Religion, Work-Family Gender Ideology, and Fertility

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ABSTRACT

Given evidence suggesting (1) religion and work-family gender ideology are each related to fertility behavior, and (2) variance in religious institutions' promotion of gendered patterns of family organization, this paper explores whether work-family gender ideology is a mechanism through which religious affiliation and/or practice influences childbearing. We use NLSY79 data to evaluate how childhood religious affiliation, more recent religious service attendance, and attitudes towards the roles of men and women in family life relate to the hazard of first premarital and first marital births. We find that for both men and women having less egalitarian work-family gender ideologies somewhat explains the elevated risk of a premarital birth for those raised in a Conservative Protestant religious tradition. Otherwise relationships between either religion and fertility or work-family gender ideology and fertility remain largely independent of one another. Our findings further elucidate relationships between religion and family formation and how attitudes toward gendered family organization might and might not factor in the process.

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Increasingly, research is identifying ways in which aspects of family formation are related to the religious beliefs and practices of family members. One of the more established streams of research regarding the religion-family nexus is that regarding associations between individual religious characteristics and fertility behavior. Through time and in many locations throughout the world, studies have shown childbearing-related outcomes such as the risk of premarital birth, timing of first or second marital births, number of children ever born, and contraceptive use to vary by religious affiliation, frequency of religious participation, and/or the personal importance given to religion (Chamie 1981; Johnson 1993; Knodel, Chamrathrithirong, and Debavalya 1987; Morgan, Stash, Smith, and Mason 2002; Mosher, Williams, and Johnson 1992; Pearce forthcoming).

In the body of work focused on religion and fertility, multiple theories are offered regarding the mechanisms of religious influence, including suggestions that many religious beliefs and practices reinforce a particularly gendered view of family roles that is more rewarding of women having children earlier in the life course; however, rarely are these kinds of hypotheses (about how religion has an impact) examined empirically. In this paper, we explore whether ideas about how the gendered balance of work inside and outside the home, or what we refer to as *work-family gender ideology*, may partly explain religious differentials in both premarital and marital fertility behavior of both women and men. We further examine the extent to which educational attainment, employment, cohabitation, and/or marriage mediate any relationships between religion and/or work-family gender ideology and fertility.

BACKGROUND & THEORY

Religion and Fertility

Beginning with the Demographic Transition Theory, complex explanations for fertility behavior often recognize some role of religion. Although demographic transition theory and the many refinements that have followed are often criticized for a lack of attention to cultural and ideational processes, a recognition of the role religion plays in fertility transitions is not absent. Notestein (1945) discusses how religious doctrine encourages high fertility and writes that the power of values and customs could limit the influence of economic development on fertility. Elaborating classic transition theory, Lesthaeghe (1983; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986) argues that secularization, or the loss of religious authority over realms of life such as family formation, along with increasing individualism, were both key factors in European fertility transitions. Also, adaptations of the microeconomic theories of fertility, such as Easterlin's framework (1975, 1978; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985), leave room for religion as a force that might increase the demand for children or perhaps increase the "psychic costs" of fertility limitation. These ideas refer to the possible influence of both the dogma of the religion one affiliates (i.e., values and ideas) with and the level of religious involvement (i.e., customs).

The majority of research about connections between religion and fertility at the micro-level focuses on religious group differences in fertility behavior. For example, from the mid-1940s through the late 1960s, researchers find Catholics desired, expected, and had more children than Protestants in the U.S. (Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell 1959; Ryder and Westoff 1971; Westoff, Potter, and Sagi 1964; Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson 1966). Since

the 1970s, Catholic-Protestant differences in fertility have converged and now non-Hispanic white Catholics have fewer children than non-Hispanic white Protestants (Mosher and Hendershot 1984a; Mosher, Johnson, and Horn 1986; Mosher, Williams, and Johnson 1992; Westoff and Jones 1979).[1] Within Protestantism, studies show substantial variation in fertility across affiliations (DeJong 1965; Marcum 1981). Also, several studies have highlighted the distinctively higher fertility of Mormons compared to other religious groups in the United States (DeHart 1941; Heaton and Goodman 1985; Spicer and Gustavus 1974; Thornton 1979; Westoff and Potvin 1967).

In contexts outside the United States, other religio-ethnic differences in fertility have been highlighted. Chamie (1981) finds Lebanese Muslims and Christians to differ from each other in their fertility behavior, fertility preferences, and contraceptive knowledge. Knodel, Chamrathrithirong, and Debavalya (1987) find higher fertility among Thai Muslims than for Thai Buddhists. Johnson (1993) finds differences between the fertility of Hindus, Christians, and Muslims in various states of India. And, Morgan, Stash, Smith, and Mason (2002) find Muslims to desire more additional children and to be less likely to use contraception when they desire no more children than non-Muslims in a variety of settings.

One of the main hypotheses offered for why there exist religious group differentials in fertility is that there are *particularized theologies* that support certain types of demographic behavior (Goldscheider 1971). For example, among certain religious groups, explicit theological

[1]One exception to this pattern of results is that Williams and Zimmer (1990) find higher Catholic marital fertility among the general population of the Providence, Rhode Island metropolitan area in 1967 and 1980. They hypothesize that the high concentration of Catholics in this region re-enforces high fertility norms.

canon about the benefits of reproduction and restrictions on contraception may affect what adherents deem as preferable and possible. Goldscheider (1971) also writes that religion shapes more general value orientations or worldviews that could influence demographic behavior. One more general set of ideas shown to be related to one's religious affiliation and fertility behavior, thus possibly operating as a link between the two, are attitudes that comprise what we refer to as work-family gender ideology.

Work-Family Gender Ideology

Work-family gender ideology is the collection of attitudes one has about the relative amount of power heterosexual spouses should have compared to one another and the focus of each spouse's time and energy (home or work or both). Work-family gender ideology encompasses attitudes about whether or not women or mothers should work outside the home, attitudes about whether it is harmful to children when their mothers work outside the home, and attitudes about whether men should be equally as involved in housework and/or childcare as women. Below, we explain how religion may be related to work-family gender ideology, and then how work-family gender ideology may serve as a mechanism for the influence of religion on fertility behavior, both premarital and marital, for women and men.

Religion and Work-Family Gender Ideology

Although the relationship between religion and beliefs about gender is complex (Denton 2004), researchers generally find theologically conservative religious adherents, especially those that attend religious services more often, to be less egalitarian regarding gendered family organization (Hertel and Hughes 1987; Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991). Many researchers have found that the language of "husband as head of the family" continues to be a core

component of the Conservative Protestant dialogue about gender ideology (Bartkowski 2001; Denton 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Pearce and Thornton 2006; Smith and Lundquist 2000). In the U.S., Conservative Protestants are typically found to be the least supportive of egalitarian work-family gender ideology and Jews and the non-religiously affiliated the most supportive, with Catholics and Mainline and African American Protestants somewhere in between (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Greeley 1989; Hoffman and Miller 1997, 1998, but see Fan and Marini 2000). Although African American Protestant denominations tend to be more conservative theologically, they tend to be more egalitarian in their models of family life (Glass and Jacobs 2005).

Childhood is a crucial point in the life course for socialization and foundations of values, beliefs, and attitudes that inform ideas and actions later in life. Thus, the work-family gender ideology promoted by the religious tradition in which a person is raised may leave a lasting imprint on one's ideas in adulthood about the gendered division of labor force participation, housework, and childcare within a family (Glass and Jacobs 2005). Therefore, we expect those raised in Conservative Protestant traditions will have the least egalitarian work-family gender ideologies, those raised Jewish or with no religious affiliation will have the most egalitarian ideologies, and those raised in Catholic, Mainline Protestant, of African American Protestant traditions will fall in between.

Independent of the religious affiliation in which a person is raised, or with which a person currently identifies, Pearce and Thornton (2006) also find a relationship between religious service attendance and espousing less egalitarian work-family gender ideology. While not all religious organizations and congregations emphasize the breadwinner-housewife model of

family organization, and in fact, many directly encourage more egalitarian frameworks, on average, religious service attendance is related to less egalitarian work-family gender ideology. In theory, it seems that there would be an interactive effect between affiliation and attendance, such that attendance within a particularly conservative religious group would have a strong negative relationship with egalitarian work-family gender ideology and attendance in a less conservative religious group would be less associated, or even positively associated with egalitarian ideology. However, in Pearce and Thornton's (2006) work, they find the relationships between affiliation and attendance and gender ideology to be additive to one another rather than interactive. It seems that, on average, attendance at any kind of religious services is negatively related to having egalitarian gender ideology and affiliation in a conservative religion increases the level of anti-egalitarianism, but not in a multiplicative manner. Now that we've outlined the theoretical basis for relationships between religion and work-family gender ideology, we turn to highlighting possible relationships between work-family gender ideology and fertility.

Work-Family Gender Ideology and Fertility

Research suggests that an individual's work-family gender ideology is a lens through which they see the world and organize their lives (Barber and Axinn 1998; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Mahaffy and Ward 2002). Family-related decisions, including fertility, provide opportunities for people to enact their beliefs about the extent to which women's and men's work- and family-related behaviors should be similar or not. While some research has found that the timing of childbearing is related to beliefs about the importance of family in women's lives (Dion, 1995; Matthews and Beaujot, 1997; Thomson, 1997), the nature of this relationship has

been more difficult to discern. In general, women with more egalitarian gender ideologies have children at a slower pace and later than do women with more traditional gender ideologies (Cunningham, Beutel, Barber, and Thornton 2005; Matthews and Beaujot 1997; Stewart 2003; but also see Thomson 1997). As role conflict theory would predict, if having children is seen as a time intensive activity likely to conflict with efforts to obtain higher education or establish a career, childbearing is more likely to be delayed (Crimmins et al 1991).

Cunningham et al. (2005) argue and demonstrate evidence that work-family gender ideology will be more strongly related to the timing of a first marital birth than the risk of a premarital birth. Premarital births are much less likely to be planned and are less socially acceptable (Abma et al. 1997). However, Plotnick (1992) shows that positive attitudes and expectations for education are related to lower odds of having a premarital birth, suggesting that higher educational aspirations, usually associated with more egalitarian attitudes, may provide the motivation to avoid mistimed, often premarital, births. Young people with more egalitarian work-family gender ideologies may be more likely to take steps to avoid pregnancy. Also, when a premarital pregnancy occurs, women and men who view women's primary role in family life to care for children and manage home life, may be less likely to end the pregnancy through abortion.

Having children young, either within marriage or not, may not appear as risky to young women who plan to specialize more in home and family activities than work and career throughout life. Thus, for both women and men, having a work-family gender ideology supportive of the male breadwinner and female homemaker model, makes one more likely to have a premaritally conceived child and to have an earlier first marital birth than others.

Connecting Religion, Work-Family Gender Ideology, and Fertility

We have now theorized connections between religion and work-family gender ideology and between work-family gender ideology and fertility, so based on these ideas, we argue that work-gender ideology is likely to be a mechanism for the influence of religion on fertility behavior. To the extent that a person is exposed to particular theologies growing up, or active in religious organizations as an adult, that reify a model of family life where men are more involved in the labor market and women are more involved in family and home activities, work-family gender ideology may be part of the reason that religious affiliation or religious service attendance are related to the risk of a premarital birth, or the timing of a marital first birth.

Given that work-family gender ideology may help explain why religion is related to fertility behavior, a further understanding of these dynamics is achieved in understanding the ways in which gender ideologies are acted out in arenas of life, such as education, employment, and union formation, that also shape fertility behavior. In fact, prior research has shown evidence of educational enrollment and attainment, employment, and residential union status to be mediators in the relationship between religion and fertility behavior (Pearce forthcoming). Therefore, it may be that religion's connection to work-family gender ideology is part of what explains religion's interconnected influence on all of these key events in the transition to adulthood (Glass and Jacobs 2005).

Although there is evidence that pregnancy-related decisions are fraught with power dynamics within a relationship (Fried and Udry 1979), ultimately the decision to continue with a pregnancy lies with the woman. Given that women are more religious than men (De Vaus and McAllister 1987; Miller and Stark 2002) and that women are more likely to hold egalitarian

work-family gender ideologies (Davis, forthcoming; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Fan and Marini 2000), it stands to reason that the processes influencing the rate of premarital and marital first births may differ for women and men. As such, we perform our analyses separately by gender.

For a summary of our overarching theoretical model, please see Figure 1. We expect that variance in religious affiliation in childhood and in proximate religious participation will be related to work-family gender ideology in ways that will shape fertility behavior. In addition, we expect that educational, employment, and union formation behaviors will help explain the role of religion and work-family gender ideology in shaping fertility behavior.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

DATA AND METHODS

The empirical analyses performed to test our hypotheses will use data from the first twenty-one waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Beginning in 1979 a national probability sample of 12,686 youth ages 14-22 were interviewed yearly until 1994 and then bi-annually from 1996 until the present. In 2004, the final year of data used in these analyses, the study had a retention rate of 76.7% (NLS Handbook 2005).

The NLSY79 contains rich prospective data on fertility, marriage, cohabitation, schooling, and work behaviors as well as a handful of items on gender ideology, religious affiliation and religious service attendance asked at multiple points in the panel study. We will use the marital and fertility information to construct the dependent variables for analyses. We will use the other prospective data and a variety of baseline measures from the 1979 survey

about family background and socio-demographic characteristics as independent variables. The key advantage to using these data to study religion, gender ideology, and fertility are the longitudinal nature of the data allowing fertility timing to be modeled using measures of gender ideology, religious affiliation and religious service attendance that precede fertility timing.

Religion Measures

Our analyses focuses on two dimensions of religion: religious affiliation and public religious practice. The feature of religious affiliation that is measured for these analyses is the religious affiliation in which respondents were raised. Respondents were asked, "In what religion were you raised?" If respondent said, "Protestant" or "Christian" a probe was asked to try and identify a specific denomination. Responses were coded into one of seven categories (Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Conservative Protestant, African American Protestant, other Protestant, other religion, and no religion) based on the RELTRAD coding scheme described by Steensland et al. (2000). Once the categories were created, dummy variables were created for membership in each category.

To measure the frequency of religious service attendance in 1979 and 1982, respondents were asked, "In the past year, about how often have you attended religious services–more than once a week, about once a week, two or three times a month, about once a month, several times or less during the year, or not at all?" The coding of these responses ranges from 1 = "not at all" to 6 = "more than once a week." Because the unit of analysis for these analyses are person-year observations, frequency of religious service attendance is a time-varying measure. For those person-year observations that take place after 1979, but before 1982, the measure of religious service attendance that is used is from 1979. For those person-year observations that take place

after 1982, the measure of religious service attendance in 1982 is used. In both cases, the measure of frequency of religious service attendance comes before the risk period, but this strategy allows for the most recent report of religious service attendance to be the one allowed to influence fertility timing.

Work-Family Gender Ideology Measure

Work-family gender ideology is be measured through a battery of eight statements called Family Attitudes Questions in the NLSY (asked in 1979, 1982 and 1987), with responses ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree (responses of "Strongly Agree" were scored "1"; responses of "Strongly Disagree" were scored "4") for each statement. The statements are as follows:

1. A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop.
2. A wife who carries out her full family responsibilities doesn't have time for outside employment.
3. A working wife feels more useful than one who doesn't hold a job.
4. The employment of wives leads to more juvenile delinquency.
5. Employment of both parents is necessary to keep up with the high cost of living.
6. It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.
7. Men should share the work around the house with women, such as doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth.
8. Women are much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children.

Statements 3, 5, and 7 were reverse scored so that high scores on all items represent an

egalitarian attitude, while low scores indicate a less egalitarian attitude.

Within the analysis, the scores for Family Attitudes Questions were added together to determine a respondent's work-family gender ideology. Due to low inter-item correlations, the final six item scale excluded items three and five. For any given year at risk of premarital or marital birth, a respondent's work-family gender ideology was fixed as their score from the most recently administered scale items.

Socio-Demographic Characteristic Measures

According to the characteristics hypothesis, there are certain socio-demographic characteristics that may explain a relationship between religion and fertility, so in these analyses, we include controls for a variety of factors which may be independent of the relationship between religion and fertility or may serve as mechanisms explaining the relationship.

Background socio-demographic characteristics that we include as controls are gender, race/ethnicity, mother's education, and whether the individual lived with two biological parents at age 14. All of these characteristics were measured in 1979. In all models, we also include a set of dummy variables for ages 15-41 and leave out the dummy variable for age 14 for comparison purposes. This is how we control for the passage of time in these processes.

Measures of Education, Employment, and Union Status

Other factors that may serve as mechanisms for the influence of religion and/or work-family gender ideology include educational attainment and whether or not an individual is enrolled in school, employed, cohabiting, or married. These variables are all coded as time-varying and are measured at each interview (the beginning of each person-year period of observations). Thus, for example, it is the effect of whether or not a person is enrolled in school

at time *t*, total years of education at time *t,* whether a respondent is employed at time *t*, or whether a respondent is cohabiting or married at time *t* on whether or not a person has a birth between *t* and *t* + 1.

Analytical Strategy

We employ discrete-time event history models to estimate the relationship between both religious affiliation in childhood and recent frequency of religious service attendance on timing of first births, and ascertain the results of including gender ideology in the model.[2] The unit of analysis is the person-year of exposure to first childbirth. Thus, the data contain multiple observations for each respondent; the number of observations corresponds to the number of years the individual is at risk for a first birth. For each year before the year of the pregnancy that resulted in the first birth, the dependent variable is coded 0 and the year in which the pregnancy leading to the first birth occurred is coded 1. For respondents who did not experience a first birth before the final interview in 2004, the dependent variable is coded 0 for all person-years.

We use logistic regression to estimate the discrete-time hazard models. Although sample size is increased substantially by using person-years of exposure to risk as the unit of analyses, Petersen (1986, 1991) and Allison (1982, 1984) show that the use of discrete-time methods does not deflate the standard errors, and thus provides appropriate tests of the statistical significance. In addition, because the probability of becoming pregnant within each one-year interval is relatively small, the estimates obtained via discrete-time methods approximate those that would be obtained through continuous-time methods. Furthermore, discrete-time methods using

[2]For additional information on discrete-time hazard models, see Allison (1982, 1984); Petersen (1986, 1991).

person-years of exposure are appropriate because the data about first birth timing are precise to the year. Because the data collection began in 1979, the hazard models begin in that year. The respondents who had a first birth prior to 1979 are excluded from these analyses.

To examine how religion is related to the timing of both premaritally and maritally conceived first births, we estimate separate hazard models using a competing risks framework. For premaritally conceived first births, marriage is the competing risk; therefore, respondents who married without a premaritally conceived first birth are no longer considered at risk, once they have married. For maritally conceived first births, a premarital first birth is the competing risk; therefore respondents who conceived a first birth before marriage are no longer considered at risk of a marital first birth.

In the analyses of premarital childbearing, only first births that occur either before marriage or fewer than nine months after marriage are considered to be premarital births. In the analyses of marital childbearing, respondents are considered to be at risk of a marital first birth starting from the beginning of the study in 1979,[3] but only first births that occur at least nine months after marriage are considered marital births.

Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in our event history analyses and separated out by dependent variable (premarital vs. marital birth) and gender. Table 1 suggests that the proportion of women and men experiencing premarital and marital first births

[3]Alternatively, young people could also only be considered to be at risk of a marital childbirth after marriage. Constructing the analyses in this way removes the dynamics of the marriage process from consideration in the speed at which young adults enter marital parenthood. Marriage timing is one way in which religion may influence how quickly individuals become parents; therefore these analyses allow young people to be at risk of marital childbearing before they are married. Limiting the risk of marital childbearing to married respondents, however, does not significantly change the substantive findings reported here.

within the time period under study do not seem to differ. However, the processes contributing to the timing of premarital and marital births do differ, according to the likelihood ratio tests for our full models in Tables 2 and 3 (likelihood ratio test: $\chi^2 = 88.054$ with 45 degrees of freedom) and Tables 4 and 5 (likelihood ratio test: $\chi^2 = 103.036$ with 45 degrees of freedom). Therefore, we present our results for both premarital and marital first births separately by gender of respondent.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

RESULTS

Risk of Premarital First Births

Table 2 presents the results of analyses exploring the relationships among the religion in which a respondent was raised, the frequency with which an individual attends religious services, work-family gender ideology, and the risk of a premaritally conceived birth for female respondents. Table 3 presents comparable results for male respondents. The first model in each table includes only those controls measured in 1979. The four following models add time-varying measures of work-family gender ideology, education, employment, and union experience.

TABLES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE

In Model 1 for both women and men, those raised Conservative Protestant are more likely to have a premaritally conceived birth than those raised Mainline Protestant. Further analyses not displayed here show that those raised in a Conservative Protestant tradition are more likely than all others to experience a premarital birth. Catholic men are also more likely than Mainline Protestant men to have a premaritally conceived child born. In Model 2, when the

measure of work-family gender ideology is added to the model, part of the relationship between being raised Conservative Protestant is explained for women and coefficient for men who are raised as Conservative Protestants becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting being less egalitarian accounts for most of the relationship. This implies that Conservative Protestants being more likely than others to have children before marriage may be related to their belief that women should specialize more in care giving than in income generation, thus they may be less likely to avoid pregnancy and more likely to forgo abortion in the event of an unplanned pregnancy.

Religious service attendance is negatively related to the risk of a premarital birth for both women and men and the consistency of these coefficients across Models 1 and 2 suggest this relationship has little to do with any relationship between religious service attendance and work-family gender ideology. In fact, however, in Model 3, where current educational enrollment and years of education are included, the relationship between work-family gender ideology and the risk of a premarital birth becomes statistically insignificant for women and weakens for men. This suggests those that are more egalitarian are also more likely to be in school and have received more years of education which then encourages the avoidance or postponement of a premarital birth.

Also in Model 3, for both women and men, the inverse relationship between religious service attendance and having a premarital birth becomes statistically insignificant when the education measures are included. Thus, it seems that regular religious service attendance encourages higher educational attainment which discourages having children before marriage. Religious service attendance may signal conformance to the conventional timing of life course

events, focusing on completing education and delaying births until after marriage. This relationship exists independently of respondents' beliefs about gendered roles in the family.

Models 4 and 5 show that current employment does not seem related to the risk of a premarital birth, while being in a nonmarital cohabiting relationship does increase the risk of having a premarital birth for women and men.

Risk of Marital First Births

Table 4 displays the results of analyses to explore the relationship between religious affiliation in childhood, religious service attendance, work-family gender ideology, and the timing of maritally conceived first births for women. Table 5 presents comparable results for male respondents.

TABLES 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE

In general, there are no differences in the timing of marital first births by religion in which respondents were raised except for the consistently lower risk of marital first birth for men raised in no religious tradition as compared to those men raised Mainline Protestant. On the other hand, more frequent religious service attendance is positively related to both women's and men's risk of marital first birth. Across all five models, controlling for background characteristics and adult experiences, individuals with more frequent religious service attendance have marital first births at a faster rate than those who attend religious services less frequently. This effect is independent of educational attainment, employment status, and work-family gender ideology.

Although more egalitarian women and men have first marital births at a slower rate than

less egalitarian individuals, this relationship is apparent only once educational attainment and enrollment are controlled. This negative relationship between egalitarian work-family gender ideologies and risk of marital birth is independent of religious affiliation, religious service attendance, employment status, and union formation. In addition, work-family gender ideology does not seem mediate the effect of religious service attendance on risk of marital first birth. In models not shown here, we tested whether the effect of religious service attendance differs based on the extent to which individuals hold egalitarian work-family gender ideologies and we found no statistically significant interactions.

CONCLUSIONS

Altogether, we find limited evidence for a key role of work-family gender ideology being a link between religion and the timing of births. Adding to previous research identifying an elevated risk of premaritally conceived births to men and women who were raised in a Conservative Protestant tradition, we find that this elevated risk is largely related to the less egalitarian work-family gender ideologies these individuals tend to hold. To the extent that young Conservative Protestant men and women are socialized to expect women to focus more on family work than income generation, they may be doing less to avoid pregnancy, if they are having sex. It is well established that Conservative Protestant youth tend to start having sex later than other youth (Thornton and Camburn 1987), yet Bruckner and Bearman's (2005) research shows that those who make virginity pledges (mainly Conservative Protestant adolescents) are less likely to use contraception when they begin to have sex, therefore placing them at high risk for a pregnancy or STD. Also, if an unplanned pregnancy occurs, youth raised in Conservative

Protestant homes may be less likely to seek an abortion, thus making their premaritally conceived birth rate higher, not because they are more likely to get pregnant than other youth, but because they are less likely to terminate their pregnancies. Further investigations into the ways these relationships play themselves out will benefit our understandings of how being raised as a Conservative Protestant shapes the transition to adulthood differently than for others.

The only other situation in which childhood religious affiliation seems to matter for fertility outcomes is that men who were raised with no religious affiliation are slower than other men to have a first child. This is even after controlling for more proximate levels of religious service attendance. Therefore, something about being raised in a religious context, regardless of attendance later on, promotes a delay in childbearing. Although Conservative Protestant denominations garner much attention regarding their encouragement (subtle and explicit) for marrying and having children early, these values are not unique to these religious groups (Pearce 2002a). Almost every religion values reproduction of its members and because religious institutions focus many services and activities around family life, men who are exposed to these family formation encouragements from a young age may be more likely to begin their families earlier. Perhaps this relationship exists only for men, because expectations for women to value childbearing are widespread, so additional emphasis on the value of parenthood through religious institutions is less powerful. For men, the emphasis on fatherhood encouraged through religious institutions may be uniquely oppositional to messages about educational and career achievement sent through other institutions.

Although we find religious service attendance to be inversely related to the risk of a premarital birth and to speed up the timing of a first marital birth, we find no evidence that work-

family gender ideology plays a role in this relationship. What does appear to be the case is that attendance at religious services discourages premarital births by encouraging educational enrollment and attainment, regardless of one's work-family ideologies. For marital births, the relationships between religious service attendance and education remain very independent and statistically significant. Overall, educational enrollment and achievement are strongly related to fertility timing, so understanding how religion relates to education choices helps us better understand how religion shapes fertility.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Event History Analysis of Transitions to First Marital and First Premarital Births: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002

		Female First Premarital Birth Analyses		Male First Marital Birth Analyses		Female First Premarital Birth Analyses		Male First Marital Birth Analyses	
Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Premarital birth	Premarital birth transition between *t* & *t*+1	.03	.18	.03	.17				
Marital birth	Marital birth transition between *t* & *t*+1					.04	.20	.03	.18
Raised Catholic	Raised in Catholic tradition	.39	.49	.37	.48	.36	.48	.36	.48
Raised Mainline Protestant	Raised in a Mainline Protestant tradition	.22	.42	.22	.41	.21	.41	.21	.40
Raised Conservative Protestant	Raised in a Conservative Protestant tradition	.17	.37	.17	.38	.18	.38	.17	.37
Raised African American Protestant	Raised in an African American Protestant tradition	.11	.31	.11	.31	.14	.35	.14	.34
Raised other Protestant	Raised in a Protestant tradition other than those listed above	.04	.19	.05	.21	.04	.19	.04	.21
Raised other religion	Raised in a religion other than those listed above	.04	.21	.04	.20	.03	.16	.05	.19
Raised no religion	Raised in no religious tradition	.02	.15	.04	.20	.03	.16	.05	.21
Frequency of religious service attendance	Frequency of religious service attendance from most recent survey, 1979 or 1982 (ranges from 1=not at all, to 6=more than once a week)	3.36	1.67	2.97	1.66	3.23	1.67	2.81	1.63
Age	Age in years at *t*	21.10	4.16	21.68	4.28	24.44	5.80	24.59	5.76
Race/Ethnicity									
White	Self-identified as non-Hispanic white	.49	.50	.51	.50	.44	.50	.46	.50
Black	Self-identified as non-Hispanic black	.17	.38	.17	.37	.23	.42	.21	.41
Latino	Self-identified as Hispanic	.14	.34	.13	.33	.14	.35	.14	.34
Other	Self-identified as other race	.20	.40	.20	.40	.19	.39	.20	.40
Mother's education	Mother's years of schooling	11.37	3.09	11.32	3.20	11.16	3.10	11.17	3.15
Two bio parents at age 14	Lived with two biological parents at age 14 (0=no; 1=yes)	.78	.41	.77	.42	.75	.43	.75	.43
Total net family income	Net family income in 1979	19199	14318	18496	14117	17218	13365	17377	13336
Work-Family gender ideology	Summed index measuring level of gender egalitarianism in work-family division of responsibilities	18.74	2.99	17.06	3.00	18.85	3.00	17.30	2.98
Accumulated years of education	Years of school completed at *t*	12.47	2.39	12.22	2.47	12.66	2.30	12.37	2.44
Currently enrolled in school	Enrolled in school at *t* (0=no; 1=yes)	.43	.50	.36	.48	.26	.44	.24	.43

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Event History Analysis of Transitions to First Marital and First Premarital Births: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002

		Female First Premarital Birth Analyses		Male First Marital Birth Analyses		Female First Premarital Birth Analyses		Male First Marital Birth Analyses	
Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Currently employed	Employed at *t* (0=no; 1=yes)	.76	.43	.82	.38	.80	.40	.87	.33
Currently cohabiting	Cohabiting with romantic partner at *t*	.06	.24	.04	.20				
Currently married	Married at *t* (0=no; 1=yes)					.61	.49	.59	.49
N		16,485		20,216		58,483		43,694	

Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis of Female Transition to First Premarital Birth, Treating Marriage as a Competing Risk: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Hazard of First Premarital Birth				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raised Catholic[a]	.21	.20	.18	.18	.18
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Raised Conservative Protestant[a]	.31*	.29*	.25	.25	.26
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Raised African American Protestant [a]	.02	.02	-.02	-.02	-.03
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)
Raised other Protestant [a]	.17	.16	.13	.14	.11
	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)
Raised other religion [a]	.05	.03	.04	.04	.06
	(.24)	(.24)	(.24)	(.24)	(.24)
Raised no religion [a]	.38	.36	.32	.33	.31
	(.28)	(.26)	(.26)	(.26)	(.26)
Frequency of religious service attendance	-.05*	-.05*	-.03	-.03	-.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Race/Ethnicity [b]					
Black	.81***	.82***	.87***	.88***	.92***
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Latino	.11	.12	.14	.15	.17
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Other	.07	.07	.08	.07	.07
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)
Mother's education	-.07***	-.06***	-.04**	-.05**	-.05**
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Two bio parents at age 14	-.36***	-.36***	-.33***	-.33**	-.31**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Total Net Family Income	-.06*	-.06*	-.05	-.05*	-.04
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)
Work-Family Gender Ideology		-.03*	-.01	-.01	-.01
		(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Accumulated years of education			-.08**	-.08**	-.07*
			(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Currently enrolled in school			-.38***	-.37***	-.34**
			(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Currently employed				.13	.13
				(.10)	(.10)
Currently cohabiting					.92***
					(.14)
Chi-Square Value	249.34	254.24	272.71	273.24	304.96
Degrees of Freedom	40	41	43	44	45
Number of Person-Years	18,240	18,240	18,240	18,240	18,240

Notes: All chi-square values are significant at .001. Models also include dummy variables representing each age from 14 to 41.

[a] Reference group is "Raised in Mainline Protestant tradition"

[b] Reference group is White

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of Male Transition to First Premarital Birth, Treating Marriage as a Competing Risk: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Hazard of First Premarital Birth				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raised Catholic[a]	.26*	.27*	.23	.23	.23
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Raised Conservative Protestant[a]	.29*	.26	.19	.19	.19
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Raised African American Protestant [a]	.10	.09	.04	.03	.03
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)
Raised other Protestant [a]	.25	.23	.17	.17	.18
	(.20)	(.20)	(.20)	(.20)	(.20)
Raised other religion [a]	-.15	-.16	-.14	-.14	-.14
	(.25)	(.25)	(.25)	(.25)	(.25)
Raised no religion [a]	.37	.37	.25	.25	.24
	(.19)	(.19)	(.19)	(.19)	(.19)
Frequency of religious service attendance	-.06**	-.07**	-.04	-.04	-.04
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Race/Ethnicity [b]					
Black	.80***	.83***	.83***	.84***	.84***
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Latino	.29*	.27	.28*	.29*	.29*
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Other	.21	.19	.18	.18	.18
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Mother's education	-.04**	-.03*	-.01	-.01	-.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Two bio parents at age 14	-.16*	-.16*	-.13	-.13	-.13
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Total Net Family Income	-.05*	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.04
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Work-Family Gender Ideology		-.05***	-.03*	-.04**	-.04**
		(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Accumulated years of education			-.07**	-.07**	-.07**
			(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Currently enrolled in school			-.49***	-.47***	-.47***
			(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Currently employed				.12	.11
				(.12)	(.12)
Currently cohabiting					.39*
					(.17)
Chi-Square Value	185.23	201.24	234.98	235.82	241.06
Degrees of Freedom	40	41	43	44	45
Number of Person-Years	22,445	22,445	22,445	22,445	22,445

Notes: All chi-square values are significant at .001. Models also include dummy variables representing each age from 14 to 41.

[a] Reference group is "Raised in Mainline Protestant tradition"

[b] Reference group is White

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Female Transition to First Marital Birth, Treating Premarital Birth as a Competing Risk: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Hazard of First Marital Birth				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raised Catholic[a]	-.03	-.03	.00	.00	.04
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Raised Conservative Protestant[a]	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.08
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Raised African American Protestant [a]	-.05	-.05	-.01	-.01	.04
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Raised other Protestant [a]	-.11	-.12	-.08	-.08	-.12
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Raised other religion [a]	-.18	-.19	-.16	-.16	-.06
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Raised no religion [a]	.17	.17	.20	.20	12
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Frequency of religious service attendance	.08***	.08***	.07***	.07***	.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Race/Ethnicity [b]					
Black	-.50***	-50***	-.47***	-.46***	-.49***
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Latino	-.21*	-.20*	-.17	-.16	-.18*
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Other	.02	.02	.04	.04	.04
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)
Mother's education	-.01	-.01	-.02*	-.02*	-.02*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Two bio parents at age 14	.00	.00	.02	.02	.02
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Total Net Family Income	00	.00	.00	-.01	.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Work-Family Gender Ideology		-.01	-.02*	-.02*	-.02**
		(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Accumulated years of education			.11***	.11***	.15***
			(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Currently enrolled in school			-.91***	-.89***	-.71***
			(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Currently employed				.21***	.30***
				(.07)	(.07)
Currently married					1.50***
					(.07)
Chi-Square Value	208.76	210.72	382.52	389.02	850.67
Degrees of Freedom	42	43	45	46	47
Number of Person-Years	43,166	43,166	43,166	43,166	43,166

Notes: All chi-square values are significant at .001. Models also include dummy variables representing each age from 14 to 43.

[a] Reference group is "Raised in Mainline Protestant tradition"

[b] Reference group is White

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table 5. Logistic Regression Analysis of Male Transition to First Marital Birth, Treating Premarital Birth as a Competing Risk: NLSY79 Data from 1979-2002 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Hazard of First Marital Birth				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raised Catholic[a]	-.14	-.15	-.13	-.13	-.12
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Raised Conservative Protestant[a]	.06	.05	.07	.08	.05
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Raised African American Protestant [a]	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.05
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Raised other Protestant [a]	-.14	-.14	-.13	-.13	-.18
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)
Raised other religion [a]	.11	.09	.10	.11	.13
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Raised no religion [a]	-.38*	-.39*	-.32*	-.32*	-.34*
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Frequency of religious service attendance	.07***	.07***	.07***	.07***	.07***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Race/Ethnicity [b]					
Black	-.26*	-25*	-.24*	-.23*	-.23***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Latino	.00	-.01	.01	.01	-.02
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Other	.00	-.01	.00	.00	.00
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Mother's education	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	-.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Two bio parents at age 14	.11	.11	.09	.08	.10
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Total Net Family Income	.00	.00	.00	.00	.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Work-Family Gender Ideology		-.02	-.02*	-.02**	-.03**
		(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Accumulated years of education			.08***	.08***	.11***
			(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Currently enrolled in school			-.78***	-.75***	-.67***
			(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Currently employed				.24*	.30**
				(.11)	(.11)
Currently married					1.34***
					(.07)
Chi-Square Value	233.39	236.93	332.79	335.45	689.58
Degrees of Freedom	42	43	45	46	47
Number of Person-Years	49,329	49,329	49,329	49,329	49,329

Notes: All chi-square values are significant at .001. Models also include dummy variables representing each age from 14 to 43.

[a] Reference group is "Raised in Mainline Protestant tradition"

[b] Reference group is White

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 two-tailed tests)

Figure 1. Theoretical Model for Work-Family Gender Ideologies Role in the Relationship between Religion and Fertility