

The Impact of Protestantism on Fertility Behaviors of Adolescents in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Sarah McKinnon¹

Joseph Potter¹

Virginia Garrard-Burnett²

¹ Population Research Center and Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin.

²The Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin

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Introduction

Although Brazil was once known as the world's largest Catholic country, estimates from the 2000 Census indicate that less than three-fourths of the population now consider themselves to be Catholic. (Alves and Novellino 2003) This finding, while not unexpected as rates had been steadily decreasing in recent years, denotes the next step of a profound religious transformation for the country. For much of the 20th Century, more than 90% of the Brazilian population was Catholic. However, this pattern had begun to change by 1980 when the percentage of Catholics in the country declined to 89%. Over the next two decades the proportion continued to fall and with 83% Catholic in 1991 and 74% in 2000. The decline in Catholicism first began in the southern and metropolitan areas of the country (Figure 1), spreading to the rest of the country over time. By 2000 very few regions had Catholic rates above 90% and, moreover, some regions had rates as low as 40-50%.

Although much of the decrease in Catholicism was the result of a loss of religious affiliation altogether, it has also been a result of an increase in other religions, specifically Protestant denominations. Findings from the Brazilian Census demonstrate that the percentage of followers of Protestantism increased from 5.2% in 1970 to 15.6% in 2000, a numerical increase of almost 22 million people. (Alves and Novellino 2003) Within Brazil there are two main Protestant affiliations, mainline and Pentecostal. Mainline Protestantism appeared first in Brazil in the late 19th century, with the arrival of foreign missionaries, primarily from the United States. The mainline Protestants are largely composed of Baptist denominations with sizeable proportions of Lutherans, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopalian denominations as well. (See Bellotti 2000; Ferreira, 1959). Although the mainline Protestant churches have a relatively long history in Brazil, such churches do not make up the bulk of the Protestant population of the country. (Oro

and Semán 2000) In contrast, Pentecostal Protestantism, a variety of Christianity which places emphasis on the miraculous “signs and wonders” and on the experiential “baptism in the Holy Spirit” in which the believer experiences ecstatic behavior (Cox 1995) is a relatively new social phenomenon in Brazil, but it is highly dynamic. The popularity of Pentecostal churches has increased substantially in recent years and by 2000 Pentecostals accounted for the more than three-fourths of all Protestants in Brazil (analysis of 2000 census data). The largest Pentecostal denominations are the Assembly of God, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURG), God is Love, and Quadrangular Gospel denominations. Although the Assembly of God (which is one of the most rapidly-expanding Pentecostal denominations in the world) and the Quadrangle Gospel Church were introduced to Brazil by foreign missionaries¹, the Pentecostal movement is largely made up many independent and often autonomous churches, many of which are of Brazilian, not foreign, origin. Among the most rapidly-growing Pentecostal churches are two Brazilian “mega-churches”, the IURG and the denomination God is Love.

Researchers examining Protestant religions in Brazil have found some fundamental differences between the different Protestant groups. Mainline Protestant churches place their primary emphasis on the “Word of God” through the reading of the Bible, leading to a valorization of “liberal” values such as literacy and education; Pentecostals, by contrast, emphasize the “experience of God” through the “baptism in the Holy Spirit.” (Noll 2002; Garrard-Burnett and Stoll 1993). Pentecostal churches have appealed mostly to women and people of low socioeconomic status while mainline Protestant churches typically attract a somewhat higher socio-economic sector and so do not generally present such a strong gender

¹ Although the Assembly of God has its origins in the United States, it was introduced in Brazil by two Swedish missionaries, who went to Belem, Pará, as Baptist missionaries in 1910, but were expelled by the denomination for speaking in tongues; they reorganized as the “Spirit-filled” Assembléia de Deus” in 1918.(Chesnut 1997, pp. 26-27)

disparity in their memberships, although this distinction is not absolute. (Oro and Semán 2000; Pierucci and Prando 2000; Brusco 1995; Machado and Mariz 1995) In the substantial body of literature that engages the question of why Latin Americans convert (Stoll 1990; Martin 1990), scholars have suggested that Protestantism offers converts both social and spiritual capital, including a benevolent form of voluntary organization for urban migrants (Lalivie d'Epinau 1969; Willems 1967; Roberts 1968); a mechanism for coping with poverty in a globalizing/globalized capitalist economy (Peterson, Vasquez and Williams 2001; Hopkins et al. 2001); and as a strategic decision to advance one's economic status through a Weberian elective affinity of Protestantism and capitalism. (See, for example, Mariz 1994). Other literature suggests that Protestantism may contribute to the empowerment of women through the "reformation of machismo," a Protestant discourse of clean-living and family values that helps to defuse family violence (Chesnut 1997; Brusco 1995). A recent current of literature argues that the conversion is a matter of rational choice in a "religious market place" in which religious consumers select "credence goods" that suit their tastes and desires. (Chesnut 2003; Finke and Starke 1992). Within virtually all of these theoretical currents lies a single common variable, which is the matter of health, which Brazilians, and indeed, most Latin Americans, strongly associate with Pentecostalism, as expressed in the Pentecostal doctrine of "sanación divina" (divine cure). This is an ideology of holy wellness in which converts believe promise good health and relief from alcoholism and drug addiction. (Chesnut 1997 and 2003; Garrard-Burnett, 2000).

Although it is difficult to summarize all the different churches that fall under the Pentecostal category, certain characteristics are common to most Pentecostal churches: all, by definition, place a heavy emphasis on the "gifts of the Spirit," manifest by supernatural healing, speaking in tongues, and other ecstatic expressions. (See Chesnut 2003; Rolim 1985). Pentecostal

churches, typically, are led by charismatic and paternalistic male pastors, who demand utmost loyalty and adherence to strict moral codes from the church's members. While Pentecostal churches usually have male pastors, women play a central role in congregations through their leadership in prayer and self-help groups, and for their involvement in church services, where they participate in pneumatic practices and through the offering of the salvation narratives (testimonios) that are central to Pentecostal worship.

In recent years, a variation of Pentecostal belief known as "health and wealth theology" has taken root in Brazil; this "theology" presupposes a causal relationship between faithfulness (often manifest through generous donations to the church) and material benefit to the believer. Although health and wealth theology also has originated in the United States, it has spread rapidly in Brazil, where the theology appeals not only to Pentecostalism's traditional lower-class constituency, but also to the economically aspiring middle sector and even to the traditionally Catholic upper class. (Rodrigues 2003) The Brazilian-origin IURG is strongly associated with this theology. (Corte, Dozon and Oro 2003) In short, Pentecostal phenomenon has moved from being seen as a fringe movement without major consequences to being one of the larger "unknowns" shaping the social and political landscape.

At the same time the religious composition of the country changed dramatically, Brazil also underwent a remarkable transition in fertility. Between 1960 and 2000, the Total Fertility Rate in Brazil declined from an average of 6.3 children per woman to a near replacement level of 2.4 (IBGE, 2005). Much like the decline in Catholicism, these changes began in more southern and metropolitan areas and spread to the northern and less populous areas with the passage of time. (Figure 2) In addition, researchers have found that the fertility transition tended to follow

other measures of development such as the spread of education and electricity. (Potter, Schmertmann, and Cavenaghi 2002)

However, data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) indicate that adolescent fertility has not experienced a similar decline. Between 1986 and 1996, age-specific fertility rates for those between the ages of 15 and 19 increased from 74.2 to 86.3 per 1,000. Both adolescent sexual activity and contraception use also increased during this time period. Whereas in 1986 80.2% of women 15-19 years of age reporting never having had sex in 1986, the rate dropped to only 67.2% in 1996. (DHS, 2005) Likewise contraception use almost doubled in the 10 year period from 7.7% to 14.7%. In 1996, the most commonly reported methods were birth control pills (8.8%), condoms (3.3%), traditional methods (1.4%), and withdrawal (1.2%).

The rise in adolescent fertility in Brazil has sparked many debates within the political and demographic arenas of the country. Not only does much speculation occur regarding the causes of the rise but also as to what should be the appropriate responses. Some, particularly in the press, see teenage fertility as a serious social problem that the government has long ignored, and that is leading to the perpetuation of poverty, criminality, etc. Others, particularly feminists and academics, take issue with what appears to be a neomalthusian concern, and point out that since fertility is falling rapidly, Brazil has no need to control its population growth, and should focus on eliminating the socioeconomic differences that lead to the higher fertility of disadvantaged youth. The relatively few studies conducted in Brazil have found evidence that adolescents at highest risk for pregnancy and/or childbearing tend to be those of lower socioeconomic status, especially in regards to educational attainment. (Simões et al 2003; Gupta and da Costa Leite 1999) In addition, adolescent mothers also tend to demonstrate a lower use of pre-natal services and higher rates of premature births, low-birth weight, and infant mortality (predominately

among those below the age of 18). There is also a general awareness that norms regarding adolescent sexuality are changing rapidly, with a shift from a “patriarchal” regime to a more liberal one, while the structural situation of adolescents is also shifting due the increased number of years they are spending in school, and their increasing access to contraception.

In this paper we explore the religious differentials in adolescent fertility in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Our purpose is to determine if the rise in Protestant religions will affect the adolescent fertility situation in Brazil and, if so, in which direction. We selected Rio de Janeiro as our study area not only because it has proportionally fewer Catholics than most other areas in Brazil but also because it has proportionately more Protestants. Likewise, the popularity of Pentecostal-based religions has been particularly strong among the inhabitants of the city and surrounding area. (Figure 3) Additionally, it can be argued that the rise of Protestantism in Rio de Janeiro may impact many other areas of the country as well. Rio de Janeiro is home to Organizações Globo, a large Brazilian media corporation that owns multiple newspapers, magazines, and radio stations as well as one of the country’s most popular television stations (Decol, 1999). Consequently, images and news about the culture and lifestyle of the city are routinely broadcast to the rest of the country.

Protestantism and adolescent fertility

Little is known regarding the effect of rising Protestantism on any aspect of Brazilian fertility, and we know of no hypotheses specifically pertaining to adolescent fertility. In fact, most studies examining the increase in Protestantism tend to be primarily descriptive in focus, presenting trends and patterns of religious composition over time and within particular social groups (Alves and Novellino, 2003; Decol, 1999; Barro, 1998). As in other contexts, one might expect strict fundamentalist churches to attempt to restrict the sexual activity of unmarried

teenage members, thus possibly lowering their exposure to pregnancy. On other hand, these churches might take a strong stance against the use of abortion (illegal in Brazil), and even the use of contraception, thus increasing the likelihood of having a child. In addition to these proximate influences, protestant and pentecostal churches may impose sanctions on members who become pregnant, and give birth as single mothers. They might also instill in their members a heightened motivation to remain in school, and undermine at least some aspects of machismo culture. For instance, Hill et al (2004) found that Evangelical Protestant men were less likely to engage in extramarital sex than both practicing and non-practicing Catholics, non-religious, and people belonging to other religions. In addition, for men who did engage in extramarital sex, Evangelical protestants were the most likely to use a condom.

In the future, we hope that researchers will carry out in depth examinations of the position of the churches on sexuality, abortion, contraception and unwed childbearing, as well as on the different ways in which they exert influence on their members. However, in the absence of a well specified model of how religion affects adolescent fertility in Brazil, or the detailed kind of data which would be needed to test it, our goal in this paper is a modest one. What we hope to provide is a comparison between the different religious groups in terms of adolescent fertility and related behaviors. We will attempt to answer the following questions: 1) Is there a religious differential in the probability of adolescent fertility? 2) Is there a religious differential in the probability of marriage among women who have engaged in adolescent childbearing? By answering these research questions we will provide the first step in realizing the role that decreasing Catholicism and increasing Protestantism may have on the adolescent fertility situation in Brazil.

Data

The data for this study came from the 2000 Brazilian Census for the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. For our purposes we use information from a 10% sample of households who were selected to complete a long-form questionnaire containing detailed individual and household data. The 2000 Census also includes geographical information so that we are able to examine community-level characteristics. We elected to aggregate data to the smallest possible geographical unit of analysis, *áreas de ponderação* or APs. Although for most of Brazil APs are made up of entire municipalities, in larger cities they consist of much smaller areas, a minimum of 400 household. Thus, the advantage of using APs is a more detailed understanding of the specific community in which people reside. For community-level variables we use the 580 APs located within the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. In constructing community- and household-level variables we use the entire 10% sample of Rio de Janeiro ($n = 1,511,640$) but for individual-level analyses our sample is restricted to female adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19 ($n = 69,579$).

Measures

There are two main dependent variables in this study. The first, adolescent fertility, is defined as one or more live births among females between the ages of 15 and 19. The second dependent variable examines marital status (married, cohabiting, or single) among females between the ages of 15 and 19 with a live birth in the previous year. For descriptive statistics, religious affiliation is categorized into the following broad groups: 1) Catholic; 2) Evangelical Protestant; 3) Pentecostal Protestant; 4) other religions; and 5) no religion. In an attempt to differentiate the effect of specific denominations or churches we further distinguish these categories in our regression analyses. We do so by creating separate categories for Baptists, the

Assembly of God Church, the Universal Kingdom of God Church, and Spiritualists. Table 1 provides the specific breakdown of our religious groups for adolescent females between the ages of 15 and 19.

Other independent variables included in our analyses are migrant status, years of education, race, and age. In addition, we also create several community-level variables to control for the impact of the neighborhood context. We control for the overall religious effect by constructing variables that measure the proportion of both Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants in the AP. In addition, we also use a method created by ABIPEME (2001) to determine the average socioeconomic status of the respondents in the community. Briefly, this method uses the education of the head of household and the number of amenities within the household (e.g. number of televisions, cars, bathrooms) to calculate an index of socioeconomic status. We adapted this measure to fit the particular variables in the 2000 Census and found the mean level for each AP.

Methods

Analyses are conducted using STATA statistical software while maps of religious concentration and adolescent fertility are created with ArcGIS. Descriptive statistics (including chi-square tests) by religious group for individual- and AP-level variables are presented in Table 1. Religious differentials in adolescent fertility are examined using logistic regression models while differentials in marital status among women who had previously experienced adolescent fertility are examined using ordinal logit models. All models first control for only religious affiliation and age. The next models include individual-level controls and the final models include both individual- and community-level controls. For each regression analysis, odds ratios are presented for three separate models.

Results

Descriptive results

According to the maps presented in Figures 4-8, there appears to be a great amount of variation in the concentration and location of religious groups. Catholics have the highest proportion of members ranging from 0.30 to 0.76. Both Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants have much lower concentrations (.01 to .18 and .02 to .33, respectively). In addition, Catholics tend to be more concentrated in the southern, coastal, and central areas of the city whereas both Protestant groups are located more in the northern outskirts of the city, especially Pentecostal Protestants. In contrast, other religious groups, while also small in number, are geographically more similar to the Catholics with highest concentrations in the southern and coastal areas. Finally, the non-religious are, once again, more likely to be in the northern parts of the metropolitan region.

According to Figure 9, adolescent fertility also varies quite a bit throughout the metropolitan area. Proportions of females aged 15 to 19 with at least one live birth range from none to slightly less than one-third. In addition, the concentration of adolescent fertility appears to follow a pattern similar to that seen with the religious composition. Adolescent fertility is lowest in the southern, coastal areas and highest in the northern and outer areas of the metropolitan area.

Table 2 indicates considerable variation in descriptive statistics among the different religious groups. Measures of adolescent fertility (ever having had a live birth and a live birth in the previous year) are highest among individuals with no religious affiliation. Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics have fairly similar rates on both measures with lowest rates demonstrated by Evangelical Protestants and members of all other religions. Currently married

or cohabiting is also highest among the non-religious but currently married or cohabiting for those with a live birth in the previous year is actually higher for Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestants. Individuals with no religious affiliation and Pentecostal Protestants have the highest proportion of both migrants and non-whites. Adolescents affiliated with other religions and Evangelical Protestantism report the highest educational levels followed by Catholics. The AP-level characteristics do not appear to vary greatly with most people residing in communities with less than 10% Evangelical Protestants and about 15% Pentecostal Protestants. Likewise, the average socioeconomic status does not vary greatly by religion with the possible exception of other religions.

Adolescent fertility

The logistic regression analyses presented in Table 3 provide evidence of religious differentials in adolescent fertility, especially for Protestants. As seen in Model 1, controlling for age alone results in significantly lower odds of adolescent fertility among all religious groups with the exception of the non-religious and members of the Assembly of God Church. Once we include individual-level variables (migrant status, race, education and age), the odds of adolescent fertility remain significantly lower for Baptists, other Evangelical Protestants, and other Pentecostal Protestants. In addition, members of the Assembly of God Church also now demonstrate lower odds. However, several other religions no longer demonstrate a difference when compared to Catholics (Universal Kingdom of God Church, Spiritualists, and other Religions). The inclusion of community-level variables has relatively no impact on the significance or direction of the odds ratio and relatively little impact on the magnitude.

The logistic regression models also highlight some other important variables impacting fertility among adolescents. Individual risk factors for adolescent fertility appear to be migrant status, black or brown race, and older ages. Educational levels above 5 years act as a protect factor as well as communities with higher levels of socioeconomic status. The proportion of Evangelical Protestants in the AP does not significantly influence adolescent fertility whereas the proportion of Pentecostal Protestants appears to have a substantially large impact (OR = 3.23).

Marital status among adolescent females with a live birth in the previous year

Table 4 examines the odds of being married or cohabiting compared to being single among females between the ages of 15 and 19 who reported a live birth in the previous year. According to each of the models, all Protestant religious groups except for members of the Universal Kingdom of God have a greater likelihood of being married or cohabiting when

compared to Catholics. In addition, there are no statistically significant differences among any of the other religious groups. These results remain remarkably constant with the inclusion of both individual- and community-level variables. Migrants, older adolescents, and whites are more likely to be married or cohabit but education has little impact. As far as community-level variables, residing in areas in which people are of higher socioeconomic status results in a lower odds of being married or cohabiting while residing in areas with higher proportions of Evangelical Protestants greatly increases the odds.

Discussion

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential impact of the rise of Protestantism and subsequent decline in Catholicism on fertility behaviors among adolescents in Brazil. To accomplish this goal we evaluate religious differentials in the odds of having had a live birth among adolescents as well as the odds of being married or cohabiting among adolescents who had a live birth in the previous year. For both of these analyses our results strongly suggest that, indeed, the changing religious composition of the country may have a profound impact on adolescent fertility, in a very positive direction. The odds of adolescent fertility were reduced by at least 25% for almost every Protestant group. The addition of controls such as education, race, and community-level socioeconomic status did very little to alter the protective effect of the Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestant religions. In addition, among those who had a live birth in the year prior to the Census, Protestants were the only religious group to differ substantially from Catholics in regards to marital status. Again, controls had little impact and almost every Protestant group reported a much greater likelihood of being married or cohabiting.

The findings of our study have some very important implications. It is clear that the religious transformation occurring throughout Brazil can, and probably will, have a large impact

on much of the society. Consistent with Hill et al's (2004) conclusions, we find that one's religious affiliation can have a profound effect on one's ultimate life course. In addition, as many Protestant religions (specifically Pentecostal Protestantism) appeal largely to those of lower socioeconomic status (Oro and Semán 2000; Pierucci and Prando 2000), the changing religious structure throughout Brazil may have a profound impact on the society overall. Not only may adolescent fertility decrease but the increase in Protestantism may also impact other important areas as well. Based upon the findings of this study, it is clear that subsequent research should continue to focus on the role of religion within not only Brazilian society but also other countries undergoing similar transformations.

Finally, it is important to note some limitations of our study. The primary limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the data. Although we have attempted to determine the possible impact of religion on adolescent fertility, with cross-sectional data it is not possible to conclusively establish true cause and effect. Instead we are only able to provide comparisons of adolescent fertility between the religions at the time of the Census. Likewise, the Census does not ask any retrospective questions regarding religion, thus, further limiting our conclusions. As adolescent fertility is often considered to be a moral issue and moral issues are often the domain of religion it is possible that adolescent fertility may affect religious affiliation as much as religious affiliation affects adolescent fertility. Unfortunately, with this data, it is not possible to explore changes in the respondent's religious affiliation over time and, thus, such occurrences may be obscured. Finally, as our study was limited to only adolescents residing in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro it may not be possible to generalize our findings to other areas of Brazil. Although, as stated previously, Rio is an important and influential city, it is also a unique city with its own unique history. Specifically, the decline in Catholicism and the rise in Protestantism

have been much more profound than in other areas of the country. Although this provides us with an ideal study environment for our research, it may also be a limitation as well. If there is something unique to Rio de Janeiro that not only encourages religious change but also enhances the impact of such change then it is possible that the effect felt in this area may not be felt in other areas of the country. Therefore, without further research in other regions, one should be cautious in extrapolating these findings to the nation as a whole.

Figure 1. Percent Catholic by Year: Brazil






Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate by Year: Brazil



**Figure 3: Religious Composition of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:
2000 Census**



**Figure 4. Proportion of Catholics by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**




Figure 5. Proportion of Evangelical Protestants by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil



Figure 6. Proportion of Pentecostal Protestants by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil



Figure 7. Proportion of Other Religions by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil




Figure 8. Proportion of No Religious by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil





Figure 9. Adolescent Fertility by AP:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil



**Table 1. Religious Affiliation of Adolescent Females Aged 15-19
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 2000 Census**

Religions	n	%
No Religion	6,791	16.82
Catholics		
Roman Catholic Apostolic		
Roman Catholic Apostolic	22,157	54.89
Catholic Charismatic, Catholic Pentecostal	12	0.03
Catholic Armenian, Catholic Ukrainian		
Brazilian Catholic Apostolic		
Brazilian Catholic Apostolic	178	0.44
Orthodox Catholic		
Orthodox Catholic	15	0.04
Christian Orthodox		
Christian Orthodox	3	0.01
Others		
Other Catholic		
Other Catholic	1	0
Evangelical Protestant		
Evangelical Protestant of the Lutheran Persuasion		
Lutheran Churches	12	0.03
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Of The Presbyterian Persuasion		
Evangelical Presbyterian Church	229	0.57
Independent Presbyterian Church	2	0
Presbyterian Church of Brazil	13	0.03
United Presbyterian Church		
Fundamentalist Presbyterian		
Renewed Presbyterian	6	0.01
Others	7	0.02
Protestant Evangelical of the Methodist Persuasion		
Evangelical Methodist Church	274	0.68
Wesleyan Evangelical Methodist	140	0.35
Orthodox Evangelical Methodist	21	0.05
Others	11	0.03
Evangelical Protestant Of The Baptist Persuasion		
Evangelical Baptist Church	2,005	4.97
Brazilian Baptist Convention		
National Baptist Convention	4	0.01
Pentecostal Baptist	15	0.04
Biblical Baptist		

Renewed Baptist	34	0.08
Others	22	0.05
Evangelical Protestant Of The Congregational Persuasion		
Evangelical Congregational Church	145	0.36
Independent Congregational Church	5	0.01
Others	12	0.03
Evangelical Protestant Of The Adventist Persuasion		
Evangelical Seventh-Day Adventist Church	207	0.51
Reform Movement of the Evangelical Adventist Church	1	0
Evangelical Adventist Church of the Promise	4	0.01
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Of The Anglican Episcopalian Persuasion		
Evangelical Anglican Episcopal Church	4	0.01
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Of The Mennonite Persuasion		
Evangelical Mennonite Church	5	0.01
Others		
Salvation Army		
Salvation Army	4	0.01
Pentecostal Protestant		
Evangelical Protestant Assembly Of God Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical Assembly of God Church	2,963	7.34
Madureira Assembly of God Church		
All Saints Assembly of God Church	4	0.01
Others	14	0.03
Evangelical Protestant Congregational Christian Of Brazil Of Pentecostal Origin		
Congregational Christian Church of Brazil	153	0.38
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Brazil For Christ Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical Pentecostal Brazil for Christ Church	34	0.08
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Foursquare Gospel Church Of Pentecostal Origin		
Foursquare Gospel Church	131	0.32
Others	1	0
Evangelical Protestant Universal Of The Kingdom Of God Of Pentecostal Origin		
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God	1,091	2.7
Others		
Evangelical Protestant House Of The Blessing Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical House of the Blessing Church	69	0.17
Others	1	0
Evangelical Protestant House Of Prayer Of Pentecostal Origin		

Evangelical House of Prayer Church	27	0.07
Others	2	0
Evangelical Protestant God Is Love Of Origin Pentecostal		
Evangelical Pentecostal God Is Love Church	126	0.31
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Maranata Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical Pentecostal Maranata Church	159	0.39
Others		
Renewed Evangelical Protestant Without Institutional Ties		
Renewed, Restored and Reformed Evangelical Without Institutional Ties	11	0.03
Renewed, Restored and Reformed Pentecostal Without Institutional Ties	1	0
Others	2	0
Pentecostal Evangelical Protestant Without Institutional Ties		
Pentecostal Evangelical Without Institutional Ties	107	0.27
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Christian Community Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical Christian Community Church	8	0.02
Others	2	0
New Life Evangelical Protestant Of Pentecostal Origin		
New Life Church of Pentecostal Origin	250	0.62
Others	1	0
Evangelical Protestant Community Of Pentecostal Origin		
Evangelical Community Church	41	0.1
Others	35	0.09
Other Evangelical Protestant Churches Of Pentecostal Origin		
Other Evangelical Pentecostal Churches	491	1.22
Evangelical Protestant Biblical Revival Of Pentecostal Origin		
Pentecostal Biblical Revival Church		
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Chain Of Prayer Of Origin Pentecostal		
Evangelical Chain of Prayer Church		
Others		
Evangelical Protestant Church Of The Nazarene Of Pentecostal Origin		
Church of the Nazarene	34	0.08
Others		
Undetermined Evangelical Protestant		
Undetermined Evangelical	11	0.03
Evangelical Without Institutional Ties	282	0.7
Multiple Declaration of Evangelical Protestant Religion	4	0.01
Others Evangelical Protestant	149	0.37

Other Religions**Church Of Jesus Christ Of The Latter Day Saints**

Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints 34 0.08

Others

Evangelical Protestant Jehovah's Witnesses

Jehovah's Witnesses 344 0.85

Others

LBV/Religion Of God

Legion of Good Will/Religion of God 1 0

Spiritualist [Espiritualista]

Spiritualist [Espiritualista] 7 0.02

Others

Spiritualist [Espírita]

Spiritualist, Kardecist 690 1.71

Others 5 0.01

Umbanda

Umbanda 223 0.55

Others 1 0

Candomblé

Candomblé 105 0.26

Others 1 0

Other Declarations Of Afro-Brazilian Religiosity

Afro-Brazilian Religiosities

Multiple Declaration of Afro Religiosity with Other Religiosities 1 0

Others 3 0.01

Judaism

Judaism 32 0.08

Others

Hinduism

Hinduism

Yoga

Others

Buddhism

Buddhism 76 0.19

Nitiren 1 0

Theravada Buddhism

Zen Buddhism

Tibetan Buddhism

Soka Gakkai

Others

New Oriental Religions

Messianic Worldwide Church 60 0.15

Seicho No-Ie 3 0.01

Perfect Liberty 2 0

Hare Krishna 2 0

Oshoo Disciples

Tenrykyo		
Mahicari		
Other Oriental Religions		
Oriental Religions		
Bahai		
Shintoism	1	0
Taoism	1	0
Others		
Islamism		
Islamism	1	0
Others		
Esoteric Traditions		
Esoteric	13	0.03
Christian Rationalism	5	0.01
Others		
Brazilian Indigenous Traditions		
Indigenous Brazilian Traditions		
Santo Daime		
União do Vegetal	1	0
A Barquinha		
Neoshamanic		
Others		
Christian Religiosity Without Institutional Ties		
Christian Religiosity without Institutional Ties	71	0.18
Undetermined		
Undetermined/Poorly Defined Religiosity	139	0.34
Multiple Declaration of Catholic Religiosity/Other Religiosities		
Multiple Declaration of Evangelical Protestant Religiosity/Other Religiosities		
Multiple Declaration of Catholic/Spiritualist [Espírita] Religiosity		
Multiple Declaration of Catholic/Umbanda Religiosity		
Multiple Declaration of Catholic/Candomblé Religiosity		
Multiple Declaration of Catholic/Kardecist Religiosity		
Undeclared		

Table 2. Individual, Household and AP-Level Characteristics of Female Adolescents¹ by Select Religions: 2000 Brazilian Census

	Catholic (n = 22,348)	Evangelical Protestant (n = 3,181)	Pentecostal Protestant (n = 6,179)	Other Religions (n = 1,868)	No Religion (n = 6,791)	χ^2
Ever had a live birth	% 7.01	% 4.56	% 6.88	4.63	14.36	506.9***
Live birth in previous year	3.98	2.60	4.18	2.61	7.63	219.2***
Currently married/cohabiting	6.54	5.68	8.72	4.27	14.06	458.5***
Among those with a live birth in previous year	52.07	69.66	67.84	44.54	57.54	27.3***
Migrant ²	17.43	17.38	19.36	17.77	19.36	18.5**
Race/Color						704.6***
White	56.44	57.06	43.40	58.65	42.29	
Black	9.26	8.30	12.82	9.83	13.43	
Brown	33.83	34.11	43.44	30.72	43.79	
Other	0.47	0.53	0.34	0.80	0.49	
Education						1600***
0-3 years	6.60	4.91	8.54	3.66	11.41	
4 years	5.41	3.93	7.22	3.55	9.94	
5 years	8.07	5.78	10.79	4.67	13.44	
6 years	10.21	9.44	13.60	7.80	14.35	
7 years	15.32	15.59	17.93	14.13	16.85	
8 years	23.19	25.64	20.89	27.81	16.67	
9 or more years	31.20	34.71	21.04	38.38	17.33	
Age	Mean (SD) 16.02 (0.8)	Mean (SD) 16.04 (0.8)	Mean (SD) 16.02 (0.8)	Mean (SD) 16.04 (0.8)	Mean (SD) 16.05 (0.8)	F 1.6
Proportion Evangelical Protestants in AP	0.07 (0.03)	0.09 (0.04)	0.08 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)	259.2***
Proportion Pentecostal Protestants in AP	0.14 (0.06)	0.16 (0.06)	0.18 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)	0.17 (0.06)	636.4***
SES in AP	11.8 (2.13)	11.2 (1.78)	11.1 (1.58)	12.3 (2.17)	11.1 (1.79)	321.3***

¹Ages 15-19

²Respondent was born in another municipality

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .0001

**Table 3. Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression Models Predicting Adolescent Fertility¹:
2000 Brazilian Census, Rio de Janeiro.**

Individual Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Religion (vs. Catholic)			
Other Evangelical Protestant	0.61**	0.69*	0.68*
Baptists	0.63***	0.71**	0.68**
Other Pentecostal Protestant	0.74**	0.67***	0.65***
Assembly of God Church	1.01	0.75**	0.70***
Universal Kingdom of God Church	1.41**	1.12	1.09
Spiritualists	0.51**	0.84	0.91
Other Religions	0.70*	0.77	0.76
No Religion	2.23***	1.64***	1.58***
Migrant ²		1.20***	1.18***
Race/Color (vs. White)			
Black		1.28***	1.26**
Brown		1.17***	1.14**
Other		1.27	1.29
Education (vs. 0-3)			
4 years		1.09	1.08
5 years		1.08	1.08
6 years		0.66***	0.66***
7 years		0.52***	0.53***
8 years		0.33***	0.35***
9 or more years		0.13***	0.15***
Age	2.07***	2.52***	2.51***
AP-Level Variables			
Proportion Evangelical Protestants			0.39
Proportion Pentecostal Protestants			3.22*
SES in AP			0.95**

¹Ages 15-19

*p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

²Respondent was born in another municipality

Table 4. Odds Ratios for Ordinal Logit Regression Models Predicting Marital Status among Adolescent¹ Females with a Live Birth in the Previous Year: 2000 Brazilian Census, Rio de Janeiro.

Individual Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Religion (vs. Catholic)			
Other Evangelical Protestant	3.80*	3.75*	3.17**
Baptists	1.81*	2.01**	1.92*
Other Pentecostal Protestant	2.83**	3.01***	2.43**
Assembly of God Church	2.84***	3.08***	3.11***
Universal Kingdom of God Church	1.29	1.34	1.26
Spiritualists	0.65	0.73	0.98
Other Religions	0.79	0.77	0.69
No Religion	1.16	1.20	1.15
Migrant ²		1.39**	1.27*
Race/Color (vs. White)			
Black		0.57***	0.52***
Brown		0.69**	0.65***
Other		1.37	1.30
Education (vs. 0-3)			
4 years		1.44*	1.33
5 years		1.16	1.12
6 years		1.30	1.31
7 years		1.03	1.03
8 years		1.35	1.30
9 or more years		0.73	0.74
Age	1.36***	1.39***	1.41***
Community-Level Variables			
Proportion Evangelical Protestants			23.79*
Proportion Pentecostal Protestants			0.33
SES in AP			0.84***

¹Ages 15-19

*p<.05

**p<.01

***p<.001

²Respondent was born in another municipality

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