and informal barriers to labor market access for immigrants vary across these countries. In terms of formal barriers, Germany has historically had much more restrictive citizenship policies than the other two countries, and on top of this, citizenship matters more in Germany for employment access. Until the early 1990s, naturalization was nearly impossible for those without ancestral ties to Germany (Diehl & Blohm 2003:141). In the German data used here (from 1996 and 2000), citizenship among the foreign-born in Germany was still rare. Citizenship matters more in Germany, because access to public-sector, civil-servant positions (including school teachers, for example), is restricted to EU citizens.

Evidence on a more *informal* barrier to access, discrimination, also suggests that, for immigrants, Germany is the least advantageous of the three destinations. A report based on several waves of Eurobarometer data demonstrates that, along an array of dimensions, including resistance to diversity, opposition to civil rights for minorities, and support for repatriation policies, Germans adopt more "ethnically exclusionist" stances than their counterparts in the other two countries (Coenders et al. 2003:2-6). However, Brits are not far behind, with Swedes having by far the least exclusionist attitudes along most dimensions.

But we should be cautious in linking the results of opinion polls to discrimination itself. First, these results are for the population as a whole, not for employers. Even assuming employers have similar attitudes to the population at large, studies have shown that employers' discriminatory behavior can be unrelated to stated opinions (Pager & Quillian 2005). Anti-discrimination legislation could be important in preventing discriminatory behavior. Britain has

the most highly developed anti-discrimination legislation in Europe; its first law against discrimination in the labor market dates back to the 1970s. Despite progressive immigrant-related policies on many fronts, Sweden's anti-discrimination legislation has lagged behind many other countries, particularly at the stage of recruitment of job candidates (Graham & Soininen 1998). Unlike Sweden and Britain, Germany has had no laws explicitly prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, citizenship, or origin country. Although EU regulations have required all member countries to implement laws against discrimination, Germany has failed to fully do so (European Commission 2005).

Taken as a whole, the findings from this review of factors affecting labor market access for immigrants suggest that, along every possible dimension, Germany is the least advantageous destination country. If public opinions represent the level of discrimination in a society well, then Sweden is probably the least discriminatory context, but if formal anti-discrimination legislation plays a larger role, then Britain could be the least discriminatory context.

Complementarity and competition

If immigrants are not successful in the competition with native-born workers over desirable jobs, then the availability of *undesirable* jobs is important: Are there jobs that native-born workers are unlikely to compete for? This is a question of complementarity of native-born and immigrant workers; in a less positive light, "complementarity" is occupational or sectoral segregation. A recent OECD publication provides a proxy for this concept: a standard index of dissimilarity at the level of economic sector, indicating how many non-citizen workers would need to be re-allocated to achieve parity with citizen workers.[5] The index value in the late 1990s is nearly 20% in Germany, 12.6% in Britain, and only 10% in Sweden. This is especially a result

of the over-representation of foreign workers in Germany in the industrial jobs for which they were recruited in the postwar period (OECD 2001:174-177). Such jobs have been an immigrant niche in all three countries, but Germany has remained more industrial than Britain and Sweden in recent decades (OECD 2000:85-87). In short, this evidence suggests that immigrants in Britain and Sweden compete more directly with native-born workers in the labor market, which might negatively affect probabilities of employment (Kogan 2003).

Work/family policies

One major factor likely to affect differences in the native-born baselines across these three countries is policies that allow or encourage women to work. Sweden is a world leader in promoting women's, and especially mothers', employment (Gornick et al. 1998; Stier et al. 2001). For the three countries here, the following policies are relevant. Germany alone has joint rather than individual taxation, which creates a moderate disincentive for married women's employment (OECD 2005). Other policies such as paid parental leave, public childcare, and school scheduling aim to increase women's labor supply directly. Gornick and Meyers (2003:258) construct indexes of such policies. Their findings show that Sweden belongs to the group of countries most supportive of employment among women with pre-school and school-aged children. Germany, along with other Continental European countries, takes an intermediate position, while Britain and other liberal countries are generally least institutionally supportive. Complementing such labor-supply policies is a large, public, social-service sector in Sweden, which disproportionately employs women. If such cross-national differences have independent causal effects (and are not merely an indicator of a particularly gender egalitarian culture among native-born Swedes), they should increase employment among immigrant and native-born

women alike.

DATA

The analysis uses British Labour Force Surveys (BLFS), the German *Mikrozensus* (MZ), and Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data (LINDA).[6] All are nationally representative, household-level surveys.

The BLFS is a quarterly survey of 0.2% of the population of Great Britain and 0.3% of Northern Ireland (Office for National Statistics 2003). Addresses are randomly selected from the Postcode Address File in Great Britain and the Valuation List in Northern Ireland. The BLFS has a rotating structure; households remain in the sample for five consecutive quarters. I select each respondent's first quarter of participation, and pool data over the period from Fall 1996 to Fall 2004 to obtain a sufficiently large sample size. For the first quarter of participation, interviews are face-to-face with at least one adult, who may provide information on other household members. Although interviewers speak only English, they carry written documents explaining the survey in nine other languages, and arrange for interpreters as necessary. Response rates have ranged from 80 to 85% in recent years.

The MZ is an annual household survey; coverage is approximately 1% of all households (Lechert & Schmidt 2000; Lehnert et al. 2003). Some key information was collected only from a 45% random sub-sample, and the scientific use file is a 70% random sub-sample of the original, so final coverage is just over 0.3%. The MZ is a single-stage cluster sample (a cluster is approximately nine residences) using two sampling frames: the census of the population for Western Germany and the population register for Eastern Germany, both updated for new housing construction each year. Interviews are generally face-to-face; in a minority of randomly

selected cases, interviewers administer written surveys. The survey instrument is only in German. One adult may provide information on all household members. Each year, 75% of households from the previous year remain in the sample, but it is impossible to track which households carry over in the scientific use file. To attain a larger sample size, I pool data from 1996 and 2000, two independent samples. Response is legally mandatory for most questions. Unit non-response is 3%; item non-response on voluntary questions reaches 10%.

LINDA combines data from population, tax, and employment registers, which are linked by individual identity numbers (Edin & Fredriksson 2000). It is based on a simple random sample of identity numbers. Everyone in the household of each sampled individual is also included. LINDA includes a large over-sample of immigrants (20% of the total foreign-born population versus 3.3% of the native-born). Because LINDA is based on registers rather than a survey, everyone sampled is in the data set. Information on how to file tax forms, a primary source of LINDA data, is available in 14 major immigrant languages (Skatteverket 2005). LINDA is longitudinal, but I use only 2002 data, because there is no comparable longitudinal data for the other two countries.

VARIABLES

Employment

The dependent variable for this analysis is work status, a dichotomous variable coded as 0 if respondents are jobless, and 1 if they are employed. As the combined result of labor force participation rates and unemployment rates among the active labor force, employment rates avoid the complicated and permeable boundary between inactivity and unemployment. Many active labor-market policies have begun to target the inactive as well as the unemployed, recognizing

this permeability (OECD 2003).

According to ILO definitions, persons in employment are those who did any work for pay or profit during a specified reference week, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent (European Commission 2003:9). Unpaid family workers are also included. I alter this definition in two ways, because of data limitations. First, the reference period is an entire year instead of a single week; this liberal definition undoubtedly increases employment rates. Second, LINDA contains no information about unpaid family workers, and so such persons must be recoded as jobless in the British and German data.

Information on employment in Sweden is based on income. A person is employed if, during the reference year, s/he had any wage or salary income from an employer, income from self-employment, or losses from self-employment. In the MZ and BLFS, a person is employed if s/he reports being employed at any time during the previous year.[7]

Age and age squared

Persons aged 25 through 59 are included. Age is centered at 40, which is near the mean in each country.

Education

The education variable is UNESCO's (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) ISCED-97 (International Standard Classification of Education) (UNESCO 1997). The categories, in their generic formulation, are:

1. Primary education (or first stage of basic education)
2. Lower secondary (or second stage of basic education)
3. (Upper) secondary education
4. Post-secondary, non-tertiary education
5. Tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification)

6. Tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification)

Category 6 is very small, so it is combined with category 5 for the analysis. ISCED codes are directly available in LINDA (Statistika centralbyrån 2000); coding procedures for BLFS and MZ are based on external documentation (OECD 1999), available from the author on request.

Marital/partnership status

This variable is coded 1 if a person lives with a spouse or domestic partner. I often refer to it as marital status, even though this is not by legal definition.[8] Among partnered immigrants, an additional variable distinguishes native-born and foreign-born spouses.

Children

The variable for pre-school aged children is coded 1 if a person lives in a family with children under 6. The variable for school-aged children is coded 1 if a person lives in a family with children aged 6 to 17.

Years since migration and years since migration squared

Because of the year-long reference period for the employment variable, immigrants who have arrived in the one year prior to data collection are excluded. The analysis is also limited to immigrants who moved as adults (aged 18 and older); an analysis of the second and 1.5 generations is beyond the scope of this analysis.[9] This criterion implies that most immigrants attained any primary and secondary education in the home country. The range for time since migration, given the sample selection based on age, is 1 to 41 years. This variable is centered at 14, the approximate mean in each country.

Origin country

Each of the 33 origins groups can be uniquely identified in at least two of the three

receiving countries. The origin countries include some within the pre-2004 "EU-15" (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain); other highly developed countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, and the US); countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union);[10] and countries outside of Europe or on Europe's periphery (Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Columbia, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uganda, and Vietnam). I also include a heterogeneous category of all other immigrants. The median sample size for immigrant groups (subdivided by country of residence, gender, and country of origin and not including the "other" category) is 228, with a minimum of 30 (women from Algeria in Britain) and a maximum of 15,000 (women from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden). A native-born comparison group provides a baseline in each country.[11]

Survey year

Dummies for survey year capture time-varying economic conditions within a given host country, such as the unemployment rate. These survey year effects apply only to Germany and Britain. (Swedish data are from 2002 only.) The reference year is 2000 for Germany and 2002 for Britain.

Region

A region variable ensures that immigrants are compared to native-born persons in similar labor markets. In Sweden and Germany, the region variable is constructed by state (län and Land, respectively). The British regional variable is an aggregation of a county/unitary authority-level indicator. In total, there are 21 regions for Sweden, 16 for Germany, and 20 for Britain.

MODELS

For each country, and for men and women separately, the analysis is based on three models of employment probability, formally expressed:

$$ln(\Pi_i/1\text{-}\Pi_i) = \alpha + \delta\, \boldsymbol{O}_i + \epsilon_i \quad [1]$$

$$ln(\Pi_i/1\text{-}\Pi_i) = \alpha + \delta_1\, \boldsymbol{O}_i + \delta_2\, \boldsymbol{C}_i + \delta_3\, \boldsymbol{S}_i + \delta_4\, \boldsymbol{R}_i + \epsilon_i \quad [2]$$

$$ln(\Pi_i/1\text{-}\Pi_i) = \alpha + \delta_1\, \boldsymbol{O}_i + \delta_2\, \boldsymbol{C}_i + \delta_3\, \boldsymbol{S}_i + \delta_4\, \boldsymbol{R}_i + \delta_5\, \boldsymbol{C}_i\, F_i + \epsilon_i \quad [3]$$

where Π_i is the probability of employment for the i^{th} individual, $\boldsymbol{O}$ is a vector of dummy variables indicating countries of origin, $\boldsymbol{C}$ is a vector of demographic and human capital characteristics (age, age squared, education, marital status, preschool- and school-aged children, years since migration, and years since migration squared), $\boldsymbol{S}$ is a vector of dummy variables indicating survey year, $\boldsymbol{R}$ is a vector of dummy variables indicating region, and F is a single dummy variable indicating whether a respondent belongs to any of the foreign-born groups. The excluded categories are native-born, low education (ISCED 1), not living with a spouse or partner, no children, survey year 2000 (Germany) and 2002 (Britain), and the capital "regions" of Stockholm, Berlin, and inner London. Age is centered at 40, time since migration is centered at 14 for immigrants, and native-born persons are coded 0 on years since migration, origins, and spouse nativity variables.

RESULTS

The discussion of results proceeds as follows. After a brief look at descriptive statistics and immigrant/native-born gaps in employment probabilities within each country, the discussion turns to the primary research questions: Does the size of the gaps in joblessness between immigrant groups and native-born populations vary across countries? Do native-born baselines

vary enough that immigrant/native-born gaps do *not* translate into absolute differences in immigrant outcomes? And finally, how do the effects of individual characteristics on joblessness vary across countries and between immigrant and native-born populations?

Descriptive statistics

[Table 1: Descriptive statistics by gender, country, and nativity]

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, by country, gender, and nativity. There are a number of things worth noting. First, there are important nativity and cross-national differences in individual demographic and human capital characteristics. On average, immigrant men and women are more likely to be married or cohabiting, and more likely to have children than their native-born counterparts in all three countries. For this reason, the effects of marital status and children, discussed below, are particularly important in understanding immigrant/native-born gaps in joblessness. Immigrants are more likely to have foreign-born than native-born spouses, and this is similarly true in all three countries. Not surprisingly, immigrants are more likely to have very low levels of education than are their native-born counterparts in all three countries. In most instances, immigrants are also nearly as likely as or more likely than the native-born to be found at the high end of the educational spectrum.

Employment outcomes (and immigrant/native-born differences in employment) also vary cross-nationally. Employment rates among native-born men, but especially native-born women, are higher in Sweden than in either Germany or Britain. Foreign-born men and women work at lower rates than the native-born in all three countries. Partly due to the higher native-born employment rates in Sweden, this immigrant/native-born gap in employment among men appears to be larger there (15 percentage points) than in Germany and Britain (nine and seven percentage

points, respectively). Among women, despite the lower native-born bar in Germany and Britain, the gap between native- and foreign-born women is over 15 percentage points in all three countries. Such aggregate employment rates are only minimally informative, because we know there is a high level of variation among immigrant populations in every country. Therefore, the discussion turns to models that take immigrants' countries of origin into account.

Within-country origin effects on employment

[Table 2: Origin effects on log odds of employment,
observed and adjusted for individual characteristics]

"Observed" origin gaps in Table 2 (gaps prior to controlling for individual-level human capital and socio-demographic characteristics) are highly variable. Many groups of immigrant men (particularly those from within the EU-15 and from other industrialized countries) post *higher* employment rates than native-born men, as seen in positive origin effects. However, this is only true in Germany and Britain; it is not the case in Sweden, where despite substantial variation, *all* immigrant groups in the analysis work at lower rates than native-born Swedes. Previous research, despite using different models and data, also documents this pattern for Sweden (Bevelander 1999). Most groups of immigrant women in all three countries have lower observed employment rates than native-born women, as seen in negative origin effects.

After adjusting the gaps for individual-level characteristics, it is clear that most within-country differences remain large. The large net variation across countries of origin again highlights the importance of looking at destination effects within detailed origin groups. Note that these "adjusted" origin gaps are those that exist at the approximate mean value of years since migration for immigrants, 14.

Destination effects

[Table 3: Cross-national differences in origin effects on log odds of employment]

Table 3 shows that destination effects are distinct and statistically significant.[12] The figures in this table are cross-national differences in the size of the gap between a given immigrant group and otherwise similar native-born persons. A positive number for the comparison "Germany versus Sweden" indicates that the given group has a higher relative employment rate in Germany than in Sweden.

Origin gaps in odds of employment are unambiguously larger among men in Sweden than among men in Britain and Germany, with only a few exceptions. We can see this in the overwhelmingly positive figures in all comparisons of "Germany versus Sweden" and "Britain versus Sweden." Of 47 explicit cross-national comparisons between Sweden and the other two countries, and for the heterogeneous group of "other" immigrants, in only one case are the relative odds of immigrant employment significantly higher in Sweden. (Immigrant men from the former Yugoslavia work at significantly higher relative rates in Sweden than in Britain.) For women, the pattern is largely the same: In only two cases are origin effects smaller in Sweden than elsewhere (among immigrant women from Bangladesh and Somalia in Britain versus Sweden). For both men and women, origin effects are mostly of similar magnitude in Germany and Britain for both men and women; that is, the cross-national differences are statistically insignificant. The only significant difference is that immigrant men from the former Yugoslavia work at higher relative rates in Germany than in Britain. Immigrant women from Greece, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Vietnam also work at higher relative rates in Germany than in Britain. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of differences in origin effects between Britain and

Germany is not nearly as striking as the pattern when comparing Sweden to the other countries.

Native-born men and women have higher employment rates in Sweden than in the other two countries, so it is worthwhile to look not only at the size of origin effects, but also at whether these gaps translate into absolute cross-national differences in odds of immigrant employment. We can compare the magnitude of cross-national differences for the native-born reference groups to the magnitude of cross-national differences in origin gaps. In Table 3, the native-born baselines use the approximate mean or mode for general independent variables across all countries (age 40, spouse present, no children, and education ISCED 3). The difference in log odds of employment for native-born men is about 0.94 higher in Sweden than in Germany. In about half of cases (for 8 of 17 specific origins groups), the cross-national differences in effects of origin for men are of larger magnitude than this, meaning that these immigrant groups in Germany have not only higher *relative* odds of employment, but higher *absolute* odds as well. The difference in log odds of employment for native-born men is about 0.66 higher in Sweden than in Britain, so 21 groups of immigrant men (of 30) have higher absolute odds of employment in Britain.

For women, the case is considerably more extreme, because native-born Swedish women have *much* higher odds of employment than native-born women elsewhere. As a result, the larger origin effects for women in Sweden generally do not translate into lower absolute odds of employment for immigrant women in Sweden when compared to immigrant women elsewhere, except in a few instances (in the case of one immigrant group in the Germany/Sweden comparison, and 5 in the Britain/Sweden comparison). On the contrary, immigrant women in Sweden generally have considerably higher odds of employment than immigrant women in

Germany and Britain. This is an important finding, because it suggests that Swedish institutions boost employment rates for women regardless of origin. This has the potential to counterbalance relatively large origin effects on employment in Sweden.

In sum, significant destination effects for both men and women are present across this very wide range of sending countries. In Sweden, the immigrant/native-born differentials in employment are larger than in Britain or Germany among both men and women. However, the reference group of native-born women in Sweden works at such high rates that, despite the larger origin gaps, immigrant women in Sweden are more likely to work than immigrant women elsewhere.

Variations in human capital and socio-demographic effects

[Table 4: Human capital and socio-demographic effects on log odds of employment]

The final issue explored here is how human capital and socio-demographic effects vary across countries and for native-born and immigrant populations. This analysis answers the questions: What are the human capital and demographic profiles of immigrants with particularly severe origin penalties? How do cross-national variations in the effects of these characteristics shape both absolute and relative immigrant employment rates? The selected coefficients in Table 4 are based on equation 3, allowing the effects of demographic and human capital characteristics to vary by country, gender, and nativity.

I focus first on family characteristics. Destination effects (Sweden's larger origin gaps) are larger among men who are married and have children than among single men and men without children. More specifically, immigrant men's employment rates are affected less positively by being married or having children than native-born men's employment rates. We see

this in the interaction effects between foreign-born status and the family variables, which are negative in almost all cases, but generally less negative in Germany and Britain. Immigrant men who are married to immigrant women (which is the majority of married immigrant men – see Table 1) have much lower relative employment rates in Sweden than in the other two countries.

Family characteristics are, not surprisingly, a major part of the explanation for high women's employment in Sweden. In fact, single women without children actually have higher employment rates in Germany than in Sweden (see native-born baseline for women). However, among married women and especially women with children, Sweden emerges as the clear leader in facilitating employment for both native-born and foreign-born women. That said, we can see in the sizable negative interaction effects between nativity and family characteristics in Sweden that institutions that promote women's employment are less effective for immigrant women. This is true in part because Swedish-born women experience no negative effects of being married or having children on their employment rates. Nonetheless, family effects in Sweden are remarkably small even for immigrant women, when compared to family effects in Britain and Germany.

Variations in education also affect the magnitude of origin gaps in employment in all three countries. Origin gaps increase at the upper end of the educational spectrum, because native-born employment probabilities rise more with increasing education than do immigrant employment probabilities. Recall that immigrants in the sample arrived in the host country as adults, so primary and secondary education was likely completed in the home country, a probable explanation for such gaps.[13] The magnitude of destination effects also varies across the educational spectrum. Immigrant men in Germany with higher education (ISCED 5/6) experience a larger devaluation of their credentials than do their counterparts in Britain or Sweden. For

women, the effects of education on cross-national differences in origin gaps are uniform: The difference between Sweden and the other two countries is largest at the high end of the educational spectrum.

[Figure 1: Effects of time since migration on immigrant employment]

Figure 1 shows how time since migration changes destination effects. (Destination effects on origin gaps presented in previous sections were from models in which time since migration was fixed at 14 years.) Not surprisingly, immigrants' employment rates increase with time in the host country, such that origin gaps in employment are largest for recently arrived immigrants. More interestingly, cross-national patterns also vary, depending on how long immigrants have been in the country. For both men and women, the employment integration process is quicker in Sweden than in the other two countries, and this cross-national difference is statistically significant for both men and women.[14] This means that, among those who have been in their host countries less than 14 years, the cross-national patterns are even more extreme than those presented in previous sections. For longer-settled immigrants, the cross-national differences narrow. Although the initial disadvantage of settling in Sweden does not disappear for the vast majority of immigrant groups, even after several decades of residence, the issue of immigrant joblessness in Sweden is clearly most pressing among recent newcomers.

DISCUSSION

The analyses show that destination countries matter considerably for immigrant employment outcomes. Expanding on previous studies, I have considered employment rates for a very wide range of specific immigrant origins groups in three host countries. The first major finding is that origin gaps in employment are largest in Sweden relative to Britain and Germany.

This is true even after controlling for individual-level human capital and socio-demographic characteristics, and it is true *within* the vast majority of detailed origins groups. The second major finding is that, despite Sweden's larger origin gaps, immigrant women also benefit *as women* (or more specifically, as wives and as mothers) from Sweden's institutional support for women's employment. That is, immigrant women in Sweden work at much higher rates than their immigrant counterparts elsewhere, even though they work at rates far lower than the *extremely* high rates of Swedish-born women. I address each of these two findings in turn.

This research's major contribution lies in describing the contours of cross-national variation. Given this research design, it is clearly not possible to definitively determine the causal mechanisms of the observed cross-national differences. Nevertheless, we can return to the cross-national variations discussed above to consider likely explanations.

Why the significantly larger origin gaps in Sweden? Compared to immigrants in Britain, immigrants in Sweden face several disadvantages. First, they are less likely to arrive with knowledge of the host country language, since Swedish is rarely used outside of Sweden. Second, anti-discrimination law is somewhat more established in Britain, which could mean that immigrants to Britain face less discrimination from employers, despite more ethnically exclusive public opinion than in Sweden. Both of these differences suggest that immigrants have more limited access to available jobs in Sweden than in Britain.

Based on institutional differences, we have no reason to believe that immigrants in Germany are more successful than in Sweden at competing with the native-born for jobs. If fact, immigrants to Germany face particularly severe barriers to access. Nonetheless, immigrants in Germany are also less likely to directly compete with the native-born for jobs, as evidenced by

higher levels of sectoral segregation. Although origin gaps are generally much larger in Sweden, this pattern is more pronounced at the lower end of the educational spectrum for men. This could be because many low-skilled immigrant men in Germany continue to hold the manufacturing jobs for which they were recruited in the postwar period, and for that reason face joblessness less often than low-skilled immigrant men in Sweden.

Perhaps the most salient difference between Germany and Sweden is in the range of options if desirable employment is not to be found. If the jobs available to immigrants in Sweden are undesirable, they can opt, at least temporarily, not to work. Since immigrants in Germany risk their residence status if they turn to social assistance, employment is forced to a considerably higher degree. Although we have reason to believe that access to desirable jobs *is* greater in Britain than in Sweden, Britain's low levels of social welfare, particularly for immigrants, mean that employment forcing is likely there as well. Note that the finding of larger origin gaps in Sweden is also consistent with the hypothesis of selectivity of migration flows based on income inequality. It is possible that migrants to Sweden are more negatively selected precisely *because* they are aware, prior to migration, of the low income inequality and high de-commodification in Sweden. But even if migration itself is driven predominantly by non-economic factors such as family unification, social networks, and political upheaval, de-commodification could depress immigrant employment in Sweden.

Relatively high differentials between immigrant and native-born joblessness represent an important challenge to Sweden's model of maximum employment which has been so successful at integrating marginalized groups into the labor force. However, it is also important to understand the ways in which other axes of inequality affect immigrant experiences. Because

immigrant families are responsible for raising a disproportionate number of children in all three of these countries, work and family policies are an important immigrant issue. Such policies appear to substantially increase women's employment in Sweden, not only among the native-born (a well-known finding) but also among immigrant women. These results further strengthen the claim that such policies independently affect women's employment and do not merely reflect a culturally specific preference for employment among Swedish women. For all receiving countries, the strategic promotion of women's labor force participation is promising for increasing native-born and immigrant employment rates and for preserving a fiscally sound welfare state.

NOTES

1. "Jobless" refers to a characteristic of persons who are either unemployed or out of the labor force and therefore not working. See discussion of variables for complete definition.

2. I am using "liberal" in the economic sense: a high commitment to free market principles in spheres such as the labor market and the welfare state.

3. In fact, as Waldinger (2001) notes, even within the United States (the focus of much of this work) the paradox of high immigrant employment rates is implicitly gendered: It applies much more to men than to women.

4. Gini coefficients for Britain, Germany, and Sweden were 36.0, 28.3, and 25.0 in 1999-2000 (World Bank 2005).

5. The figures are unfortunately by citizenship, and not by nativity; this is typical of most official cross-national reports. These are probably *conservative* estimates of cross-national differences, because non-citizens in Britain and Sweden are likely to be more negatively selected from among all immigrants (and less likely to work in the same sectors as the native-born) than non-citizens in Germany.

6. I thank Statistika centralbyrån (SCB) in Örebro and the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim for allowing me to work with LINDA and the MZ, respectively, on site at their facilities during visits in 2004. Due to legal regulations with these official micro-level data, I can only access them in-country.

7. Identical definitions of employment would obviously be preferable. I have chosen LINDA over the Swedish labor force survey (Arbetskraftsundersökningarna), which would have a more comparable employment variable, because of LINDA's far superior sample size and household-level design, very important for parts of the larger project from which this article is drawn.

8. In the Swedish data, cohabiting couples can only be identified if they are either officially registered or have children in common. This probably accounts for the somewhat lower partnership rates in Sweden when compared to the other two countries.

9. The second generation (native-born children of immigrants) is included in the native-born category, because they are not uniformly identifiable in the data.

10. Among immigrants who arrived in their host countries when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were still unified nation states, the contemporary names of places of origin are often not available in the data. In other cases, the data distributors have aggregated these countries of origin.

11. A drawback of the German data is that among foreign-born German citizens, one cannot determine country of birth. Only beginning in 1999 (i.e., in the 2000 data but not in the 1996 data) can one identify who *is* foreign-born among current German citizens. The native-born comparison group and the group of foreign-born German citizens (included in the "other" category) are therefore drawn only from the sub-sample of 2000 data and weighted accordingly. These limitations affect results much less than they would in other receiving countries. The vast majority of foreign-born German citizens foreign-born "ethnic" Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The bias of excluding naturalized immigrants is thus minimal – but growing, because of recent changes to German citizenship laws. The MZ's sample size and response rate are far superior to those of other available surveys, and help outweigh such limitations.

12. I test the statistical significance of destination effects (the effect of destination country on the size of a specific origin gap) with Wald chi-square statistics. Allison (1999) argues that Wald statistics are problematic for comparing logit coefficients across groups, given unequal residual variation. Unfortunately, I cannot use the method he proposes, because it assumes that the researcher can work with data for all populations simultaneously; I could not use the LINDA and MZ data outside of secure facilities in Sweden and Germany. Nonetheless, Allison's critique rests on the assumption that a binary variable (here, employment) is in fact an indicator of a latent continuous variable ("employability"). One need not assume the presence of a latent continuous variable, if one's goal is to descriptively assess employment.

13. Around 70% of immigrant men and women with higher education (ISCED 5/6) in Sweden and Germany arrived when they were older than 25, an age at which they are likely to have already completed education. In Britain, the figure is only about 50%; this difference could help explain a lower devaluation of university credentials in Britain.

14. Based on Wald chi-square tests (with one degree of freedom and a critical value of 3.84), the linear term for years since migration is significantly more positive in Sweden than in the other two countries. Cross-national differences in the quadratic terms are mostly insignificant.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by gender, country, and nativity

	Men						Women					
	Sweden		Germany		Britain		Sweden		Germany		Britain	
	NB	FB	NB	FB	NB	FB	NB	FB	NB	FB	NB	FB
Age (mean)	42.2	43.3	41.7	42.3	41.4	40.1	42.3	42.8	41.9	41.8	41.5	40.8
Age (st. dev.)	10.1	8.9	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.7	10.2	9.2	9.7	9.5	9.8	9.9
Spouse present	54%	63%	68%	80%	74%	77%	60%	64%	74%	82%	73%	73%
Of these												
Native-born spouse		22%		23%		27%		29%		22%		33%
Foreign-born spouse		78%		77%		73%		71%		78%		67%
Preschool children present	14%	18%	14%	21%	19%	29%	16%	19%	15%	20%	20%	25%
School-aged children present	29%	35%	28%	38%	31%	36%	37%	45%	33%	43%	38%	40%
ISCED 1	6%	12%	5%	14%	16%	19%	4%	16%	5%	19%	23%	26%
ISCED 2	13%	12%	7%	24%	20%	4%	9%	11%	14%	29%	34%	6%
ISCED 3	51%	43%	53%	40%	38%	52%	50%	39%	56%	30%	19%	45%
ISCED 4	8%	4%	18%	9%	8%	5%	5%	4%	14%	10%	10%	8%
ISCED 5/6	22%	29%	17%	13%	18%	21%	32%	30%	11%	12%	14%	15%
Years since migration (mean)		14.2		14.0		12.8		14.6		13.3		14.3
Years since migration (st. dev.)		9.5		10.0		10.8		9.9		9.5		10.8
Employed	94%	79%	89%	80%	88%	81%	93%	77%	73%	56%	75%	57%
N	165,259	79,034	48,569	6,843	186,745	10,586	167,546	86,613	47,999	6,584	200,275	14,367

Sources: British Labour Force Surveys, Fall 1996-Fall 2004; German Mikrozensus, 1996 and 2000; Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data, 2002.

Notes: Sample includes persons of working age (25-59) who are native-born or immigrated as adults (aged 18+).

Table 2. Origin effects on log odds of employment, observed and adjusted for individual characteristics

	Men						Women					
	Sweden		Germany		Britain		Sweden		Germany		Britain	
	Observed	Adjusted	Observed	Adjusted	Observed	Adjusted	Observed	Adjusted	Observed	Adjusted	Observed	Adjusted
EU-15												
Austria	**-.85**	**-.73**	.54	.46			**-1.06**	**-.87**	-.36	-.36		
Britain	**-.64**	**-.60**	.15	.13			**-1.07**	**-1.10**	**-.55**	-.35		
France	**-1.11**	**-1.07**	.24	.26	**.81**	**.86**	**-1.11**	**-1.33**	-.29	-.33	-.01	**-.27**
Germany	**-.87**	**-.68**			-.04	-.17	**-1.09**	**-1.01**			.07	-.03
Greece	**-1.94**	**-1.95**	-.23	.07	**-.51**	-.57	**-2.60**	**-2.25**	**-.46**	.19	**-.70**	**-1.09**
Italy	**-1.23**	**-.94**	**-.50**	-.09	-.02	.33	**-1.31**	**-1.32**	**-.76**	-.19	-.28	-.31
Netherlands	**-.45**	**-.58**	.74	.82	**1.21**	1.01	**-1.17**	**-1.17**	**-1.03**	**-.79**	.08	-.22
Portugal	**-1.14**	**-.94**	-.17	.35	.20	.59	**-1.41**	**-1.17**	**-.77**	-.01	**-.48**	.24
Spain	**-1.35**	**-1.08**	-.25	.50	-.41	-.14	**-1.38**	**-1.25**	**-.80**	-.42	-.05	-.12
Other more developed countries												
Australia	**-1.43**	**-1.31**			**1.54**	**1.56**	**-1.37**	**-1.43**			**.78**	**.57**
Canada	**-1.41**	**-1.45**			.58	.34	**-1.19**	**-1.37**			.23	-.14
Japan	**-1.45**	**-1.37**			.59	.67	**-1.50**	**-1.65**			**-1.75**	**-1.99**
US	**-1.25**	**-1.45**	.02	-.15	**.69**	**.66**	**-1.34**	**-1.70**	-.12	-.42	**-.41**	**-.54**
Eastern Europe												
FSU	**-1.59**	**-1.65**	**-.98**	**-.80**	**-.80**	-.55	**-1.32**	**-1.44**	**-.93**	**-.31**	**-.60**	**-.53**
Poland	**-1.19**	**-1.27**	-.27	-.10	-.47	-.30	**-1.15**	**-1.15**	**-.65**	**-.30**	**-.55**	**-.63**
Romania	**-.92**	**-1.09**	-.36	-.39			**-.81**	**-.90**	.04	.40		
Yugoslavia	**-1.21**	**-1.27**	**-.82**	**-.65**	**-2.11**	**-1.99**	**-1.58**	**-1.25**	**-.82**	**-.23**	**-1.43**	**-1.03**
Other less developed countries												
Algeria	**-1.29**	**-1.31**			**-1.03**	**-1.10**	**-1.67**	**-1.84**			**-1.41**	**-1.25**
Bangladesh	**-1.17**	**-1.56**			**-.97**	**-.63**	**-1.31**	**-1.63**			**-3.47**	**-2.88**
China	**-1.51**	**-1.67**			**-.77**	**-.89**	**-1.42**	**-1.47**			**-1.18**	**-1.24**
Columbia	**-1.20**	**-.99**			-.50	-.25	**-.97**	**-.88**			**-1.30**	**-1.10**
Egypt	**-1.56**	**-1.90**			-.21	-.60	**-1.73**	**-2.13**			**-1.53**	**-1.59**
India	**-.97**	**-1.24**			**-.37**	**-.39**	**-1.38**	**-1.58**			**-1.01**	**-.90**
Iran	**-1.34**	**-1.59**	**-1.25**	**-1.64**	**-1.22**	**-1.42**	**-1.49**	**-1.64**	**-1.35**	**-1.23**	**-1.17**	**-1.30**
Iraq	**-2.23**	**-2.34**			**-1.73**	**-1.55**	**-2.25**	**-2.19**			**-1.80**	**-1.81**
Morocco	**-1.44**	**-1.46**	**-1.23**	-.67	-1.04	**-1.01**	**-1.61**	**-1.51**	**-2.07**	**-1.36**	**-1.32**	**-.77**
Pakistan	**-1.43**	**-1.68**			**-.94**	**-.85**	**-2.24**	**-2.54**			**-2.99**	**-2.67**
Philippines	-.39	-.33			**1.14**	**1.24**	**-.59**	**-.53**			.23	**.33**
Somalia	**-1.99**	**-1.84**			**-2.62**	**-1.97**	**-1.83**	**-1.39**			**-4.08**	**-2.78**
Sri Lanka	**-1.08**	**-1.08**			-.17	-.29	**-1.32**	**-1.11**			**-.62**	**-.54**
Turkey	**-1.23**	**-1.47**	**-1.27**	**-.97**	**-1.17**	**-.85**	**-1.98**	**-1.77**	**-1.84**	**-1.09**	**-2.03**	**-1.49**
Uganda	**-1.27**	**-1.42**			**-.73**	**-.92**	**-1.10**	**-.99**			**-1.06**	**-.94**
Vietnam	**-1.40**	**-1.35**	**-.63**	-.65	**-1.82**	**-1.46**	**-1.83**	**-1.32**	**-.84**	-.24	**-2.13**	**-1.64**
Other	**-1.32**	**-1.18**	**-.48**	**-.45**	**-.62**	**-.55**	**-1.17**	**-.90**	**-.45**	-.02	**-.44**	**-.32**
Native-born baseline	**2.69**	**3.58**	**2.07**	**2.64**	**2.03**	**2.92**	**2.61**	**3.27**	**1.01**	**1.84**	**1.11**	**2.07**

Sources: British Labour Force Surveys, Fall 1996-Fall 2004; German Mikrozensus, 1996 and 2000; Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data, 2002.

Notes: Sample includes persons of working age (25-59) who are native-born or immigrated as adults (aged 18+). Adjusted effects of origin country control for age, marital status, children, education, years since migration (=14 for immigrants), region, and survey year. The native-born baselines in "adjusted" columns control for variables at the approximate mean or mode for all three countries: age=40, spouse present, no children, and education=ISCED 3. See text for region and survey year details. Bold indicates coefficients significantly different from 0, p=.05, two-tailed test.

Table 3. Cross-national differences in origin effects on log odds of employment

	Men			Women		
	Germany vs. Sweden	Britain vs. Sweden	Britain vs. Germany	Germany vs. Sweden	Britain vs. Sweden	Britain vs. Germany
EU-15						
Austria	**1.18**			.51		
Britain	.73			**.76**		
France	**1.33**	**1.92**	.60	**1.00**	**1.05**	.06
Germany		**.52**			**.98**	
Greece	**2.02**	**1.38**	-.64	**2.44**	**1.16**	**-1.28**
Italy	**.85**	**1.26**	.41	**1.13**	**1.01**	-.12
Netherlands	**1.40**	**1.59**	.19	.38	**.95**	.57
Portugal	**1.29**	**1.53**	.24	**1.16**	**1.40**	.25
Spain	**1.58**	**.93**	-.65	**.84**	**1.14**	.30
Other more developed countries						
Australia		**2.87**			**2.01**	
Canada		**1.79**			**1.22**	
Japan		**2.04**			-.34	
US	**1.30**	**2.11**	.81	**1.28**	**1.16**	-.12
Eastern Europe						
FSU	**.85**	**1.10**	.25	**1.13**	**.91**	-.22
Poland	**1.17**	**.97**	-.19	**.86**	**.52**	-.34
Romania	.70			**1.30**		
Yugoslavia	**.62**	**-.72**	**-1.34**	**1.01**	.22	**-.79**
Other less developed countries						
Algeria		.20			.59	
Bangladesh		**.93**			**-1.25**	
China		**.79**			.23	
Columbia		.74			-.22	
Egypt		**1.30**			.54	
India		**.85**			**.67**	
Iran	-.05	.17	.22	.41	.34	-.06
Iraq		**.79**			.38	
Morocco	**.79**	.45	-.33	.16	**.74**	.58
Pakistan		**.83**			-.13	
Philippines		**1.58**			**.85**	
Somalia		-.14			**-1.39**	
Sri Lanka		**.79**			**.57**	
Turkey	**.50**	**.63**	.13	**.68**	.28	**-.40**
Uganda		.50			.05	
Vietnam	.71	-.11	-.81	**1.08**	-.32	**-1.40**
Other	**.73**	**.63**	-.10	**.88**	**.59**	**-.30**
Native-born baseline (mean)	**-.94**	**-.66**	**.28**	**-1.43**	**-1.20**	**.23**

Sources: British Labour Force Surveys, Fall 1996-Fall 2004; German Mikrozensus, 1996 and 2000; Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data, 2002.

Notes: Sample includes persons of working age (25-59) who are native-born or immigrated as adults (aged 18+). Effects of origin country control for age, marital status, children, education, years since migration (=14 for immigrants), region, and survey year. The native-born baselines control for variables at the approximate mean or mode for all three countries: age=40, spouse present, no children, and education=ISCED 3. See text for region and survey year details. Bold indicates a statistically significant cross-national difference based on a Wald chi-square test with 1 degree of freedom (critical value=3.84, p=.05).

Table 4. Human capital and socio-demographic effects on log odds of employment

	Men						Women					
	Sweden		Germany		Britain		Sweden		Germany		Britain	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Age	**-.025**	.002	**-.023**	.002	**-.043**	.001	**-.021**	.002	**-.039**	.002	**-.033**	.001
Age squared	**-.001**	.000	**-.005**	.000	**-.002**	.000	**-.001**	.000	**-.004**	.000	**-.003**	.000
Age x foreign-born	**-.021**	.002	**-.015**	.006	.001	.005	**-.025**	.002	**.018**	.005	**-.016**	.004
Age squared x foreign-born	.000	.000	**.002**	.000	.001	.000	**-.001**	.000	**.001**	.000	**.001**	.000
Spouse present	**1.35**	.03	**1.11**	.04	**1.35**	.02	**.86**	.03	**-.19**	.03	**.61**	.01
Spouse x foreign-born (spouse is native-born)	**-.20**	.06	**-.28**	.13	-.06	.10	-.01	.04	**-.28**	.10	**-.18**	.06
Spouse x foreign-born (spouse is foreign-born)	**-.84**	.04	**-.33**	.11	**-.42**	.08	**-.59**	.03	.00	.09	**-.46**	.05
Preschool children present	**.51**	.06	**.17**	.07	**-.20**	.03	**.40**	.04	**-1.19**	.03	**-1.31**	.02
School-aged children present	**.53**	.04	**.24**	.05	**-.22**	.02	**.34**	.03	**-.68**	.03	**-.56**	.01
Preschool children x foreign-born	**-.40**	.06	**-.33**	.13	.03	.08	**-.41**	.05	-.08	.09	-.05	.06
School-aged children x foreign-born	**-.32**	.04	**-.43**	.10	-.02	.07	**-.19**	.04	**.22**	.07	.01	.05
ISCED 2	**-.26**	.06	.10	.07	**1.02**	.02	**.19**	.05	.08	.05	**1.00**	.01
ISCED 3	**.48**	.06	**.69**	.06	**1.18**	.02	**1.14**	.05	**.66**	.05	**1.08**	.02
ISCED 4	**.75**	.08	**1.19**	.07	**1.61**	.04	**1.21**	.08	**1.28**	.06	**1.59**	.02
ISCED 5/6	**.99**	.06	**1.79**	.08	**1.92**	.03	**1.98**	.06	**1.55**	.06	**1.82**	.02
ISCED 2 x foreign-born	**.47**	.07	**.33**	.12	**-.38**	.14	**.21**	.06	**.34**	.10	.13	.09
ISCED 3 x foreign-born	.07	.06	.00	.11	**-.29**	.07	**-.21**	.06	**.37**	.10	**-.17**	.06
ISCED 4 x foreign-born	**-.20**	.10	-.21	.17	-.08	.18	**-.29**	.10	-.03	.14	**.29**	.10
ISCED 5/6 x foreign-born	**-.26**	.07	**-.95**	.16	**-.41**	.10	**-.76**	.06	**-.62**	.13	-.13	.08
Years since migration	**.058**	.002	**.045**	.006	**.042**	.004	**.057**	.002	**.043**	.005	**.043**	.003
Years since migration squared	**-.002**	.000	**-.003**	.000	**-.002**	.000	**-.002**	.000	**-.003**	.000	**-.002**	.000
Native-born baseline	**1.83**	.07	**.85**	.08	**.41**	.05	**1.27**	.06	**1.40**	.07	**.41**	.04

Sources: British Labour Force Surveys, Fall 1996-Fall 2004; German Mikrozensus, 1996 and 2000; Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data, 2002.

Notes: Sample includes persons of working age (25-59) who are native-born or immigrated as adults (aged 18+). Reference categories for the native-born baseline are single/not married, no children present, and ISCED 1. Age is centered at 40. Years since migration is centered at 14 (native-born persons coded 0). Figures are taken from a model that also includes dummy variables for countries of origin (native-born persons coded 0), survey year, and region. Bold indicates coefficients significantly different from 0, p=.05, two-tailed test.

Figure 1.
Effects of time since migration on immigrant employment



Note: Effects are fixed at 0 for years=14.